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Abstract
In the Internet-age, the geographical boundaries that have previously impinged upon inter-
organisational collaborations have become decreasingly important. Of more importance for
such collaborations is the notion and subsequent nature of security and trust - this is espe-
cially so in open collaborative environments like the Grid where resources can be both made
available, subsequently accessed and used by remote users from a multitude of institutions
with a variety of different privileges spanning across the collaboration. In this context, the
ability to dynamically negotiate and subsequently enforce security policies driven by various
levels of inter-organisational trust is essential.
Numerous access control solutions exist today to address aspects of inter-organisational secu-
rity. These include the use of centralised access control lists where all collaborating partners
negotiate and agree on privileges required to access shared resources. Other solutions involve
delegating aspects of access right management to trusted remote individuals in assigning
privileges to their (remote) users. These solutions typically entail negotiations and delega-
tions which are constrained by organisations, people and the static rules they impose. Such
constraints often result in a lack of flexibility in what has been agreed; difficulties in reaching
agreement, or once established, in subsequently maintaining these agreements. Furthermore,
these solutions often reduce the autonomous capacity of collaborating organisations because
of the need to satisfy collaborating partners demands. This can result in increased security
risks or reducing the granularity of security policies.
Underpinning this is the issue of trust. Specifically trust realisation between organisations,
between individuals, and/or between entities or systems that are present in multi-domain
authorities. Trust negotiation is one approach that allows and supports trust realisation.
The thesis introduces a novel model called dynamic trust negotiation (DTN) that supports
n-tier negotiation hops for trust realisation in multi-domain collaborative environments with
specific focus on e-Health environments. DTN describes how trust pathways can be discovered
and subsequently how remote security credentials can be mapped to local security credentials
through trust contracts, thereby bridging the gap that makes decentralised security policies
i
difficult to define and enforce. Furthermore, DTN shows how n-tier negotiation hops can
limit the disclosure of access control policies and how semantic issues that exist with security
attributes in decentralised environments can be reduced. The thesis presents the results from
the application of DTN to various clinical trials and the implementation of DTN to Virtual
Organisation for Trials of Epidemiological Studies (VOTES). The thesis concludes that DTN
can address the issue of realising and establishing trust between systems or agents within the
e-Health domain, such as the clinical trials domain.
ii
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1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the context, challenges, research motivation and contribution of this
thesis. It concludes with a thesis statement and summarises the overall thesis outline.
1.1 Research Motivation
Access control in decentralised collaborative systems presents huge challenges when many
autonomous entities such as organisations, humans, software agents from different security
domains seek to dynamically access and share resources in a secure and controlled way. It is
largely understood how to control access to resources within a given domain, however consid-
erable challenges remain with regards to decentralised access control between collaborating
autonomous remote entities as typified through Grid based collaborative research. The ideal
solution would be a scalable distributed security approach where trust is easily discovered
and realised and used to securely extend site autonomy to support collaborative work in a
dynamic manner.
Currently there are numerous ways of controlling access to remote resources. Solutions based
on a global schema for federation administration [1] or centralised policies have been used
to provide access control to remote resources. Nowadays, however, access control across
boundaries is an increasingly complex activity when collaborating partners are autonomous
as regards to what is shared, how it is shared, how it is described or structured and who
can access it [2]. This problem is further exacerbated when dynamic sets of heterogeneous
resources are to be federated. The problem essentially is how to relate and exchange security
attributes and other essential security information to support the federation from one organi-
sation to the other without weakening any given site’s security policies or infrastructure more
generally [3]. Another way this problem has been explored is through semantic heterogeneity
[4] of security credentials where the focus is on a credential’s context realisation and how
credentials relate with one another across boundaries [5, 6].
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Often organisations are aware that certain resources exist in other organisations but usually
will have to negotiate to obtain the required access rights or privileges with those target
organisations to access their resources. In some cases, a target organisation publishes those
resources they are willing to share with other organisations on a per collaboration basis. In
other words an organisation or a user in an organisation will know that certain resources
exist and yet lack appropriate credentials to access them. When this happens, the requesting
organisation will initiate a negotiation process with the target organisation for privileges
typically given as security attributes for resource sharing. These agreements are often difficult
to reach because of different organisational security requirements and models. The agreement
challenge is exacerbated when the number of organisations, users and resources involved in the
agreement stage is large and dynamic. A fundamental cause of this is the lack of co-ordination
and acceptance of agreements by the wider communities. A common approach for inter-site
security policies is pre-exchange of security credentials between organisations. Among the
disadvantages of this method are (a) credential revocation (b) credential re-distribution and
(c) credential duplication/redundancy, which arise when a credential is revoked and/or re-
distributed when security policies become invalid, extended or changed [7, 8]. Credentials
may also become redundant or duplicated as new credentials are distributed.
The e-Health domain is no exception to this, and needs ways in which clinical researchers,
health providers and associated IT staff can successfully and seamlessly share health informa-
tion if they are to improve or make available quality healthcare services. One major area that
aims to improve healthcare services is research into, and support of, epidemiological studies
and clinical trials. Conducting such studies demands that detailed collaborative agreements
between various healthcare providers, partners and researchers are in place. Usually, these
collaborative agreements are given as specific agreements (protocols) governing who is in-
volved, where and how collaboration is to be achieved, and importantly how the data col-
lected can be used [9]. These collaborations require data to be shared between parties and
across boundaries; hence the need to control access to shared resources.
In most cases, when an organisation advertises the availability of some of their resources (for
resource discovery), they already have local access control policies in place that protect them
from unauthorised use. For example, an NHS hospital might be willing to make available
some statistical data to any organisation within the health services or health-research institu-
tions. However, proving your identity (authentication) as a researcher from a health-research
institution is not sufficient to guarantee access without proper privileges (authorisation) re-
quired for local security policies that may exist at a given hospital. In the health domain
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there is an urgent need to share and collaborate, e.g. to identify potential clinical trial par-
ticipants, seek consent to access patient information, recruit participants, collect data from
on-going trials and manage on-going studies. All these will require access to electronic health
information such as patient demographics, patient medical history, lab/test results, current
treatment notes, past and current prescriptions. However, the lack of access to this geo-
graphically and autonomously distributed information may delay a trial or affect the success
of a trial. Thus, the research undertaken are reported in this thesis has been conducted to
address these issues.
1.2 Research Contribution
This thesis introduces a novel model called Dynamic Trust Negotiation (DTN) to address the
heterogeneous and autonomous federation of credentials and policies. The model describes
how trusted intermediary parties can provide multiple negotiation and delegation hops to
help establish trust between strangers or non-collaborating institutions. The model prevents
the disclosure of credentials and access policies, and reduces credential semantic issues that
exist in decentralised systems [10, 11], such as the Grid.
In the context of access control, this thesis defines trust as the possession of authentic and
valid credentials necessary for access control at an end point - typically a target with access
control policies defined by the target resource providers. A credential is either valid and
authentic or only authentic. An authentic credential implies a verifiable and un-tampered
credential, while a valid credential implies a semantically correct credential that is acceptable,
useable and tenable to an end point, e.g. a data service. Trust negotiation aims at delivering
valid credentials that are authentic, and able to satisfy an access policy.
Dynamic trust negotiation (DTN) itself is the process of realising trust between strangers
or two non-trusting entities, e.g. institutions, through trusted intermediary entities. Trust
is realised when an entity delegates its digital credentials to trusted intermediary entities
through which it can subsequently interact with previously non-trusting entities. These
intermediary entities can in turn delegate to other intermediary entities resulting in n-tier
delegation hops. Any entity can serve as a negotiator for other entities provided it is trusted
by the two non-trusting entities or by their intermediaries.
DTN explores how credentials can be negotiated as the basis to support collaborative research
between autonomous, distributed resources. It addresses the heterogeneity and autonomy of
trust management credentials and policies in multi-domain environments. DTN negotiates
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credentials between trusted parties also known as a circle of trust (COT), who act as me-
diators on behalf of strangers and thus bridge trust gaps. This bridge also reduces the risk
associated with disclosing policies to strangers.
DTN is based on a peer-to-peer model where organisations in a federation establish trust and
negotiate security attributes both statically and dynamically with neighbouring organisations
forming what is known as peer trust. Peer trust is a peer-to-peer trust model that exists
between peers based on reputation, past experience or mutual agreements. This peer-to-peer
trust model supports the establishment and subsequent interactions between trusted and
non-trusted organisations, and serve as the basis for dynamic negotiations. In doing so it
achieves the following objectives:
• it provides an alternative to the global attributes ontology approach that defines what
attributes or credentials are, what they are used for, and where they are used;
• it supports inter-domain authorisation issues;
• it supports access to resources across organisational boundaries;
• it stays compatible with existing privilege management infrastructures;
• it enables the negotiation of security credentials through delegation of roles;
• and it dynamically supports the discovery and establishment of chains of trust.
This thesis’s contribution to knowledge is in the area of discovering and realising trust in an
open and decentralised environment such as the e-Health environment. The originality of
the work includes:
• the design and development of Dynamic Trust Negotiation (DTN);
• the application of routing algorithms for trust discovery;
• the application of trust contracts for trust negotiation;
• and the application of trust contracts and negotiation hops to trust realisation.
1.3 Supporting Publications
The following publications have so far been made as a result of this research and other related
work:
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• O. Ajayi, R. Sinnott, and A. Stell. Towards Decentralised Security Policies for e-Health
Collaborations. In Proceedings of 2nd International Conference on Emerging Security
Information, Systems and Technologies, (SECURWARE), Cap Esterel, France. IEEE
Computer Society, Aug. 2008.
• O. Ajayi, R. Sinnott, and A. Stell. Blind Data Aggregation from Distributed, Protected
Sources: The Future Model for Security-oriented Collaborations. Workshop of the UK
E-Science All Hands Meeting, Edinburgh, UK, 2008.
• O. Ajayi, R. Sinnott, and A. Stell. Dynamic Trust Negotiation for Flexible e-Health
Collaborations. In Proceedings of 15th Mardi Gras Conference, Baton Rouge, USA.
ACM Digital Library, Feb. 2008.
• O. Ajayi, R. Sinnott, and A. Stell. Trust Realisation in Multi-domain Collaborative
Environments. In Proceedings of 6th IEEE International Conference on Computer and
Information Science, ICIS07. IEEE Computer Society, July 2007.
• O. Ajayi, R. Sinnott, and A. Stell. Formalising Dynamic Trust Negotiations in De-
centralised Collaborative e-Health Systems. In Proceedings of the 2nd International
Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, (ARES07), Vienna, Austria. IEEE
Computer Society, Apr. 2007.
• O. Ajayi, R. Sinnott, and A. Stell. Trust Realisation in Collaborative Clinical Trials
Systems. In HealthCare Computing Conference HC2007, Harrogate, England, Mar.
2007.
• R. Sinnott, O. Ajayi, A. Stell, and A. Young. Towards a Virtual Anonymisation Grid
for Unied Access to Remote Clinical Data. In 6th International HealthGrid Conference,
Chicago, USA, June 2008.
• R. Sinnott, J. Watt, J. Jiang, and O. Ajayi. Shibbolth-based Access to and Usage of
Grid Resources. In Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Grid Computing,
Barcelona, Spain, Sept. 2006.
• R. Sinnott, J. Watt, J. Jiang, A. Stell, O. Ajayi, and J. Koetsier. Single Sign-on and
Authorization for Dynamic Virtual Organizations. In 7th IFIP Conference on Virtual
Enterprises, PRO-VE 2006, Helsinki, Finland, September 2006.
• R. Sinnott, A. Stell, and O. Ajayi. Development of Grid Frameworks for Clinical
Trials and Epidemiological Studies. In Challenges and Opportunities of HealthGrids -
Proceedings of Healthgrid 06, volume 120, June 2006.
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• R. Sinnott, A. Stell, and O. Ajayi. Initial Experiences in Developing e-Health Solutions
across Scotland. Workshop on Integrated Health Records: Practice and Technology,
Edinburgh, Mar. 2006.
• A. Stell, R. Sinnott, and O. Ajayi. Secure, Reliable and Dynamic Access to Distributed
Clinical Data. In Proceedings of Life Science Grid Conference, Yokohama, Japan, Oct.
2006
• J. Watt, R. Sinnott, O. Ajayi, J. Jiang, and J. Koetsier. A Shibboleth-Protected
Privilege Management Infrastructure for e-Science Education. In Proceedings of 6th
International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid, CCGrid2006, Singapore,
May 2006.
1.4 Thesis Statement
This thesis asserts that it is possible to discover and realise trust through circles of trust
and exchange security credentials in a collaborative e-Health environment. Trust realisa-
tion enables decentralised access control for various autonomous and heterogeneous e-Health
organisations. The dissertation assumes the existence of a means of authentication across
e-Health domains either by federated or centralised authentication mechanisms. The focus
in this dissertation is on security credentials or attributes that are used for trust negotiation
and access control.
1.5 Dissertation Outline
This dissertation presents dynamic trust negotiation (DTN) and how it is used for the discov-
ery and realisation of trust between heterogeneous and autonomous entities, thereby support-
ing decentralised authorisation in collaborative environments. Chapter 2 reviews background
literature in the area of security, access control and trust management. The chapter concludes
with a review of security frameworks in the context of e-Health collaborations. Chapter 3
presents DTN objectives and gives an overview of the design of a DTN system. Chapter 5
describes the formal model of DTN in decentralised collaborative e-Health systems. Chapter
6 presents the syntax and semantics of the DTN policy language. The chapter describes
in detail various policies that are used in DTN, including policies based on trust contracts.
Chapter 7 describes the details of two protocols used in the DTN framework for discovery
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and negotiation. Chapter 4 describes the overall DTN Architecture explored in this thesis
and shows how it uses a discovery system and negotiation system. Chapter 8 discusses the
area of clinical trials and presents scenarios that have served as the basis for testing the DTN
framework described in this thesis. Chapter 9 describes the DTN implementation undertaken
in the Virtual Organisation for Trials of Epidemiological Studies (VOTES) project and also
discusses DTN performance. Finally, chapter 10 presents and discusses the conclusions of
the dissertation and identifies potential areas of future work.
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This chapter reviews background literature in the area of security and other related work
loosely associated with supporting e-Health collaborations. The discussion focuses on access
control and trust. As will be discussed trust is a fundamental base for security. The first
section discusses security in decentralised and open environments while the second section re-
views existing access control models and approaches. These lay ground work for any security
contributions. The third and fourth sections review privilege management infrastructures
and security standards from the Grid and open systems perspective respectively. Negotia-
tion and trust management are discussed in the fifth and sixth sections that serve as basis for
this thesis. Decentralised access control from the Semantic Web perspective is discussed in
the seventh section. The chapter concludes with reviews of other work or projects that have
tried to address security in the context of e-Health collaborations, since the health domain
is the context for this thesis and these projects raise issues that this thesis aims to address.
2.1 Security in Decentralised and Open Environment
Security can be viewed from a centralised or decentralised perspective. Each of these per-
spectives introduces various security challenges since their properties and environments differ.
One of the main properties of a centralised security system is that a single pivotal point ex-
ists, from which security can be marshalled, co-ordinated and managed. In a decentralised
security system, however, a single pivotal point does not exist. Indeed many such points will
co-exist.
Two types of environment can be classified, closed and open environments. A closed envi-
ronment is one in which tight control exists over a number of issues such as systems, users,
resources and infrastructure. An open environment can be seen as a more liberal environment
where each component in the environment is to an extent free of one another. For example,
the Windows operating systems, can be regarded as systems designed in a closed environment
with little or no input from external sources. The Linux operating systems are designed in
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Figure 2.1: Security Concepts
open environments where anyone from anywhere can, in principle, input into the design and
direction of the system. A key advantage of open environments is their collaborative nature.
This is not to say that collaboration does not exist in closed environments.
Arguably, security, from a centralised perspective, could exist in closed or partially closed
environments, whereas security from a decentralised perspective that could exist in either
closed or open environments. The security challenges facing decentralised and open envi-
ronments are enormous [12, 13]. Overcoming some of these challenges are the basis for this
work. One prime example of an open environment requiring a decentralised security model
is the Grid paradigm. Grids exemplify the challenges of security in decentralised and open
environments, related works in security of Grid systems and are discussed in this chapter.
2.1.1 Security Concepts
Security is a broad topic of research but some principal concepts are worth mentioning here.
This is not to disregard other concepts or other aspects of security, but rather to emphasise
those that underpin this thesis. The concepts shown in Figure 2.1 include: Authentication,
Authorisation, Confidentiality, Integrity and Non-repudiation. The concept of trust is also
discussed in this section, since it underpins each of these concepts.
12
2 Literature Review and Related Work
Authentication: Authentication is the identification and assurance that a subject is who
they claim to be. It is the assertion of the ownership of an identity. A subject’s identity
is usually verified when a proof of identity is provided. For example, an identity may be
proved or verified when a username and pass phrase are presented and successfully validated
against a stored phrase or key. Alternatively an identity may be verified when a valid digital
certificate is presented along with data signed by the subject [14, 15]. Usually the certificate
is signed by a mutually trusted third party and the certificate binds the identity of a subject
to their public-key. A parallel example of a digital certificate is a drivers license or passport.
Authentication models in use today include: trusted third party and web of trust [16]. Unlike
the trusted third party model, the web of trust is not hierarchical in nature. The web of
trust model allows a party to verify an entity’s identity by verifying any one of the many
signatures used to sign a message. The signature that is trusted the most is used for the
verification. In the UK e-Science community, a centralised certificate authority (root CA)
has been adopted as a trusted third party used for the verification of certificates. The main
advantage of centralised over decentralised CAs is its single point of control and reduced
ambiguities, thus allowing support for single sign-on. However, the main disadvantage of
centralised authentication is its single point of failure, where a compromised root CA affects
verification and causes downtime or, in the worst case, compromise of any site where CA
certificates have been used. In contrast, decentralised authentication does not suffer when
one of the CAs are compromised or invalidated. Rather only those sites that have used
certificates from that CA are affected. The main advantage of decentralised authentication
is its flexibility and scalability. Since there is no single point of failure and as multiple sites
participate in the up keeping of authentication data. Whilst the main disadvantage is that
it seldom takes a while for the changes or updates to propagate or for notifications to be
received.
Authorisation: Authorisation is the validation that a subject has the required privileges
to access a resource. Usually authorisation is achieved through some sort of access control
policies, restricting access to protected resources for privileged users or entities. An access
policy primarily indicates what actions a subject is authorised to perform on an object
or the capabilities of a subject in a system. It typically defines the context, attributes
and constraints that must be satisfied before access can be granted to an object. Today,
numerous authorisation models are in use often based on one or more policy specifications.
Some of the policy specifications that exist today include: discretionary, mandatory and
role-based policies. These policies are discussed in more detail in [1], while [13] compares
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and contrasts centralised and decentralised authorisation models. An assumption made by
most authorisation models is that a subject’s identity has been validated prior to the system
deciding access control. Thus it is always required that a subject is authenticated before he
or she can be authorised.
Confidentiality: Is the assurance that information either stored or in transit can only be
accessed by authorised entities. Using cryptographic techniques, confidentiality can be im-
proved to protect against man-in-the-middle attacks [14], but can be compromised where
the shared key or private key are exposed, for example. In some cases, both shared key and
public-key cryptography are used to achieve better performance. Today, technologies such as
HTTPS using Transport Layer Security (TLS) [17] provide secure point-to-point connection
through which data can be transmitted securely between endpoints. However, when interme-
diary parties such as proxies need to access and work on data being transmitted, TLS does
not ensure end-to-end security. End-to-end security ensures that a message or parts of a mes-
sage are encrypted and can only be viewed by the intended recipient regardless of the nature
of connection or intermediaries that are required to work on parts of the message. As such,
technologies using Message Level Security (MLS) [18] are often preferred for confidentiality
since they ensure end-to-end security.
Integrity: Is the assurance that an unauthorised modification of data has not occurred in
transit or generally. This implies that anyone should be able to read or make use of the
data with certainty that the data has not been tampered with or altered by an unauthorised
entity. Encrypting data with a private-key ensures that only the person with private-key
can modify it while others with the associated public-key can read or open it. In practice,
for performance reasons, it is normally the case that the digest of the message is taken and
encrypted with the private-key. The recipient receives the digest and decrypts the encrypted
digest with the public-key. The decrypted digest is then compared with the received message
to verify the message integrity. Message digests are created using a checksum or one-way
hash algorithms such as MD5 (128-bit hash value) [19] or SHA-1 (160-bit hash value) [20].
Reliability of these hash algorithms against attacks depend on the size (in bits) of the hash
values.
Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation is the assurance that transactions once performed by
a subject are undeniable. This is a requirement that cryptography by itself cannot satisfy.
Non-repudiation requires the generation, verification, storage and tracking of evidence and
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facts in order to resolve disputes that may arise. Usually the process of dispute resolution
involves trusted third parties that validate tracked and stored evidence such as certificates,
signatures, transaction details and time stamps.
Trust: Trust is the underlying phenomenon of security concepts. Trust is built on the
concept of limiting expected behaviour [16]. It is associated with an assurance measurement.
The level of confidence in limiting behaviour within a security context determines the level
of assurance. From an authentication point of view, trust defines the level of assurance that
should be associated with identity. From an authorisation point of view, trust defines the
expected behaviour of an entity in possession of security credential, i.e. what the entity
should have access to or what privileges they can have. From a confidentiality point of view,
trust is the assurance or confidence associated with behaviour, e.g. the confidence in certain
entities to keep information secured and protected. From an integrity point of view, it is the
assurance of an expected behaviour. For non-repudiation, it is the assurance that an action
or behaviour is undeniable.
2.1.2 Security Threats
A threat is a hostile entity or agent that can intentionally or otherwise disclose or modify the
information managed by a system [21]. Threats can include anything e.g. events that violate
the security of a system. Security violations of a data system, for example, may include
improper access, modification or deletion of data. Confidentiality, information integrity and
system availability are three main categories where the consequences of violations can be
observed.
• Confidentiality – preventing/detecting/deterring the improper disclosure of informa-
tion. Confidentiality violation is caused when data is accessed either intentionally or
otherwise by improper users or systems. In some cases this can be caused when users
who are authorised to access certain information can infer unauthorised information
often termed statistical disclosure [22].
• Data Integrity – preventing/detecting/deterring the improper modification of data.
Violation of data integrity can be caused through improper modification of data. Data
modification can occur even in situations where the data itself cannot be read. That is
data integrity can be violated regardless of whether confidentiality is violated.
• System Availability – preventing/detecting/deterring the improper use of a service.
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Violation often affect system availability. This can be caused by actions that prevent a
system or service from being accessible by authorised users. One example of this might
be denial of services [23].
There are two classes of users that can give rise to security threats: authorised users and
hostile agents [21]. Authorised users can abuse their privileges and authorities to violate
the security of the system. Hostile agents can include internal users and external users who
carry out improper actions to violate a system for a variety of reasons. Internal users can be
unauthorised users who despite their lack of privileges carry out improper actions to access
data they have not been authorised to use. In some cases hostile agents use applications
(legally or illegally), programs and codes such as viruses to attack and violate systems.
2.1.3 Cryptography and Public Key Infrastructure
Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) [24, 25, 26] are technologies based on the use of public-key
encryption and/or digital certificates for security implementation in distributed applications.
Cryptography (or Encryption) is a method or technique of concealing information from eaves-
droppers. It dates back to time immemorial and it has evolved over the years. Two well
known cryptographic methods today are symmetrical and asymmetrical cryptography.
Symmetrical cryptography is a method where both parties at the end of the communication
share and keep a key. The key is used for both encrypting and decrypting information. The
strength of the method is that it is fast but the weakness is that the key must be kept secret.
Examples of this method include algorithms like DES [27], Triple DES [27], Blowfish [28] and
AES [29].
Asymmetrical cryptography also known as public-key cryptography is a key-pair method -
often based on a public key and a private key. It is the basis for PKI. The keys are different,
but are mathematically constructed so that if you encrypt data with one key you can only
decrypt it with the other. In practice, the owner of the keys gives the public key to whoever
they want to communicate with whilst they keep the private key. More than one person could
have the public-key, hence why it is called public-key, but only one person should have the
private-key. If a message is encrypted with a public-key, only the person with the private-key
can access it. But if a message is encrypted with a private key, only those with the public-key
can access it. The benefit of this method is that the receiver of the information may be sure of
the sender (as long as the private-key has not been compromised). The issue of this method
is: how do we know if the private-key has been compromised? This is an issue of trust and
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the basis of digital signatures - that is identifying whose signature it is. Other issues are:
how do we know that the sender is who they claim to be? In practice this is resolved by the
existence of a trusted third party such as a CA. The sender provides a certificate that has its
name and public-key amongst other things. This certificate is signed by the CA before the
certificate is issued. The CA acts like a cheque guarantor, who is expected to have validated
the content of the certificate.
Current PKI standards use X.509 standard [30] which describes the structure used for digital
certificates. With PKI, confidentiality can be achieved through encryption, data integrity
through a digital signature and mutual trust through CA infrastructures. However PKIs are
not without their own issues and they do not solve all domain security needs, e.g. those of
the e-Health domain. From the end-users perspective, PKIs are difficult to implement [31]
and keys are difficult to be kept secret. For instance, users are often required to transform
their certificates to other useable forms; to configure their systems to use these certificates;
store their certificates in a secure place, as well as not storing multiple copies of their cer-
tificate which often happens when backing up their systems. In addition, users often write
down their strong private key passwords in unsecured places because of the difficulty in re-
membering their passwords. Lastly, where a private key has been compromised it is difficult
to detect and this can only be done retrospectively. In the UK e-Science and other Grid
communities, PKI has been widely accepted and it now underlies most security solutions
used in e-Infrastructures. This is partly because it is supports the notion of single sign-on.
The root CA used by the community is widely seen as a basis for trust but only in the area
of authentication and not authorisation (i.e. access control).
2.2 Access-control Models
Access-control models provide the formal representation for describing and implementing
security policies. Security policies in the context of access control refers to the set of rules
and practices that an organisation defines to manage who can have access to what resource
[16]. Access-control models provide a means of analysing whether a security system conforms
to an abstract model in its design and implementation, and satisfies the same properties that
the abstract model satisfies. Today, a number of access-control models exist and have been
in use to analyse access control policies. These models can be mainly grouped into two
categories: mandatory and discretionary models.
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2.2.1 Mandatory Access-control
Mandatory access-control (MAC) models manage access for information based on the clas-
sifications of subjects and objects in a system. Subjects are entities that access objects and
objects are information entities such as resources and services. Mandatory policies drive
these models, which classify subjects and objects based on the sensitivity of the information.
Subjects are initiators like users or system processes, while objects are targets like database
tables and actions are activities like read or write. The classification given to a subject
expresses the level of trust assigned to the subject. The object classification expresses the
risk level assigned for that object. To access an object, a subject must belong to the object
security class.
Mandatory policies are predefined and remain static. They are invariant and cannot be
changed dynamically. Policies are defined by administrative officers that set up who has
access to what resource based on the sensitivity of the resource. Resources that belong to
the same classification have the same access control applied to them. This implies that
a subject with a security classification label can access all resources that have the same
confidentiality label. A lack of a discretionary property is mostly unacceptable in todays
commercial environment, as fine-grained access control (in terms of subject, objects and
actions) are often preferred, e.g. database management systems. In addition to this issue,
MAC does not allow access rights to be transferred from one subject to another.
Mandatory policies are suitable for certain kinds of environments such as the military, where
users and resources can be classified. MAC models provide a level of protection against
hostile agents due to its flow-control nature. Information flows are prevented from objects
with higher classification to lower classification. For example, a user at a specific trust-level
is prevented from accessing resources or processes at a higher trust-level. Even so, malicious
code embedded in a program running at a specific classification can (in principle) be used
for disclosing information to a different classification.
2.2.2 Discretionary Access-control
Discretionary Access-control (DAC) models manage access to information based on the iden-
tity of subjects and rules that are specific to each subject and object in the system. The rules
which are defined by discretionary policies specify the types of access a subject is allowed for
the object. [21] defines discretionary as “the possibility that exists for owners to grant and
revoke access rights on some objects”. Discretionary policies are owner-centric and require
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each object in the system to be owned by one or more entities. These owner entities define
who can access the object and in what mode it can be accessed. A subject is granted access
to an object where the subject satisfies authorisation rules that have been defined for the
object.
Today, a DAC policy is widely adopted and used as the basis for most implemented policies
because of its ease, simplicity and how it relates to many access situations. The ability to
own, grant and revoke access rights enables the decentralisation of administrative control and
is one of the reasons for its wide adoption. However, one issue with DAC is that it does not
protect the flow of information and can thus give rise to containment issues. Similarly, the
propagation of access rights that DAC supports is unbounded and often difficult to determine
in systems.
Though discretionary and mandatory policies are different, they are not mutually exclusive.
They can easily be combined to compliment each other in addressing vulnerabilities in pro-
viding access control. Mandatory policies can be used to provide authorisation control while
discretionary policies can be used to provide access control. For instance, can user X request
resource Y? If he can, what kind of action - read/write, can he perform on resource Y? Any
request that satisfies the discretionary control will also satisfy the mandatory control.
The access matrix model [32] is one of the most widely used security models. The model can
be used to represent most policies including discretionary and mandatory policies. However,
it is more widely applied for discretionary policies.
2.2.3 Access Control List vs. Capability
Access Control Lists (ACL) and Capabilities [16] originate from the Access matrix model
[32]. The access matrix is a conceptual model that details access rights that each subject has
for each object. The access matrix shown in Figure 2.2 contains a row for each subject and
a column for each object. Each cell of the matrix contains the access right for that subject
on that object. The problem with implementing an access matrix is that they are large and
often difficult to maintain since they describe a whole system. Similarly many cells may be
redundant. Other issues are how to classify and/or categorise objects along with what type
of access rights they require.
One of the main reasons for access control is to prevent unauthorised access to objects and
resources. Discretionary and non-discretionary (mandatory) access controls [16] are two
common mechanisms for achieving control. Discretionary access controls are based on the
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Figure 2.2: Access Matrix
access matrix model and are often implemented using an ACL and/or Capability. The method
is called Discretionary because access rights to objects are at the discretion of the object owner
or provider. Non-discretionary access controls are based on access classes consisting of two
parts: sensitivity level and sets of categories. Non-discretionary access controls are mostly
use by the military and are not generally implemented in non-military systems. The lattice
security model [33] is a common model for mandatory access controls.
An ACL assumes the columns in an Access Matrix, which for each object consists of a list of
subjects with their associated access rights. The Capability assumes the rows in an Access
Matrix and provides a list for each subject that consists of objects, the location of objects
and the access rights that the holder has for each object. Both ACL and Capability have
to be protected to prevent authorised alterations of access rights known as containment and
thus prevent unauthorised access to objects (resources). [34, 35] discusses containment issues
in respect to both ACL and Capability systems.
An ACL defines who can do what on an object and is widely implemented in systems today
because they are both easy to implement and provide better performance compared to Ca-
pability systems [21]. Each object is provided with a list that shows the access rights for each
subject in the list. With ACL, access to objects can easily be reviewed and access to objects
can easily be revoked. On the contrary, access rights of subjects can not easily be reviewed
or access to subjects revoked since the system will have to iterate through all ACLs of every
object. An example of the ACL is the Grid mapfile in globus-based systems. A Grid mapfile
holds a list of subjects who can access a resource along with the access rights the subject
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possess [36, 37, 38].
A Capability defines a subject’s rights for an object. Each subject is defined with a list (a list
of capabilities) that details what objects they can access and what rights they have for those
objects. Capability systems assume that the use of capability is both necessary and sufficient
for access to an object by subjects. Apart from implementation and performance issues of
capability systems, capability problems stem from the ability to revoke all access rights to
an object and also with the ability to review access to an object, since all of the subject
capabilities will have to be visited to review or revoke access to an object. An example of a
capability in a Grid system is an attribute certificate [39]. An attribute certificate stores all of
the attributes or access rights that a subject holds for various resources (objects). Similar to
capabilities in a capability based system, attribute certificates are signed to avoid tampering.
In addition, capability systems either restrict the rights and/or shrink the size of a capability
list, a process known as refinement. Refinement is analogous to a system where a subject
makes available some of their attributes for authorisation.
In Grid systems today, solutions like PERMIS [40] combine both ACL and Capability security
models to provide a secure access control system. Although PERMIS is a role based policy
system, it leverages the benefits of discretionary access control by providing policies that
list subjects and granted actions on specific objects similar to an ACL. At the same time
PERMIS can be configured to make use of subject attributes based on policies to make
access decisions similar to Capability systems. Shibboleth [41], on the other hand, provides
a means of exchanging attributes (credentials) between domains. These attributes are in
essence capabilities of what a subject is allowed to do in a domain. Shibboleth could be used
to support Capability systems across domains where security attributes have been pre-agreed.
2.2.4 Identity-based Access Control
Identity-based access-control (IBAC) is a model that manages access to information and
resources based on a subject’s identity. Identity is the possession of proof that uniquely
describes an entity or subject. Identification is the process of establishing the identity of a
user or entity while authentication links the identity of a subject to a user/entity. Identity-
based access control manages the access to information based on the identity of a subject
that wants to perform an operation on an object [42]. Identity management, albeit digital
identity management, is the process of managing, creating, using and verifying identities.
Security policies used in IBAC systems define the permissions associated with a resource for
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an asserted identity. Most identity-based access control systems in use today are modelled
based on the access control list discussed in Section 2.2.3. Using ACL, if a subject entry
exists in the list, and the operation to be performed is part of the entry for an object, then
access to the object is permitted for that subject. A typical example of an IBAC that uses
ACL is the grid-mapfile, which is discussed later in Section 2.3.4. As in ACL, IBAC supports
discretionary policies, which requires object ownership – each object in the system is owned
by one or more entities. Usually, object ownership lies with the creators of the object.
However, in some environments resource ownership does not lie with subjects but rather with
the organisation. ACL in these environments have been modelled to use a “group” as an
entry instead of a subject. A group in this case is a collection of subjects. So if a subject’s
identity is found in a group and an entry exists in the ACL for that object, the subject is
permitted to perform the operation defined in the ACL.
2.2.5 Role-based Access Control
Role-based access control (RBAC) manages the access to information based on the role of a
subject that wants to perform an operation on an object. The notion of “group” is mostly
similar to the notion of “role”. A role is the representation for the collection of users and a
user can be a member of one or more roles. In RBAC, a group is equivalent to a role if [42]:
• there are no restrictions on the number of groups that could exist;
• there is no upper limit on the number of users that could be members of a group;
• there are no restrictions on the number of groups that a user can simultaneously be a
member of.
Many RBAC models [43, 44, 45, 46] have been described but [44] is widely accepted as
the primary model. The main elements of RBAC are users, roles and permissions. Users are
assigned to roles and roles are given permissions. Permissions specify the privileges permitted
on objects. Permissions given to roles are permitted to all users in that role. It is important
in RBAC that users are assigned to roles that reflect specific privileges they require for their
task. This requirement is well known as the least privilege principle [21, 47].
RBAC is largely used today because it specifies and enforces security policies in a way that
reflects the organisation structure. An ACL can be used to model RBAC if groups are used
fundamentally as roles in the ACL model. Because of this, ACL have been widely used for the
implementation of RBAC in organisations. The use of roles makes it easy for users to switch
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between roles thus dynamically changing the permissions they have. In a large organisation
with many dynamic users, this notion of roles makes RBAC scalable and simplifies policy
administration.
In [44], roles are allowed to contain other roles, which introduces role hierarchies. A role
hierarchy is defined [42] as a strict partial ordering on the set of roles. In a role hierarchy, a
higher role inherits the permissions of lower roles, through the inheritance relation that exists
between the two roles. Hierarchies between roles further simplifies policy administration.
The RBAC model also introduces role constraints and combines role hierarchies with role
constraints. Through constraints, RBAC can support the principle of separation of duty [48]
through mutual exclusion of roles. In addition to constraints, other RBAC-related models
have introduced role delegation and revocation [49, 50, 51, 52]. Some have also introduced
parameterised roles and obligations [53] to optimise the number of roles and to provide
more fine-grained access control. The fundamental benefit of RBAC is that it is based on
user attributes and not on identity. This attribute concept is useful in the area of trust
management where the identity of a user is initially or often unknown. For example the
decision to allow a person entry into a building is often not based on their identity but on
whether they hold a required credential – an access card, key or fob. The benefit of this is
that the entry system is manageable since the access decision is not based on the identity
but access attributes that can easily be assigned, person to person.
2.3 Privilege Management Infrastructures
Privilege Management Infrastructures (PMI) are based on the use of privileges to enforce
access to resources. Privileges are essentially attributes that determine what type of access
or permission a user or entity has. One common form of attribute is descriptive attributes
which include roles, access levels and group membership. Privilege management [54] entails
the definition, assignment, presentation, delegation and revocation of attributes, and their
enforcement by authorisation infrastructures.
A PMI is analogous to a PKI where a PKI uses user certificates for authentication, so
a PMI uses attribute certificates for authorisation. Most PMI-based systems include an
attribute issuing service and a policy engine. The software components of a PMI can be
centralised or distributed depending on the application and often support a push or pull
model approach for attribute retrieval/delivery. A policy engine comprises, amongst other
things, a Policy Decision Point (PDP) and a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) [55]. The PDP
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makes authorisation decisions by checking through collections of rules that are associated with
a target, while the PEP ensures that all requests to access a target are authorised through
the PDP. Various PMI infrastructures have been developed and some of these are outlined
here.
2.3.1 Privilege and Role Management Infrastructure Standard Validation
The Privilege and Role Management Infrastructure Standard Validation (PERMIS) [40, 56] is
an authorisation infrastructure that uses role based hierarchy policies to achieve fine grained
access control. It can work with most authentication systems such as Kerberos [57], PKI,
Shibboleth [41] and username/password systems. The infrastructure provides both an at-
tribute/policy issuing service and a policy engine. Other PERMIS components include:
• authorisation policies, which are signed by source of authorities (SoA);
• attribute tokens, which are X.509 based attribute certificates;
• servers such as LDAP servers, which are used to store policies and attribute certificates;
• Attribute Certificate Manager (ACM) tools, formerly known as the Privilege Allocator,
used for issuing and managing attribute certificates.
PERMIS policies are written in XML and comprise sub-policies [54] thus requiring policy
decomposition by the PDP. The policies provide information on subjects, source of authority
(SoA), roles, targets and actions that can be performed. These policies are typically stored
in LDAP servers. The PDP shown in Figure 2.3 makes its decision based on stored policies
and presented user attributes communicated by the PEP. PDP decision response is either a
deny or grant or an insufficient information. The PEP subsequently enforces this decision on
access to the resource.
PERMIS gets its attributes in pull mode from attribute authorities (AA) but can also get
attributes through push mode from AA or from the PEP. When a user makes a request for
a resource in the push mode, the PEP for the resource picks up the request and contacts
the PDP with the pushed user attributes while PERMIS pulls the policies for the particular
resources. In the pull mode, PERMIS pulls user attributes from LDAP servers, which could
be remote LDAP servers. The pull mode requires PERMIS to be configured with the location
of LDAP servers where user attributes can be pulled from. This configuration requirement
potentially limits PERMIS in the pull mode, which potentially makes pull mode less preferred
to the push mode in supporting some virtual organisations (VO). Another downside for the
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Figure 2.3: PERMIS Authorisation System [from JISC Middleware Security Workshop, 20-
10-2005]
pull mode is that the user’s privacy is not protected because the identity of the user, e.g.
their Distinguished Names (DN) would have to be known for all attributes of the user to be
retrieved. How user’s attributes are retrieved in the push mode depends on the application
implementation. For instance, a user could forward their attributes along with their request
for resources or the application could use a Shibboleth [41] style approach for retrieving and
forwarding user attributes. With Shibboleth, releasing a user’s distinguished name (DN)
could be prevented.
PERMIS supports dynamic delegation of authority, where remote SoAs are trusted to issue
attribute certificates (AC) to their users and potentially to delegate the trust to their subordi-
nates. However, roles assigned by remote SoAs must conform to a role assignment subpolicy
that is provided by the root SoA. PERMIS also supports distributed credential management,
where numerous attribute authorities (AA) are empowered to allocate credentials to users.
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2.3.2 Virtual Organisation Membership Service
The Virtual Organisation Membership Service (VOMS) is a service designed to manage au-
thorisation in a virtual organisation [58]. VOMS is a centralised attribute authority and
it relies on other infrastructures such as the Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) [59, 37] for
authentication services. It also relies on other infrastructures such as Local Centre Autho-
risation Service (LCAS) [60] and the Local Credential Mapping Service (LCMAPS) [61] to
provide a framework for Authorisation Decision Functions to grant or deny requests based
on provided VOMS attribute assertions.
VOMS components shown in Figure 2.4 include user clients, servers aka VOMS server [54, 62],
administration clients and an administration server. The user client identifies a subject’s
identity to the user server which are often at the subject’s home location (origin). The user
client queries the VOMS server using the subject’s GSI proxy that it creates and the roles it
wishes to use. The VOMS server in response extends the proxy certificate with the VOMS
related attributes. These attributes are signed by the VOMS server as an assertion to the
resource provider. This extended proxy certificate is provided to the PDP of the resource
provider that then makes a decision based on the VOMS assertions. With LCAS/LCMAPS,
this decision is about account should the user in this VO with this role be mapped to. VOMS
is currently being rolled out across the UK National Grid Service (NGS) and is a common
approach accepted by the UK oriented Grid community for specification of attributes. The
VOMS assertion usually includes the VO name, assertion validity, and groups or roles or
privileges. The administration client and administration server are used for VOMS server
management. VOMS systems are an example of an IBAC based-systems Section 2.2.4.
VOMS is primarily an issuing service while PERMIS is both an issuing service and a policy
engine. VOMS-signed proxy certificates can be used by non-VOMS aware authorisation
decision functions since VOMS does not modify the body of an X.509 user certificate but only
the extensions. In addition, VOMS provides a privacy mechanism for subjects in that subjects
can choose how much information about themselves they are willing to expose [58]. One
known vulnerability of VOMS is that it lacks a revocation mechanism and VOMS attributes
can only be rendered invalid after their validity period. The VPMan [63] is a project that
combines VOMS and PERMIS to improve security of resources such as the NGS.
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Figure 2.4: The VOMS system [62]
2.3.3 Community Authorisation Service
The Community Authorisation Service (CAS) is an authorisation service used to control
access to resources in a VO [64]. CAS provides central control over resources in a given VO,
similar to an administrator that manages resources in a domain. It is also analogous to a
certificate authority (CA) in a PKI. In essence organisations delegate some privileges to the
VO and the VO grants these privileges to its users.
CAS uses a push based authorisation model. As shown in Figure 2.5, a client makes a
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) request (AuthorisationDecisionQuery) to the
CAS server for access to particular resources together with their intended actions. The
request is made up of resources and required actions. The CAS server identifies the user
and determines the privileges of the user based on the VO policy. The CAS server sends a
signed SAML assertion response (AuthorisationDecisionStatement) back to the client. The
communicated assertion contains the user’s identity, known as the Subject and some or all
of the user’s requested actions. The user communicates with the resources with the signed
assertions and the resource validates the assertion with its local policy and access is allowed
but restricted to the validated actions.
CAS only implements PDP engine. The resource providers are required to implement their
own PEP engines. Resource providers trust the CAS server to authorise users on its resources.
CAS does not use roles or groups thus the management of users’ access rights is neither
maintainable nor scalable. That is CAS does not issue ACs [58], instead it suggests the
permissions a user has as it relates to the resource. Similarly, it is the CAS administrator
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Figure 2.5: The CAS system [64]
Figure 2.6: GT4 GSI Overview [37]
rather than the SoA, that decides who has access to what resources. CAS thus presents a
centralised approach to authorisation which is not really suitable for the Grid. Currently,
CAS only supports Globus [59] GridFTP.
2.3.4 Grid Security Infrastructure
The Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) [37] is the security framework underpinning the
Globus Toolkit middleware [59] and provides various security functionality to support Grids.
The current incarnation of the Globus middleware is based on Web Services technologies.
GSI is the most commonly used security infrastructure on the Grid. It contains four primary
functions: authentication, authorisation, delegation and message protection.
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As shown in Figure 2.6 Authentication is performed using X.509 digital certificates or user-
name/password pairs as credentials. X.509 credentials allow for the use of advanced security
features such as delegation, confidentiality and data integrity. The username and password
option does not support such features. However, through other solutions such as MyProxy
[65], username and passwords can be used to access MyProxy repositories to create short
lived proxy (X.509) certificates.
GSI implements an Access Control List (ACL) in the form of a grid-mapfile, which is used
to control access to resources. A grid-mapfile contains a list of mappings between local user
accounts and Distinguished Names (DN) of pre-accepted X.509 entity certificates. The list
determines who can access services or resources on the host/container and the privileges of
the host’s mapped local accounts. This controls access on a per container or per Unix account
privileges and not on a per service or per service-method basis. In some cases this kind of
access control is sufficient, but is not in many other cases such as the service-oriented cases.
The current version of GSI uses the SAML standard for providing AuthorisationDecision
assertions as a means of exchanging user’s attributes from clients to services, this is used
by most CAS clients. It also uses the AuthorisationDecision protocol of SAML to support
integration of other authorisation decision services, such as PERMIS.
GSI provides message protection by communicating SOAP messages [66] over Transport-
Level Security (TLS) or encrypting portions of SOAP messages using WS-Security standard
or the WS-SecureConversation specification for Message-Level Security (see Section 2.4.4). In
contrast to TLS which uses X.509 credentials to establish secure transport layer connections,
MLS uses X.509 credentials to either establish a session key or uses the associated keys of
the sender and receiver’s X.509 credentials for message protection.
Whilst widely accepted, GSI has several issues including a lack of scalability owing to the
use of grid-mapfiles and lack of inherent fine-grained access control. However, fine-grained
access control could be achieved with the use of third party authorisation services such as
PERMIS in combination with GSI.
2.4 Security Standards in Federation Systems
This section reviews some evolving security standards that underlines the exchange of secu-
rity information in decentralised open environments. Key to this is federation. Organisation
for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) considers Federation
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[67] as a term for organisations that collaborate based on agreed standards and that com-
bine business and technological practices to enable access to resources and services across
boundaries in a secure and trustworthy way. A federation is built based on trust, standards
and agreements [68, 69]. Today, a federation is often associated with single sign-on (SSO)
across organisational boundaries [70, 71]. SSO enables a user to authenticate once at the
beginning of a process or computation and then to be automatically authenticated to every
other process or computation that the user or process initiates. Users do not have to keep
multiple passwords and they do not have to keep authenticating themselves every time access
is required to other processes, services or resources.
2.4.1 Security Assertion Markup Language
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [72] is a standard developed by OASIS to
provide a means of exchanging security-related information between parties over the net-
work. The standard provides a communication framework written in XML for the exchange
of assertions between (virtual) domains. This framework does not define new mechanisms
for authentication or authorisation but enables existing security mechanisms to interoperate
across boundaries. One of the SAML components called Assertions provides security informa-
tion consisting of user authentication (identity), attributes and entitlements. SAML allows
domains to collaborate and make decisions based on signed assertions. As shown in Figure
2.7, SAML components include Protocols [70], Bindings [73] and Profiles [74]. The XML rep-
resentation of SAML makes it in principle interoperable and easy to integrate into existing
applications; flexible and extensible with other standards such as Shibboleth, WS-Security
[75] and PERMIS.
The SAML specification defines how to construct, exchange, consume, interpret and extend
security assertions for various needs. Key benefits of the specification include: interoper-
ability; loose coupling of resources; improved end user experience; risk transference, and a
reduced administrative costs for service providers [76].
SAML contemporaries include Liberty Alliance [77] and WS-Federation [69]. To bridge the
gap between these different federated protocols, federation gateways [78] are being suggested
to act as brokers between the different evolving federated identity management protocols.
The word “evolving” is to indicate the incompatibilities that exist presently between protocol
versions.
SAML V1.0 became an OASIS standard in November 2002 and V1.1 [79] was released in
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Figure 2.7: SAML Overview - Push Scenario
September 2003. SAML 1.0 addressed how identity information and be communicated from
one domain to another. While SAML 1.1 adds support for “network identity”, secure ex-
change of user security information between organisations and introduces signing of SAML
assertions by the use of digital certificates. In March 2005, SAML V2.0 [70] was approved
as a standard and appears to be a step closer to full convergence of federated identity stan-
dards. SAML V2.0 comprises input from Shibboleth and Liberty Alliance’s Identity Federa-
tion Framework (ID-FF) 1.2 [71]. SAML 2.0 consolidates protocols for single sign-on, policy
management and delegated administration. SAML 2.0 enhancements include support for
federated identity, global sign-out and session management. Typical uses of SAML includes
[80]:
• Web-based single sign-on (Authentication) including communication of authentication
assertions from one site to another;
• Attribute-based authorisation and use in Shibboleth for attribute exchange;
• Web Services security as used within SOAP messages to transfer security information.
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2.4.2 Shibboleth
Shibboleth [41] is an Internet2 project that describes an open standard protocol for secure
exchange of attributes between trusted collaborating partners for the purpose of authentica-
tion and authorisation. Shibboleth was initially a higher education initiative for actualisa-
tion of federation in schools, but is now gaining acceptance outside academic communities.
Shibboleth builds on trust between collaborating partners and between institutions within a
federation.
Shibboleth defines a model and architecture for cross-institutional exchange of authentication
and authorisation information. Similarly, it defines a means for establishing and managing
trust between institutions. It provides a protocol for the secure exchange of attributes re-
quired for authorisation decisions between partnering sites. Shibboleth depends upon and
indeed pushes the need for standard schema definitions required for secure inter-site com-
munication. It also provides privacy mechanisms that allow users to retain control over the
release of their attributes. The model is usable with most third party security standards.
As shown in Figure 2.8, the main Shibboleth components include: Identity Providers (IdP)
also referred to as origins; an identity provider discovery service also known as Where Are
You From (WAYF) service, Shibboleth Handle Indexical Reference Establisher (SHIRE),
Shibboleth Attribute Requester (SHAR) and Service Providers (SP) also known as targets.
Shibboleth extends and bridges local authentication and authorisation infrastructures be-
tween institutions. Typically, a user that wishes to access a remote resource is redirected
back to their home institution for authentication (via a WAYF) established for the federa-
tion and uses the home site authentication infrastructure to authenticate themselves. Using
a push model, the home institution forwards user attributes to the service provider (in the
future, users will be able to select which attributes they want to make available to service
providers). The target in turn makes authorisation decisions based on the received attributes
using its own authorisation infrastructure. The key to this model is that the semantics and
structure of the exchanged attributes are agreed and understood between sites. It also relies
on trust between the two sites, that is, where the target site delegates authentication to the
home institution.
The main benefits of Shibboleth to the Grid community include simplicity for end users,
secure exchange of attributes and single sign-on. Users log in once and their session in-
formation allows access to many resources without re-authentication assuming the browser
session is maintained. Today many projects [81] that use portals as a Shibboleth target have
X.509 certificates created via a portlet for MyProxy [82] services and are used to invoke
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Figure 2.8: Shibboleth Architecture Overview
Grid services on behalf of a user. This is primarily because many users are not willing to
maintain and use X.509 certificates due to the associated difficulty in maintaining and using
them [83]. Through Shibboleth a user is shielded from X.509 certificate management issues,
though (except via MyProxy) it implies that more than one user may be using one X.509
certificate at any given time to invoke Grid services. Although the many user to one certifi-
cate approach is widely discouraged, it is often used as an alternative in environments where
users are reluctant to managing their own certificates [81].
2.4.3 eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [84] is a privilege management lan-
guage. It is an OASIS [85] standard that can be used to design access control policies
and make resource requests. The standard describes both an access control policy lan-
guage, e.g. who can do what and when, and a request/response language which expresses
queries/responses for access to a resource. The language is extensible and can be adapted
to suit various purposes. Some extension points include new functions to express new al-
gorithms, data types and logic combinations. The new XACML specification v2.0, can use
other open standards for specification of its requests and responses. For instance, XACML
generic responses include Permit, Deny, Indeterminate or Not applicable. It can also be
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extended to express responses such as SAML [72] assertions or XACML-based attributes as
SAML attributes and requests as SAML requests [80].
XACML, unlike PERMIS, does not provide a policy engine but devolves the task to other
actors. In XACMl, the SoA or AA are responsible for the PDP while the Resource Provider
(RP) is responsible for the PEP. As opposed to PERMIS, XACML provides a language for
defining, assigning and presenting policies as well as attributes that are used by both the PDP
and PEP. XACML also provides the specification for locating policies that are required in
evaluating requests. In a typical scenario, the PEP receives a request from users and pushes
the request and attributes to the PDP. The PDP receives the request and queries for policies
that are required for deciding on the request. The PDP, like every other PMI, responds to the
PEP with a decision token, which can be allow or deny. Unlike every other PDP, the XACML
based PDP is extensible to fit into various scenarios with various decision algorithms that
can be applied to these scenarios. XACML also allows various combining logic (algorithm for
evaluating more than one policies) to be applied to the policies or policySets (set of policies).
At the moment XACML does not support features for delegation of authority [86] but does
support multiple roles and role based policies albeit with little support for role hierarchies
[87]. Although XACML is more versatile and less mature than PERMIS, it has a wide appeal
because of its international consensus and the support of OASIS.
2.4.4 Web Services - Security
Web-Services Security (WS-Security) [75, 88] is an OASIS specification that ensures the
integrity and confidentiality of SOAP [66] messages. SOAP messages are based on the remote
procedure call (RPC) [89] paradigm similar to other distributed architectures like CORBA
[90] and DCOM [91]. The WS-Security specification proposes SOAP header extensions, which
can be used to underpin many other WS-Security standards. The goal is to provide a complete
security framework that is customisable and extensible to individual/specific domain needs.
One primary benefit of the standard is that it helps to structure the content of a SOAP
header, where a header is a placeholder for contents generated by supported WS-Security
standards.
WS-Security uses different security token profiles to carry identity information. One of these
profiles is the SAML token profile which uses SAML assertions to provide message security
[80]. Other profiles use other token formats such as X.509 public key certificates, Kerberos
tickets and encrypted username/password pairs. The specification also supports multiple
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signature and encryption formats.
As shown in Figure 2.9, there are numerous evolving Web Services specifications some of
which are designed to address a range of security issues. These specifications include: XML-
Encryption [92], XML-signature [93], WS-SecureConversation [94], WS-Policy [95] and WS-
Trust [96]. WS-SecureConversation is a message level security equivalent of https. Like https,
WS-SecureConversion defines a protocol for agreeing a shared session key that can be used
for securing a conversation. XML-Encyption is an established technology that uses well-
known cryptography technologies to encrypt XML messages. As part of the specification,
the identity of the encryption algorithm used is carried in the message. Ws-Policy is used to
specify access rules that an authorisation engine can use for evaluating security tokens that
are carried as part of a message. WS-Trust is a specification that defines methods for issuing,
renewing, and validating security tokens. It also defines ways by which participants in a secure
message exchange can establish, assess the presence of, and broker trust relationships.
The issue with all these standards is that they increase the possibility of incompatibility
between systems as there are so many developments, some evolving, some real and some pro-
posed. WS-Interoperability (WS-I) [97] is an initiative designed to promote interoperability
across all Web Services specifications. WS-I issues profiles (WS-I Basic Profile and Basic
Security Profile) that provide interoperability guidance for resolving incompatibility issues
that may exist between sets of standards as well as their different versions.
2.5 Trust Management
Trust is an important concept that underpins information security. Understanding trust
and how trust can be realised or at least transferred affects how authorisation is viewed in
centralised and decentralised open environments. In [98] OASIS defines trust as the char-
acteristic that one entity is willing to rely upon a second entity to execute a set of actions
and/or to make set of assertions about a set of subjects and/or scopes. Four trust properties
were presented in [15].
• The first trust property is that trust is transitive depending on the context. For ex-
ample, if Bob trusts Alice and refers patient X to Alice for diagnosis, and Alice trusts
Jane and refers patient X to Jane for further diagnosis, then Bob may be willing to
accept Jane’s diagnosis of patient X.
• The second trust property is that trust cannot be shared - that is if Bob trusts Alice
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Figure 2.9: WS-Security Evolving Specifications
and Bob trusts John, it does not imply that Alice will trust John.
• The third trust property is that trust is not symmetric, that is Alice trusting Bob does
not mean that Bob trusts Alice.
• The last trust property is that trustworthiness cannot be self-declared, that is, Bob
saying to Alice that he is trustworthy does not mean that Alice will trust him. This
property is the basis for reputation and experience as a means of deciding who to trust
[99].
Trust Management (TM), a term first introduced in [100], is an authorisation mechanism
that provides a unified approach to how security policies, credentials and their relationships
are formulated and interpreted. Trust management from a distributed system points of view
is expected to support expressive and extensible policies, local control and decentralised
administrative tasks.
2.5.1 PolicyMaker/KeyNote
PolicyMaker [101, 100] was a pioneering example of trust management systems. It was the
first tool to process signed requests based on trust management principles [100]. Its cre-
dentials and policies were fully programmable and could be written in any programming
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language that was “safe” for the local environment. Its design choice was to accommodate
any policy language and to enable the reuse of its compliance-checking algorithm. However,
in general, the language openness to situations where policy compliance checking was unde-
cidable and in monotonic cases require plenty of time to solve [2]. PolicyMaker was designed
to be minimal and analysable, so a fair amount of responsibility was placed on the calling ap-
plication including the responsibility for credential gathering and cryptographic verification
of credentials signatures.
KeyNote [102, 103] was similar to PolicyMaker in that its design was based on the same
principles as PolicyMaker. However, it differs in two ways. The first was that KeyNote
assigned more responsibility to the trust management engine in that cryptographic signature
verification was done by the KeyNote policy engine unlike by the application in PolicyMaker.
The second difference was that a specific language compatible with KeyNote’s compliance
checker was required for writing credentials and policies. In both PolicyMaker and Keynote,
credentials and policies were referred to as assertions. Policy assertion differs from credential
assertion in that the issuer field of the policy are locally trusted and so does not need a
signature.
In KeyNote, authorisation requests are passed, by calling applications, to a KeyNote policy
engine for authorisation. The calling application passes the public key of the requester, a list
of credentials (signed by foreign parties), local policies and an action attribute to the policy
engine. The policy engine replies with an authorisation decision that, in the simplest case,
may be “permit” or “deny” the requests. Keynote does not enforce policies; it only provides
decisions based on the security requirements of the request to calling application. It is the
responsibility of the calling application to interpret and enforce the decision reached by the
KeyNote policy engine.
2.5.2 SPKI/SDSI
The Simple Public Key Infrastructure / Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure (SPKI
/ SDSI) is an IETF SPKI working group project [104, 105], developed to provide an in-
ternet standard for certificate formats and authorisation protocols including key acquisition
for authorisation purposes as opposed to authentication. Originally SDSI [106] and SPKI
were separate infrastructures developed concurrently. They were motivated by the percep-
tion that X.509 public-key infrastructure was restrictive and too complex. This perception
was emphasised by inadequate global name spaces of public-key certificates. Significantly,
SDSI dealt with the issue of decentralised name spaces while SPKI focused on authorisation
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specifications. These infrastructures were later merged into a single framework and widely
called SPKI/SDSI or just SPKI.
In [104] an algorithm for resolving certificate chains given a set of credentials was presented.
The algorithm in the worst case performs at a polynomial-time, which was a good achievement
considering the challenges of linking certificates together. This achievement can be attributed
to the SPKI/SDSI naming scheme. In SPKI/SDSI, a local name space can be associated with
a public-key thus enabling the use of local names to work both locally and globally. Similarly,
SPKI/SDSI introduced the notion of linked local names, which expands the expressive power
of SPKI/SDSI. This has a wider application appeal since application name spaces can be
supported.
In addition to its naming scheme, SPKI/SDSI defines two classes of certificates, name certifi-
cates and authorisation certificates. Authorisation certificates differ from name certificates
in that they specify permissions granted to an entity. To access a resource, an entity must
provide a set of certificates. If a certificate chain exists, access to the resource would be
permitted.
SPKI/SDSI and KeyNote are similar in that they are both capability-style TM systems.
These systems use credentials to delegate permissions in where each credential is used to
delegate permissions from its issuer to its subject (holder). A chain of credentials is like a
capability, granting a set of permissions to the holder of the last credential in the chain.
2.5.3 Role-based Trust-Management Framework
Role-based Trust-management Framework (RT) [107, 108] is a language based framework for
role-based trust management. In RT, roles are viewed as attributes. An entity is a member
of a role if the entity has the unique attribute identified by the role. [107] argued that
authorisation in collaborative environments can be simplified in systems where attributes are
used for access control decisions. Attribute-based systems provide the flexibility needed to
support the distributed nature of authority in decentralised environments - unlike capability-
style systems, which cannot express authorisation statements that simplify decision making
for access control in a decentralised environment where distributed authorities exist. The
four attribute based access control requirements supported in RT0 [107] are:
• Decentralised attributes in which an entity asserts an attribute that is held by another
entity.
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• Delegation of attribute authority in which an entity delegates the authority it has on
an attribute to another entity.
• Attribute inference in which an attribute can be inferred through another attribute.
• Attribute-based (in contrast to identity-based) delegation of an attribute authority in
which authority over an attribute is delegated to another entity based on attributes
that the entity possess.
[107] defined four additional RT components: RT1,RT2,RTT , and RTD . RT relies on the
use of credentials to manage roles, role delegation, linked role and parameterised roles. Pa-
rameterised roles were introduced in RT1 to extend RT0. RT2 extends RT1 by grouping
logically related objects such as resources together. Threshold and separation-of-duty poli-
cies was supported by RTT , which introduces the concept of manifold roles. Similarly, the
support for delegation of role activation was introduced by RTD .
RT languages use Datalog [109] to represent credentials and policy rules. Using Datalog, the
notion of well-formed credentials was introduced, by which safe Datalog rules are used to
represent RT1 credentials. The problem of credential chain discovery is not uncommon to
trust management systems. This problem was addressed first in [108], in which goal-directed
algorithms were presented for credential chain discovery. These algorithms can be used in
scenarios where credentials are either stored with the subject or with the issuer.
2.5.4 Trust Negotiation
Credentials provide a means of transferring trust between entities. The need to exchange
credentials between unknown entities introduces the concept of trust negotiation (TN) com-
monly known as Automated Trust Negotiation (ATN) [110]. ATN is an approach for trust
establishment between strangers through the exchange of sensitive information such as dig-
ital credentials. Trust is established through an iterative but cautious bilateral disclosure
of credentials [111, 112]. Digital credentials, which are analogous to paper credentials are
digital assertions about a credential owner signed by the credential issuer. Currently digital
credentials are widely implemented using X.509 certificates [30]. A credential is signed using
an issuer’s private key and the signed credential is verified with the issuer’s public key. A
credential contains attributes that describe properties of the holder asserted by the issuer.
Credentials also contain the public key of the credential owner through which the owner
can demonstrate its ownership by the corresponding private key. Negotiating these sensitive
credentials without any human intervention is the basis of trust establishment [113, 112].
39
2 Literature Review and Related Work
Several approaches [114, 115, 116, 113, 117] to trust negotiations have been proposed to
support access control policies in an open decentralised environment. Some approaches have
investigated a trust negotiation framework in the context of a peer-to-peer environment. [117]
introduced a Locally Trusted Third Party (LTTP) which acts like a cache and mediator be-
tween two entities for the purpose of successful trust negotiation. Similarly [114] introduces
a sequence prediction module that caches and manages trust sequences used in previous suc-
cessful trust negotiations. [116] proposes a trust chain based negotiation strategy (TRANS),
which dynamically constructs trust relationships using a trust proxy that can cache common
credentials or partial trust chain information from previous negotiations.
ATN is not all about credential disclosure but also about access policy disclosure. [118, 113,
119, 112] all present models for negotiation strategies to protect the disclosure of sensitive
credentials. However, for a negotiation to succeed the negotiating peers must operate using
the same strategies. [120] discusses the use of interoperable strategies for credential exchange
and why every entity should be free to use whatever strategy they choose before or during
negotiation. Two strategies are said to interoperate if trust negotiation succeeds whenever
it is possible. Arguably, if a trust negotiation succeeds, access policies would have been
disclosed. In some context, these access policies are sensitive information that needs to be
protected.
Various ATN systems have been developed, they include Trust-X [114] and TrustBuilder
[121]. Trust-X is a framework that provides an XML-based language that is used to encode
policies and certificates for trust negotiations. It also provides a peer-to-peer architecture
used for negotiation management. TrustBuilder is an architecture that focuses on negotiation
strategies. The architecture verifies credentials and checks policy compliance – by verifying
which credential should be involve in a negotiation. Other systems like Traust [122] have been
developed to augment TrustBuilder to provide interaction between applications or systems
that offer trust negotiation services.
The focus of this thesis is how credentials can be negotiated as the basis to supporting
collaborative research between autonomous, decentralised domains. In sensitive domains
such as e-Health, it is often impossible to deal with strangers owing to the risk involved. This
makes it much more difficult to support automated trust negotiations. When an intermediary
party is introduced that is known to both parties (initially strangers), then the associated
risks are reduced since credentials are not perceived to be disclosed to strangers. The model
introduced in this thesis negotiates credentials between known parties who can then act as
mediators on behalf of strangers.
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2.6 The Semantic Web
The Semantic Web introduces concepts extending the current Web in which information is
structured and given well-defined meaning. The semantic Web applies semantics to the Web,
expressing content in a machine processable form to enable co-operation between computers
and people [123]. The Semantic Web’s goal is to provide automatic discovery, integration
and reuse of information on the Web by linking information based on meaning and not solely
on syntax. The Semantic Web introduces the notion of ontologies as a possible solution to
semantic interoperability as discussed in [124].
An ontology is a detailed description of a shared vocabulary or conceptualisation of a specific
subject matter. Its use for security promises an inter-institution authorisation method for
collaboration between organisations sharing resources across boundaries. In [5] a security-
focused interoperable model was presented that uses a shared ontology for implementing
access control between collaborating healthcare institutions. The model contains a mediator
shown in Figure 2.10, which acts as a security broker that maps shared security ontology
information to a local security ontology, which is understood by the local authorisation
infrastructure for access decisions.
[125, 6] described ontology mapping as a possible solution to inter-institution authorisation
issues. The solution uses matching techniques such as multi-strategy learning and relaxation
labelling to match one ontology to the other. Relaxation labelling is a technique use for
assigning labels to nodes in a graph, given a set of constraints. The technique considers
the labels of neighboring nodes, the percentage of nodes in the neighborhood that satisfies a
certain criterion, and whether a set of constraints is satisfied or not. For instance, in Figure
2.11, a Medical Science Division of a University participating in a clinical trial might have
roles of Senior Lecturer, Reader and Professor which might have equivalent functionality (and
be mapped) to Consultant or Clinical Lecturer to Registrar in the NHS domain. This labelling
is not simply a naming issue: the role is directly associated with privileges. Thus a Professor
is able to perform duties beyond those of a Senior House Officer for example. The solution
in [125] has advantages over [5] in that the latter depends on an agreed and shared ontology
while the former does not. However, having an agreed and shared ontology eliminates the
need for matching techniques because static rules are defined by each organisation to map
between the shared and local ontology.
The application of Semantic Web technologies in Grid computing has led to the concept of
Semantic Grid technologies. The Semantic Grid presents an opportunity for information and
services to have well-defined meaning, so one can build intelligent and secure Grid services.
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Figure 2.10: Shared Ontology Architecture
Figure 2.11: NHS Hospital/Medical Science Division Ontologies
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Hopefully, the Semantic Grid for data or service integration will spawn semantic security
solutions. Especially in scenarios where non-trusting entities and providers wish to share
data.
2.7 Context of e-Health Domain
This section reviews some healthcare projects that were developed to provide system inter-
operability, data access, integration and management in decentralised autonomous e-Health
environments. There are many projects that could be reviewed in this domain space, those
reviewed here were selected because of their similarities to the MRC-funded VOTES project
[126, 127], i.e. they are Grid-based e-Health scenarios.
2.7.1 Integration Broker for Heterogeneous Information Sources
The Integration Broker for Heterogeneous Information Sources (IBHIS) [128] is a collabora-
tive project developed by three Universities in the UK: Durham, Keele and UMIST1. IBHIS
is an information broker that serves as a trusted intermediary between autonomous organisa-
tions to provide access to distributed data services in heterogeneous forms. The architecture
provides live access to distributed data that are protected by local access rules. IBHIS was
designed based on the concept of federated database systems [129, 130].
As shown in Figure 2.12, the architecture provides services that address issues of query
formulation, data access service (DAS) discovery and enforcement of access rules. Each DAS
maintains a semantic description file that describes the data it contains; the access control
policy for the data it provides and the access control mappings that can be used to relate local
roles to remote roles. Queries are formulated using an ontology service that maps clinical
concepts between a broker and data services. In addition to the broker, the IBHIS model
includes an audit service that keeps records of all actions, which may subsequently be used
for evidence corroboration in ethical and legal cases. Similarly, the model includes a semantic
registry, used to identify the required DAS when a query is submitted.
A user creates a query using a global ontology and, based on their access profile, submits
the query to the broker. The broker processes the query consulting the semantic registry to
identify which DASs are needed for the query and to decompose the query into sub-queries.
Based on the identified DAS and sub-queries, attribute authorisation is performed to match
1UMIST is now known as the University of Manchester
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Figure 2.12: The Architecture of IBHIS Operational System [128]
the sub-query to the data access permissions received from the DAS. The broker views data
fields as attributes for the purpose of attribute authorisation and in some cases attributes
are dropped from the final sub-queries. DAS executes sub-queries; does authorisation and
returns results to the broker.
In the final stage, the broker is expected to filter results through inference rules, but it is
not clear how these rules are formed or the algorithms used for the inference checking. Also,
besides semantically correct global query issues, the centralised nature of the model where
the broker acts as a link between users and data providers, is the single point of failure of
the entire system. To address this potential failure, it is important for each DAS to be able
to discover and connect to one another besides the centralised broker. However, for this
to work, each DAS must be able to trust the another, i.e. realise trust, and they must be
able to map local roles between one another. Trust realisation and relating local roles across
domains are some of the issues this thesis aims to address.
2.7.2 Clinical e-Science Framework
The Clinical e-Science Framework (CLEF) [131, 132] is a UK e-Science project that is be-
ing developed by a host of UK universities to deliver an interoperable infrastructure that
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supports access and integration of various operational electronic patient records in order to
support clinical and bioscience research. One of the goals of the project is to develop a man-
ageable repository of information histories that can easily be linked to genetic and genomic
information.
In the framework, the repository often called a ‘Chronicle’ is the central component of the
framework. All data workflows pass through the repository, thereby making it possible to
build an historical information view of consenting patients. In order to preserve privacy
and confidentiality various safeguards are designed in the framework. First, patients records
comprising of structured and unstructured data sets are pseudonymised in the repository
to anonymise patients. Patient’s records are tagged with a CLEF entry identifier which
can only be reversed by the data provider. Second, data is depersonalised during access to
conceal or remove any potentially identifying information. Third, statistical disclosure control
techniques are employed to eliminate or reduce any identity inference that may occur.
Another design goal of CLEF was for it to be built on or extend Grid middleware and
so leverage Grid security frameworks. In addition to Grid authentication, CLEF access
control services are being developed with PERMIS [56] to provide scalable authorisation. In
retrospect, CLEF depends on numerous technologies, especially technologies that are proven
for e-Science to deliver and maintain its interoperable repository. However, it is not clear
how CLEF hopes to achieve robustness and availability of its ‘centralised’ repository.
CLEF’s aim is to “develop a high quality, safe and interoperable information repository,
derived from operational electronic patient records to enable ethical and user-friendly access
to the information in support of clinical care and biomedical research” [131]. However, to
achieve this in the long term, the security model will have to be extensible and scalable.
The centralised model will have to be reviewed and the issue of trust realisation between
collaborating members will have to be addressed. This thesis focuses especially on trust
realisation from a clinical research and collaboration perspective.
2.7.3 ARTEMIS
A typical healthcare provider has many heterogeneous healthcare information systems that
support patient care delivery. Providing interoperability between these healthcare systems
was the motivation behind ARTEMIS. ARTEMIS [133, 134] is a project involved in the de-
velopment of a semantic web-service driven peer-to-peer infrastructure for healthcare infor-
mation systems. ARTEMIS fundamental objective is to support communication of electronic
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healthcare records across organisational boundaries. With this objective an infrastructure
that supports interoperability between healthcare information systems was developed.
The key components of the ARTEMIS infrastructure includes: clinical concept ontologies;
semantically annotated security and privacy policies, and mediators, Figure 2.13. Clinical
concept ontologies are derived from healthcare information standards such as HL7 [135], CEN
TC251 [136], ISO TC215 [137] and are used to describe Web Services functionality semantics
and the data or documents that are exchanged through Web Services. Semantically annotated
security and privacy policies are defined by healthcare providers. These policies are based
on agreed organisational requirements. Mediators are super-peers that broker and reconciles
semantic differences between healthcare organisations. Mediators reference agreed healthcare
standards to reconcile organisational semantic differences. The peer-to-peer architecture of
the mediator components provides scalability and enables discovery of other mediators.
ARTEMIS models healthcare organisations as peer nodes, which are connected in a peer-
to-peer network structure. Typically healthcare providers are autonomous. Each healthcare
provider develops and semantically annotates security policies that suit their organisation.
Using mediators or super-peers, there security policies are able to be mapped and translated
between organisations, Figure 2.14. A mediation [5] is achieved between a requester and a
provider by linking organisational role ontologies with clinical concept ontologies. The idea
of role mapping using clinical concept ontologies introduced a possible solution to informa-
tion access interoperability. However, it introduces semantic interoperability issues that are
common with open network and federated systems [3, 138]. To address this, this thesis inves-
tigates an alternative to the single ontology paradigm by considering how localised security
ontologies can be folded into one another through trust contracts.
2.7.4 PsyGrid
PsyGrid [140, 141] is a UK e-Science project developed by a collaboration of universities in the
UK to address issues that affect healthcare systems, such as data gathering and aggregation.
Its aim is to develop Grid middleware and applications that could support epidemiology and
clinical trials in the mental health domain. It also aims to make available resources on first
episode psychosis that researchers and clinical scientist can use. Essentially, it is a data
collection system for longitudinal studies.
Data is collected from eight different geographic areas in the UK and stored in a data repos-
itory. Each of the areas is autonomous and corresponds to a hub of the Mental Health
46
2 Literature Review and Related Work
Figure 2.13: The ARTEMIS Architecture [139]
Figure 2.14: The ARTEMIS Process [139]
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Research Network (MHRN). One of the design principles of PsyGrid is to produce a reliable,
customisable and secure infrastructure that clinical researchers can use. Two key components
of PsyGrid are a central data repository for storing clinical data and a security sub-system
that uses SAML [70] and a role-based access control system. As opposed to message level
security, TLS [17] in conjuction with PKI is used for secure communication. Since the frame-
work is not designed to support message collaboration, where parties need to secure different
parts of a message. PsyGrid also provides audit trails and anonymisation support on data
imported and exported.
For the implementation of the security layer, technologies like SAML, LDAP, MyProxy [65]
and OGSA-DQP [142] are used for the inter-organisation federation. Policy authorities in
an organisation trust SAML assertions signed by another organisation’s attribute authority.
A policy authority is expected to be able to verify the signature on a SAML assertion of the
attribute authority it trusts, thereby enabling privileges of a user from another organisation to
be used for access control. This is made possible in PsyGrid as inter-organisation federation
that requires participating organisations to agree on semantics and meaning of privileges
that will be used in the federation in advance. This assumption is not always valid and
means a lack of scalability and flexibility. Also, the requirement of reaching agreement in
advance is a limitation since agreements are not always easy to reach and maintained in an
open environment. This thesis examines pair-wise agreements in the form of trust contracts
since organisations are able to reach and maintain agreements with another on a peer-to-peer
basis.
2.7.5 Cancer Biomedical Informatics Grid
The cancer Biomedical Informatics Grid (caBIG) [143] is a program and designed to create a
national-scale infrastructure that connects data, research tools, scientists and organisations,
to leverage their combined strengths and expertise in an open federated environment, so as
to precipitate in the development of effective patient therapies for cancer. The underlying
infrastructure for caBIG is referred to as caGrid. caGrid provides the technology that en-
ables collaboration between institutions and it supports sharing of information and analytical
resources securely. caGrid makes available virtualised datasets through its open standard-
ised service interfaces and communication mechanisms. caBig emphasises data modelling and
semantic interoperability across heterogeneous resources, achieved by use of controlled vocab-
ularies, common data elements, published information models and well defined programming
interfaces.
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caGrid infrastructure is built upon the version 4.0 of Globus Toolkit (GT4) [59]. This enables
caGrid services to be based on the Web Services Resource Framework (WSRF) version 1.2
of the standard [144]. Developed on top of the Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) [37] is
the Grid Authentication and Authorisation with Reliable Distributed Services (GAARDS)
[145]. GAARDS provides enterprise services and administrative tools that can be used to
administer and enforce security policy in a Grid environment.
GAARDS services for authentication include: Dorian Services, Authentication Services, Cre-
dential Delegation Services (CDS) and Grid Trust Services (GTS). Like GSI, GAARDS
require Grid credentials in order for a user/application to communicate with secure Grid
services. To obtain Grid credentials, a user is expected to be registered with a Dorian ser-
vice or have an existing account in another domain that is a Dorian trusted security domain
(identity provider). An Authentication Service provides a framework for identity providers
for issuing SAML assertions that may be used by a user to obtain Grid credentials from a
Dorian Service. However, in the case where a user is registered at a Dorian domain (IdP),
the user can obtain their Grid credentials directly by authenticating at the Dorian domain.
Once a Grid credential has been obtained, a user can then invoke secure services. A secure
service supports authentication by validating Grid credentials presented by a user against a
Grid Trust Service (GTS).
GTS maintains a federated trust fabric of all trusted digital signers such as Dorian and grid
certificate authorities. The importance of GTS is in how it maintains the trusted digital
signers as these signers are dynamic, growing in number, and regularly publish new trust
information. The importance of GTS is that it enables Grid services to remain updated and
to know which CA certificates or credentials to trust. The traditional approach to trusted
CA certificates is to have a CA directory in the server/service configuration directory that is
used to identify which credentials are trusted (LSLV). This implies that trust is configured
at the container level instead of the service level. LSLV approach is supported out of the box
in Globus, but its scalability and maintainability drawbacks make it unsuitable for enterprise
Grids that require fine-grained and flexible access control for each Grid service that exists in
a container.
In addition to GTS managing trusted certificates, Grid services can retrieve trusted certificate
from GTS and perform credential validation locally (RRLV) or they could send received
credentials to a GTS for validation (RSRV) [7].
Once a user has been authenticated at a GTS, a secure service may then proceed to de-
termine if the user is authorised to perform what they requested. GAARDS services for
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authorisation include: Grid Grouper services [145] for managing and enforcing Access Con-
trol Policies. The Grid Grouper service is a group-based authorisation service that can be
used to enforce authorisation policy based on memberships to groups2. Groups provisioned
by the Grid Grouper are defined and managed at the Grid/virtual organisation level. This
enables applications and Grid services to enforce authorisation policies based on membership
to groups at the Grid level. Groups in Grid Grouper are organised into namespaces, which
are also called stems and a stem may contain a set of child stems.
In addition to the Grid Grouper, the caCore Common Security Module (CSM) [146] can
also be used for authorisation as it provides a centralised approach to the management and
enforcement of access control policy. A Grid service can enforce its local authorisation policies
by asking the Grid Grouper directly if the requester (user) is a member of a given group.
Similarly, a Gird service can make use of the CSM as its PDP to decide if a requester is
authorised to perform a given action. The CSM in the case of group-based access policy, can
enforce access control based on groups that are provisioned by the Grid Grouper.
In order to support federated queries, distributed workflow execution and integration with
web applications, GAARDS 1.2 provides Credential Delegation Service (CDS) and Web Single
Sign-On (WebSSO). Using the CDS, external users (delegates) or services can assume the
identity of another entity (delegator) for the purpose of authorisation with remote services or
applications. With the CDS, a delegation policy can be expressed, which entitles delegates
to assume the identity of the delegator for a limited period. WebSSO on the other hand
compliments the CDS in that it enables web users to make use of both web and Grid services
without the need to provide login credentials. WebSSO provides a mechanism that automates
the delegation and retrieval of a user’s Grid credential by using the identity of the currently
logged in web user.
Although the concept of Grid Grouper and CDS is significant, it is not clear how the model
will scale with increase in number of Grid Groupers. Similarly, as many more users become
available, many more delegators will be required. To address this scalability concern, it
would be valuable if components like Grid Grouper and CSM could negotiate trust, i.e.
group namespaces (security attributes) with one another. In addressing this, this thesis
investigates trust negotiation in decentralised environments.
2The similarities between groups and roles are discussed in 2.2.5
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2.7.6 UK BioBank
UK Biobank [147] is a long term study that began in 2007 in the UK to investigate genetic
predisposition, environmental exposures including lifestyle, nutrition and medication in the
causes of diseases. The study targets half a million UK based participants aged 40–69, which
will be followed up for about 25 years from their enrolment. During the study, data such as
blood samples, DNA, disease events, drug prescriptions, deaths of participants are stored in
a centralised repository [148]. Currently, participants are being recruited and data collected
from about 39 regional centres in the UK. It is expected that some years from now, researchers
will apply to use the database and be able to compare a sample anonymous participants that
developed a particular disease such as heart disease with a sample of participants that did not.
With the sample, they will hopefully be able to consider the benefits, effects and interaction
of specific genes, lifestyles and medications.
The main components of the biobank system architecture include: appointment service, data
archive, a laboratory information management system (LIMS) and a core data repository
[149]. The appointment service which is controlled centrally, makes use of an NHS register of
people aged 40–69 to identify potential participants. In order to recruit 500, 000 participants,
an estimated 5 million primary invitations are needed using the NHS register. Collected
data is stored in a data archive. Data samples like urine and blood samples are stored in a
sample archive, which is managed by the LIMS. Access to the sample store are through store
operators based on access privileges assigned to user profiles. In addition, orders for sample
retrieval can only be made through the LIMS which is subject to an approval process and
cannot be initiated by a store operative. The core data repository which is the architecture
central component, can only be accessed by a selected number of named UK biobank staff
under controlled conditions.
UK BioBank is relevant to this work as it presents an example of a large, country-wide
study, with serious implications if anything goes wrong. It is important to note that the UK
BioBank approach to security is a closed and centralised approach so as to limit and curtail
security risks. For example, the aspect of patient recruitment required the National Health
Service to provide the register of patients aged 40–69. This was made possible by the fact
that one of the sponsors of the study is UK Department of Health and thus has the advantage
of NHS services [149]. However, if patient records were not obtained centrally, that is if each
of the 39 regions were expected to separately find and recruit patients from their locality, it
would present a huge security challenge and several risk implications could follow. Similarly,
it is yet to be seen how access to ongoing participants records and data linking would be
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controlled and monitored over the coming years. Perhaps the NHS would still be responsible
for providing follow up data as they become available. To address these issues, projects like
VOTES and the Scottish Health Information Platform (SHIP) [150] are investigating various
security models that BioBank can build on.
2.8 Summary
This chapter has reviewed the associated background literature in the area of security and
presented other relevant work associated with supporting e-Health collaborations.
The first section of this chapter covered security in decentralised and open environments by
introducing security concepts including authentication, authorisation, data confidentiality
and integrity, and non-repudiation. The discussion showed that trust underlines security
concepts and that security threats are related to the violations of these concepts. From an
authorisation point of view, trust is often modelled using digital credentials. Related to
this, cryptography and public key infrastructure were discussed as they highlight the issues
of trust realisation. The discussion showed that using PKI, confidentiality can be achieved
through encryption, data integrity through a digital signature and centralised trust through
certificate authorities.
The second section of this chapter reviewed the various types of access control models since
they underpin the work described in this thesis. The models included mandatory and dis-
cretional access control; access matrix; identity-based and role-based access controls. These
models provide a means of analysing whether a security system conforms to an abstract
model in its design and implementation, and whether it satisfies the same properties as the
abstract model. The discussion showed that no one security model fits all by highlighting
their relevant strengths and weaknesses.
The third section of this chapter focused on various Grid-oriented privilege management
infrastructures including PERMIS, VOMS and CAS. Using these infrastructures as exam-
ples, the challenges of security in decentralised and open environments were discussed. The
discussion showed that the definition, assignment, presentation, delegation and revocation
of security attributes are core security challenges in decentralised environments. This sec-
tion concluded with a review of Grid security infrastructures and associated framework, and
emphasised the need for fine-grained access control systems.
The fourth section of this chapter discussed some of the evolving security standards and
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languages, such as SAML, Shibboleth, XACML and WS-Security. The discussion showed
some of the in-roads made towards solving key security challenges. The chapter described
how solutions such as SAML provides a mean of exchanging security-related information
between parties, whilst Shibboleth provides a standard protocol for the secure exchange
of attributes between trusted collaborating partners for the purpose of authentication and
authorisation. XACML defines a standard for writing access control policies and provides one
way to describe the semantics for trust realisation. WS-Security on the other hand provides
a set of specifications for realising security concepts through Web Services. To achieve this,
the WS-security standard has proposed SOAP header extensions and profiles for exchange
of security tokens.
The fifth section of this chapter introduced trust management. Four fundamental trust
properties were discussed: that trust is transitive; that trust cannot be shared; that trust
cannot be mirrored, and that trust cannot be self-declared. All these properties underline
the notion of trust in this thesis. They serve as the basis for the credential equivalence
discussed in Section 5.6. Some existing trust management models were presented in this
section including: PolicyMaker, SPKI/SDSI, RT, and ATN. The limitations of these models
highlighted the need for a trust discovery and realisation framework, especially between non-
trusting domains. The sixth section reviewed the area of the semantic web (and the notion
of ontology) and its application to Grid systems.
The last section of this chapter addressed the context of this research by focusing in particular
on the e-Health domain and on the various projects that have been conducted in respect of
interoperability, data access, data integration and management in decentralised autonomous
e-Health environments. IBHIS was reviewed and it was described how it uses a broker for
data sharing and access. However, for IBHIS to work in a decentralised environment it
must be able to realise trust and map local attributes between domain brokers. The CLEF
system was reviewed and it was shown how it uses a centralised repository for sharing data
between parties. Given this model, it was identified that it is not clear how CLEF hopes to
achieve robustness and availability of its centralised repository. ARTEMIS, another e-health
framework was described and it was shown how it relies on the use of clinical ontologies
and semantically annotated security policies. However, ARTEMIS also introduces semantic
interoperability issues in decentralised environments where for example different ontologies
may exist. Other e-Health projects reviewed in this chapter included PsyGrid, caBIG and
UK Biobank. For each of these it was discussed how they each have their own open security
challenges and could benefit from trust realisation and discovery.
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This chapter presents Dynamic Trust Negotiation (DTN). It describes the overall objectives
of DTN and the design of the DTN system. The design of DTN includes the formulation of
policy statements, the application of policy language, the DTN protocol, and the architecture.
The design is broken down into components and this chapter describes each component in
relation to other components. It concludes with a typical scenario for applying DTN.
3.1 Design Objectives
Trust is an important component in collaborations and this is especially so in e-Health
collaborations. As collaboration in the e-Health research community continues to grow,
so does the need to realise and establish trust between systems or agents representing the
involved parties. Dynamic Trust Negotiation (DTN) [10, 151] is designed to address the issue
of realising and establishing trust between systems or agents within the e-Health domain such
as the clinical trials. To address this issue, the DTN design objectives are as follows:
• To support access to resources across organisational boundaries: the primary
goal of DTN is to enable seamless access to resources across boundaries without com-
promising separate organisation security measures that are in place, e.g. to ensure
confidentiality and integrity.
• To be compatible with existing privilege management infrastructures: In
order not to compromise the existing security infrastructure of each organisation, DTN
has to be deployable and compatible with the existing PMI in place. These might
include security standards such as WS-Security [88], Shibboleth [41], SAML [72] and
XACML [84].
• To provide an alternative to the single global policy or attributes approach
that defines what attributes or credentials are, what they are used for and
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where they are used: Existing solutions for decentralised access control like Shibbo-
leth require the use of agreed attributes such as the eduPerson attributes [152, 153] to
be used for authorisation across boundaries. Another solution is that used in Artemis
[134] where local ontologies of authorisation attributes are mapped to a global attribute
ontology or vice versa for access control. In contrast to the global attributes approach,
DTN should enable the use of foreign attributes or credentials to be acceptable, useable
and tenable for local policies without the need for global attributes.
• To negotiate security credentials through delegation of roles: DTN should
allow the negotiation of attributes used for access control between organisations through
the use of credentials so that local roles can be assigned to entities with credentials
issued by trusted foreign parties.
• To support the discovery and establishment of chains of trust: Chains of trust
are analogous to certificate chains, which show how a remote certificate can be trusted
through an order list of certificates through intermediary certificates to a root trusted
CA certificate. In this thesis, chains of trust are viewed as an order list of entities
that are connected together through trust relationships. DTN can be considered as
supporting the discovery of these trust relationships and when necessary, establish the
chain of trust between entities.
In addition to the above objectives, the following are some e-Health collaboration challenges
that DTN aims to address.
• Control And Autonomy: Each organisation in the community is independent and
controls access to, and use of, their own resources. Tackling this demands the need to
address the challenges of distributed access control including policy definition, enforce-
ment, conflicts and heterogeneity. In e-Health environments, organisations typically
design and enforce their own access policies with no notion of external collaboration or
sharing information with external organisations. In some cases, situations arise where
access policies are tied to applications, making it difficult to share information with
other applications within the same organisation, a unique feature of health organisa-
tions.
• Credential proliferation: The use of credentials for access control has been around
for a considerable time including applications in health organisations. However, a
common occurrence in most health organisations is the proliferation of credentials.
Some of these credentials are tied to applications and so it is possible to have users
with similar credentials for different applications. Applications such as the Scottish
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Care Information Store (SCI-Store) [154], the General Practice Administration System
for Scotland (GPASS) [155], and the Picture Archiving and Communications System
(PACS) [156], for example, provide access to data resources that in most cases are
related to one another, thus users are required to present different credentials to different
applications for access to related data.
• Different and numerous policies: Since a centralised access management control
model does not exist, organisations are at liberty to create policies that meet their
specific needs. These policies, more often than not, are written in different languages.
Similarly, as numerous health applications exist within the same organisation, different
policies exist with the same goals.
• Policy disclosure - not with strangers: This is one of the main challenges of
e-Health collaborations. Policies can exist that may not be disclosed to external or-
ganisations. This is partly due to government directives such as [157] that prevent
data disclosure. In some scenarios where policies disclosure is permitted, they are
only disclosed to trusted third parties that possess the necessary access and disclosure
agreements (contracts).
• Government guidelines: The e-Health environment is an area where government
guidelines, acts [158], and directives [157] exist to ensure adequate protection for pa-
tients and healthcare providers. They raise requirements that must be met and systems
developed in this area are required to satisfy these requirements, e.g. privacy protec-
tion.
3.2 Architectural Overview
The overview of the DTN layered architecture is shown in Figure 3.1. The architecture
is made up of three main components: a protocol interface; a trust enforcement engine
and an access control engine. Two protocols are defined in DTN, the first is for trust-path
discovery, through which a trust-pathway (chain of trust) can be established between entities.
The second protocol deals with trust negotiation, through which trust (credentials) can be
negotiated between trusted entities on behalf of two non-trusting entities. Without discovery
of a trust-path, trust negotiation on behalf of non-trusting entities cannot be achieved. These
protocols are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. In addition to negotiating security
credentials, discovery and the establishment of trust-pathways, these protocols also ensure
that policies are not disclosed to strangers (non-trusted entities).
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Figure 3.1: Decentralised View of DTN Architecture
As shown in Figure 3.2 The trust enforcement engine is responsible for trust negotiation
between itself (e.g. the local organisation) and other trusted entities (e.g. remote organi-
sations). It participates in negotiations that are initiated by other intermediary nodes (e.g.
remote/intermediate organisations) and can also initiate negotiations with other intermedi-
ary nodes. It receives foreign credentials and, where the negotiation is successful, it releases
credentials of its own to other entities that it trusts, on behalf of the initiator. During nego-
tiation, when a credential is received, it verifies and also validates the credential against its
policies through the access control engine.
Figure 3.2: DTN Negotiation Components
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The access control engine itself provides authorisation services for the trust enforcement
engine. As credentials are negotiated, the acceptance and release of credentials have to be
authorised against various policies. Similarly, in the case of it being the resource target, i.e.
the service provider, foreign credentials that are to be negotiated for local attributes, such
as roles, are authorised against trust contract policies. These policies are discussed in detail
in Chapter 6. Some authorisation requests that are made to the access control engine are
discussed in subsequent sections.
3.3 Protocol and Trust Enforcement Engine
The trust enforcement engine works with the negotiation protocol. When a negotiation
request is received, the protocol parses the request and, if it is identified as the service
provider, it forwards the received credentials to the trust enforcement engine. If it is only an
intermediary node in the negotiation, it forwards the received credentials along with the list
of next-hop nodes to the trust enforcement engine. The list of next-hop nodes are generated
and maintained through a discovery protocol on an on-demand basis. The list of next-hop
nodes is made up of nodes that are in its circle-of-trust. Credentials and a list of next-hops
are used by the trust enforcement engine to construct authorisation requests that are made
to the access control engine.
The trust enforcement engine ensures that policy rules governing the acceptance and release
of credentials are enforced. Often these rules embody constraints that are placed on certain
entities and their credentials. For instance, in Figure 3.3, node D might be willing to release
its General Practitioner (GP) role at the request of organisation C to organisation A and not
to organisation B because B has no trust contract for C ’s GP role, unlike A that has one.
A trust contract is an agreeable arrangement made between two mutually suspicious entities
to trust each other, which includes agreement on identity and key management, credential
mappings and delegation of access attributes such as roles. These agreements can be static
and made oﬄine by Attribute Authorities. The list of nodes that a node has a trust contract
with constitute the node’s circle-of-trust. The Circle-of-trust and trust contract are discussed
in more detail in Chapter 5.
The government guidelines, acts and directives mentioned above can be enforced using trust
contracts. Similarly, the trust enforcement engine ensures that negotiations do not occur with
entities that are not in its COT thus ensuring that policies are not disclosed to “strangers”.
In addition, since trust negotiation goes through multiple negotiation hops, it makes it less
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Figure 3.3: Use of Trust contract
likely for the requester to infer the policies that control access to a resource. The ability to
infer is far less likely as multiple trust-paths may exist between the requester and the service
provider.
3.4 Trust Enforcement Engine and Access Control Engine
During negotiations, the trust enforcement engine makes various authorisation requests to
the access control engine depending on whether its domain is the service provider for the
service request or just a trusted intermediary.
Example 3.1 Bob in organisation A initiates a service or data request to Organisation C
for patient records. C is not in A’s circle-of-trust as no trust contract exists between them.
However, B is in A’s circle-of-trust and C is in B’s circle-of-trust. As shown in Figure 3.4,
A negotiates with organisation B for B’s credential that can satisfy C ’s access policy. B in
this case is a trusted intermediary while C is the service provider. Each of these organisations
A,B ,C have their own trust enforcement engine and all participate in the trust negotiation.
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Figure 3.4: Use of Trust contract and Circle-of-trust
Upon receiving an authorisation request, the access control engine invokes its policy decision
point (PDP) that in turn makes access deductions using authorisation policies to reach a
decision. An authorisation decision is essentially a logic deduction based on the request and
policy rules. Four essential authorisation requests include: assigning and activating a role,
invoking a contract and releasing a credential.
3.4.1 Assigning a Role
In the case of an organisation being the service provider, the trust enforcement engine needs
to ascertain if it can assign a role to a foreign entity based on the negotiated credential.
A foreign entity can access a resource only after they have been assigned a local role with
permissions for the resource requested.
Example 3.2 Based on Example 3.1, a credential issued by organisation B that asserts that
Bob is a clinician has to be assigned to C ’s local role before a decision can be made for Bob to
access C ’s resources that he requested. For instance, C has a resource called PatientMaster
table and the Nurse role has been granted permissions to perform select and update actions
on PatientMaster. So if Bob wants to select or read datasets from PatientMaster table at
C , he would need to be assigned C ’s Nurse role.
A typical assign request would be:
Assign Bob who is issued a credential from B that asserts Bob has a Clinician
role with the Nurse local role granted with permission p such as {select action
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on Patientmaster table}. This can be written as a predicate:
assign((credential issued by B that asserts entity has Clinician role),
Nurse,Patientmaster(select))
In Example 3.2 Bob is the entity and only when the assign predicate is evaluated to be true
by C ’s PDP that Bob can be assigned a nurse role. The specification of such predicates are
described in Chapter 6.
3.4.2 Activating a Role
A role can be viewed as an attribute that is associated with a set of permissions. In RBAC
[43, 44], roles are assigned to users and given permissions through roles. It is important
that roles are assigned to users as this allows for the specific privileges they require for their
task. Once a user is assigned a role, the user can enjoy the benefits of the role by activating
its role membership or by acting in the capacity of the role. In practical terms, a user can
activate a role by presenting the attributes that says he/she is a member of a role to a policy
enforcement point (PEP).
Role-based access control is largely used today because it specifies and enforces security
policies in a way that reflects organisational structures. In ABAC [107, 119], roles are simply
attributes that are used to distinguished between capacities [21]. As is shown in [39] role
attributes can be exchanged as attribute certificates which are widely used in Grid systems.
Example 3.3 Bob might be registered at a hospital as both a Consultant and as a Pa-
tient. Bob’s attributes showing he is a Consultant might include his General Medical Council
(GMC) Code and his specialisation attributes. As a Patient he might have a patient iden-
tification attribute. As a Consultant he may be able to administer prescriptions to Patients
and as a Patient he might himself receive prescriptions. In most systems he would not be
allowed to activate both roles at the same time as control policies may be in place to ensure
separation of duty [48].
In DTN, role memberships are described using predicates, can activate and has activated
predicates. The can activate predicate describes if an entity can act in the capacity of a role,
while has activated describes whether an entity is currently acting in the capacity of a role.
A typical activation request may be:
Has Bob activated a Consultant role? If the answer can be deduced to be true
then Bob can administer a prescription. If false, the question “can Bob activate a
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Figure 3.5: Separation of duty
Consultant role” will be asked. If that answer is deduced to be true then Bob can,
in principle, go ahead to administer a prescription to a patient. The predicates
for has activated and can activate can be written as follows respectfully:
has activated(Bob,Consultant(g19099, cardiologist))
can activate(Bob,Consultant(g19099, cardiologist))
where g19099 in both predicates might be Bob’s GMC code and cardiologist his
specialism.
As another example, if Bob wants to activate the Consultant role. If the predicate
has activated(Bob,Patient(1943567)) can be deduced to be true, then the access policy rule
that says an entity cannot have activated both a patient and a clinician, e.g Consultant role,
will be triggered preventing Bob from activating both roles. For instance a policy rule that
controls the activation of a Consultant role at a given PEP may be expressed as:
Entity e can activate a Consultant role if a Consultant role at a given PEP has
been assigned to e and e has not activated the Patient role at that PEP.
The specification of such predicates and policy rules are described in Chapter 6.
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3.4.3 Invoking a Contract
At the heart of DTN are trust contracts. Trust contracts are agreements between domains,
which are invoked during trust negotiations. A remote domain invokes a contract it has
reached with another domain in order to get the benefits of the interoperability. When a
credential is received from a remote domain, the first request to the access control engine by
the trust enforcement point is a contract invocation request. If an applicable contract does
not exist, the trust enforcement engine will prevent the domain from participating in the
trust negotiation.
Before a local role can be assigned to a foreign entity, the credential presented by the entity
must (through appropriate deductions) be able to invoke a trust contract for that local role. A
foreign entity should not be allowed to activate a local role, only a local entity can. Similarly,
an entity should not be able to invoke a contract that exists in its local domain since no
contract between a local entity and its domain should exist1. For instance, based on the
example in Section 3.4.1 Bob can be assigned a Nurse role only after Organisation B has
invoked the contract for the Nurse role. In this case, C would have a trust contract with B
that says B ’s Clinician credential is required for C ’s Nurse role.
The contract invocation request made by the trust enforcement engine to the access control
engine can be expressed as follows:
Can B invoke a contract for the Nurse role by releasing a credential it issued that
asserts a Clinician role? That is, can the following predicate be deduced?
can invoke((credential issued by B asserts entity has Clinician role),Nurse)
If the request is not granted then the domain can not take part in the negotiation. If the
request is granted and the domain is the service provider, then it is possible to proceed to
assigning the role to the entity assuming no issues of separation of duties exist. If the request
is granted and the domain is a trusted intermediary, a credential release request will be made
and evaluated before it can proceed with the trust negotiation.
A request can also be made to deduce if a contract has already been invoked. This deduction
can be used to prevent two mutually exclusive contracts from being invoked concurrently by
the same entity. This request can be expressed as follows:
1A local entity should not be able to invoke a contract for a local role where both are in the same domain
and/or sub-domain. In the context where both are in the same domain but in different sub-domains then
a local entity may be required to invoke a contract for a local role.
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Has B invoked a contract for the Nurse role in the current negotiation session?
This can be expressed as a predicate: has invoked(B ,nurse)
The specification of such predicates and policy rules are described in Section 6.
3.4.4 Releasing a Credential
If a domain is participating in a trust negotiation as a trusted intermediary, the trust en-
forcement point would first make a contract invocation request and, if the request is granted,
it would subsequently make a release credential request to the access control engine before a
credential can potentially be released to remote entities during negotiation. This is because,
in trust negotiation, credentials are sensitive resources that have to be protected. For in-
stance, based on the example in Section 3.4.1, organisation B ’s PDP would need to deduce
if the credential that asserts a Clinician role can be released to C . It is only when the
deduction is true that B ’s trust enforcement engine can release the credential to C during
the trust negotiation process.
The release credential request ensures that credentials are only released to approved domains
i.e. known and trusted organisations. Suppose organisation B from the example in Section
3.4.1 has organisations D and E in its circle-of-trust. B could negotiate, i.e. release its
credential to D and not to E . This may, for example, be a scenario where D is a healthcare
institution and E is a social care institution, and the credential being negotiated are mainly
healthcare related. In some other scenarios, it may just be that C is not comfortable releasing
that role credential to E .
DTN supports policies that control the release of credentials, for an extra layer of protection.
The release credential request can be expressed as follows:
Can B release a credential that asserts a clinical role to domain C if entity A has
invoked a contract for the clinician role? That is, can the following predicate be
deduced from B’s policy?
can release cred(C , (credential issued by B asserts entity has clinician role),A)
If the request is granted, the credential is released to the trusted domain, i.e. C in this
case, and negotiation at B would be regarded as successful. If the request was denied, the
negotiation requester domain, i.e. A in this case, would be notified with a negotiation failed
response. The specification of such predicates and policy rules are described in Section 6.
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3.5 Access Control and Policy Evaluation
Access control relies on the evaluation of access policies with respect to access requests.
Policy evaluators, such as a PDP, are used by access control engines to deduce if access to
resources should be granted or denied. A policy is made up of rules which contain the core
logic of a policy. Policy rules can be expressed as Boolean functions or predicates.
Programming logic lends itself well to policy specifications as policies are written in terms
of the goals and not in terms of actions sequences. Today many policy languages are based
on Datalog [109] and in some cases Datalog with constraints [159, 107]. Constraint logic
programming offers an easy way of introducing access control restrictions, e.g. that a GP can
only access medical records of patients that are registered with a particular GP practice. The
fact that one can express natural conditional statements into policy rules makes constraint
logic programming attractive.
The policy language used to express policy rules and credentials in this thesis are based on
Datalog with constraints similar to that expressed in Cassandra [2]. For DTN policies, four
main predicates are introduced and mentioned in Section 3.4. These predicates are discussed
in detail in Chapter 6 along with how these predicates can be used to express policies in a
distributed environment.
However, there are several drawbacks to implementing Datalog inference engines [107]. For
example, it is not easy to integrate a Datalog inference engine to an application. To avoid
these drawbacks, DTN policies are implemented using XACML [84] policies since XACML
policy evaluation engines are relatively easy to implement and integrate with existing ap-
plications. Appendix A shows some DTN rules that have been expressed in Datalog and
implemented as XACML policies.
3.6 Scenarios
To show the applicability of DTN, this section outlines some typical scenarios. These are
explored in more detail in Chapter 8.
A trial administrator with the responsibility of recruiting patients for a cardiovascular re-
search trial executes queries that span multiple health organisations. These queries involve
linking records across all of the datasets provided by service providers in these organisations.
Access to data is based on trust and access rights that each of the service (data) providers
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have granted to the administrator based on: their role; their home organisation; the current
clinical trial study, the context for access; the origin of the data; the general patient consent
or patient consent for a study; and the sensitivity of potential result sets. An example of
a successful query might be to return patients suffering from cardiovascular disease, aged
between 40 to 50, residing in Glasgow, who have given general consent for their medical
records to be used for clinical trial studies. Or it may return patients who have not given any
consent that the trial administrator would like to subsequently solicit consent from (possibly
through the patient’s GP).
Similarly, suppose a researcher from the University of Dundee named Alex wants to recruit
patients for a leukaemia cancer trial from three healthcare providers: Glasgow, Edinburgh,
and Aberdeen. He decides to submit query requests to each provider. The following idealises
the transaction between Alex@Dundee and Gartnavel hospital in Glasgow.
1. Authentication at Gartnavel: Alex needs to identify himself at Gartnavel. Since
Alex does not have a local ID at Gartnavel, Gartnavel cannot authenticate him locally.
However, Gartnavel is part of an Identity Federation which Dundee University is also
part of. Based on the basic authentication trust relationship between IdPs in the feder-
ation, Gartnavel was able to verify that Alex has authenticated at Dundee University.
With this authentication information identity, a request session is created for Alex.
2. Authorisation at Gartnavel: Alex submits a query request to Gartnavel for patients
that satisfy a certain criteria. Although the identity of Alex has been verified, his re-
searcher role at Dundee University cannot be used for authorisation at Gartnavel since
no authorisation policies exist recognising a researcher role from Dundee University,
i.e. no access agreement exists between Gartnavel and Dundee University for data ac-
cess. However, Gartnavel does have access agreements with other healthcare providers.
Gartnavel notifies Alex that his query request cannot be authorised but are willing
to reconsider his request if his authorisation credentials can be successfully negotiated
through other healthcare providers.
3. Trust Negotiation Initiation: Since Alex cannot negotiate his credentials directly
with healthcare providers, he makes a negotiation initiation request to his Institution’s
attribute authority asking that his credentials be negotiated with healthcare providers
that Dundee University has access agreements with.
4. Trust Negotiation: Dundee University negotiates Alex’s research role with healthcare
providers that they have access agreements with. One of the healthcare providers that
Dundee University has access agreements with is Tayside Childrens Hospital, Ninewells.
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Tayside Childrens Hospital had agreed to have Dundee’s research role recognised as
an honorary consultant role in line with their NHS contract policy [160]. Gartnavel
has access agreements with Tayside Childrens Hospital, which has Tayside consultant
roles recognised as Gartnavel consultant roles in line with [160]. That is, Tayside
honorary consultants are recognised as Gartnavel honorary consultants just as Tayside
consultants are recognised as Gartnavel consultants.
5. Data Access: Based on Alex’s request session, Gartnavel is able to collate all nego-
tiated credentials that they have access agreements with including having a Tayside
consultant role. Authorisation decisions are made based on Alex’s negotiated creden-
tials and requested data. Since the Tayside consultant role is permitted to access
anonymous leukaemia patient records at Gartnavel, Alex is allowed to have a list of
anonymised consented leukaemia patients that satisfy his criteria.
This is an elementary scenario where only one negotiation hop gives Alex the permissions he
needs. In most cases, several hops are needed in order to achieve access agreements between
institutions.
The above scenario is also idealised since federated access control and authorisation sys-
tem are not yet in place at these hospitals. Such scenarios are currently being explored in
Connecting for Health (CfP) / National Programme for Information Technology (NPfIT)
[161] and will be explored further in the Wellcome Trust funded Scottish Health Information
Platform (SHIP) [150] amongst others.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter the objectives of DTN were presented. To meet these objectives and the
associated challenges of e-Health collaborations, the overarching DTN design objectives were
formulated and discussed. Based on this an architectural overview was presented that in-
cluded the three main components, namely: a protocol interface; a trust enforcement engine
and an access control engine.
The chapter described the function and purpose of the architectural components. Discussion
on assigning and activating roles, invoking contracts and releasing credentials were introduced
and explained. The evaluation of access policies vis-a-vis policy rules and credential requests
used in the research were presented. The advantages and disadvantages of technologies such
as Datalog were discussed.
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The chapter concluded by describing various scenarios utilising the application of DTN.
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4 The DTN Architecture
This chapter describes the DTN architecture. The architecture is made up of two systems:
a discovery system and negotiation system. The first section describes the discovery system
and the components that make up the system, while the second section describes the nego-
tiation system and its components. The last section describes the flow of data in the DTN
architecture during a typical negotiation process.
4.1 Discovery System
The discovery system is used by domains to realise trust-pathways between themselves and
other nodes that are not members of their circle-of-trust. As shown in Figure 4.1, the
discovery system is made up of five components: the protocol interface; the controller; the
protocol data processing; a management interface, and a routing information handling. These
components are discussed in detail in the following sections. The routing algorithm described
by these components is presented in Chapter 7.
4.1.1 Protocol Interface
The discovery system provides an interface through which routing messages, i.e. route request
and responses can be exchanged between a node and nodes in its COT. The interface is
implemented as a web service and has an endpoint reference [162]. It is this endpoint reference
that nodes use to communicate with each other. By exposing the discovery system as a
GT4 or Web Service, the discovery system can easily be implemented to extend any trust
management infrastructure, such as the PERMIS.
The endpoint reference of a node is created using the URI address of the node. Whenever
a node decides to change its URI address, it notifies the nodes in its COT of the change.
Route request and route response described in Section 7 are two primary interfaces of the
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Figure 4.1: Discovery System Overview
discovery web service. Communicating via WS implies that routing messages are exchanged
as SOAP messages [66]. Similarly, it implies that nodes can take advantage of WS-Security
as discussed in Section 2.4.4 for route message exchange.
The protocol interface is responsible for transcoding routing messages between itself and the
controller component. Message transcoding is node dependent as nodes are free to imple-
ment the discovery protocol as they see fit, so as to enable easy integration with their local
infrastructures.
4.1.2 Controller
The protocol processing unit is made up of two components: a controller and a protocol
data processing component. The controller component controls and maintains the state of
messages during the discovery process. When a routing message is received, the controller
decides how the message should be processed and, when necessary, creates corresponding
messages that are communicated via the protocol interface.
A controller authenticates the sender of a message and validates a message before it is pro-
cessed by the protocol data processing component. Security keys, which are managed by a
trust management system, are used by the controller for MAC validation and also for sender
authentication through key verification.
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The controller monitors and ensures message security. The controller guards against vulner-
abilities and attacks such as spoofing and replay attacks, as discussed in Section 7.4.1. The
controller along with the protocol data processing component ensures that routing messages
received or sent adhere to the discovery protocol and are secure.
4.1.3 Protocol Data Processing
The protocol data processing component processes routing messages. Every message received
has to conform to the structure defined for routing messages. Received messages are decoded,
interpreted and actions taken based on the message.
After validation by the controller, route request (RREQ) and route response (RREP) mes-
sages are processed by the protocol data processing component. The data is analysed and
passed on to the routing information handling component for subsequent reuse as described
by the discovery algorithm presented in Section 7.2.3.
4.1.4 Routing Information Handling
The routing information handling (RIH) component stores routing information for discovered
nodes. Routing information includes next-hop nodes and nodes that exist in a COT. During
trust negotiation routing information is communicated via the controller and through the
management interface to the negotiation service. Frequently the controller must access the
RIH for its routing information and retrieve or update the COT information. The endpoint
of a discovery process needs to update the routing or next-hop information.
4.1.5 Management Interface
The management interface is used to access and manage data on the controller. Through the
interface, a node’s COT information can be updated and managed. The interface can also
be used to update the number of trust contracts a node has with other nodes. The interface
can compliment any existing trust management infrastructure through the use its API and
it can be used by the negotiation service to retrieve next-hop nodes.
As discussed in Section 7.2.2 key management is pivotal to the discovery process. The
management interface provides a medium through which security keys managed by a trust
management infrastructure are accessible by a controller. A security key can be a shared
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key that has been agreed between two nodes or it might be a public-private key pair. It is
necessary that key management is separated from the discovery system as existing infras-
tructure may already exist for managing security keys. An example of a trust management
infrastructure for key management is a PKI [26] system – discussed in Section 2.1.3.
4.2 Negotiation System
The negotiation system shown in Figure 4.2 is used for trust negotiation. The system com-
prises a negotiation service, agent and a SAML plus component. The negotiation service
interacts with the negotiation agent and is used to enforce the decision of the agent. The
negotiation service also interacts with the discovery system in order to identify other trusted
domains (next-hops), when it is acting as an intermediary domain. Each of these components
are described in this section.
Figure 4.2: Negotiation System Overview
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4.2.1 Negotiation Service
The negotiation service is the point of contact for node interactions during trust negotiation.
It provides a secure interface through which domains can request and exchange credentials.
The negotiation service consists of two main components: the interface to the negotiation
protocol, and the trust enforcement point. The protocol interface is the point of interaction
where negotiation request or responses are received or sent. The protocol interface is also
the point of interaction between the negotiation service and the management interface of the
discovery system.
4.2.2 Trust Enforcement Point
This component interacts with the negotiation agent and is used to enforce the decisions
of the agent by communicating responses or by interacting with the SAML module. It
communicates responses through the negotiation service to a requester or to intermediary
domains. Based on the negotiation agent’s decision, it initiates a negotiation request with
other next-hop domains on behalf of the requester.
4.2.3 Negotiation Agent
An agent must understand the protocol used for trust negotiation as in [122] and manage
the negotiation session. An agent validates a negotiation request and checks that access and
release policies are not violated. The attribute assertions received are validated against access
policies and checked against trust contracts that may exist between domains. Depending on
the negotiation strategy in use, further requests can be made for more attribute assertions
from the request domain. The agent checks the release policies upon validating the accept
policies. If these policies are satisfied, attribute assertions are issued for further negotiation
with other intermediary domains or for interaction with the SAML module.
Negotiation requests made by the trust enforcement point are processed by the negotiation
agent’s access control components. The four main negotiation requests are role assignment,
role activation, contract invocation and credential release. These negotiation requests are
also viewed as authorisation requests and are described in Section 3.4.
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4.2.4 Policy Information and Decision Points
A Policy Information Point (PIP) is a component used by the negotiation agent to prepare
the request context that is sent to the policy decision point (PDP). Request context includes
attributes for the subject, actions and resources. In DTN, subject attributes include role
assertions required for access decisions by foreign entities.
The prepared request context is presented as an XACML request [84]. XACML was preferred
as it is a standard widely accepted for access control policies and, as such, has wider accept-
ability in open systems. Existing PIP components in various organisations can be used to
prepare DTN authorisation requests. An example of an XACML DTN authorisation request
is shown in Appendix A.
A Policy Decision Point (PDP) is a component used by the negotiation agent to make autho-
risation decisions. A PDP based on the request context will retrieve corresponding policies
that are necessary for it to reach a decision. In DTN, as with the PIP, the PDP use the
XACML standard. If corresponding policies cannot be found, an indeterminate result is re-
turned [163]. If corresponding polices are found and are valid, the access decision can either
be a deny or permit response.
4.2.5 SAML plus
Component The SAML plus is a component invoked when a resource/ domain is the service
provider for the negotiation session. Even though intermediary domains have SAML plus,
they do not make use of it during negotiation unless they are the service provider. It is called
SAML plus because it extends both the Identity Provider (IdP) and the Service Provider
(SP) components used by SAML.
Negotiated Attribute Store
A Negotiated Attribute Store (NAS) is introduced to augment a service provider. This is a
requirement for DTN as a NAS is used to store attributes that have been negotiated during
trust negotiation. These negotiated attributes are bound to the negotiation session and thus
link the resource requester to a local attribute. As opposed to retrieving attribute assertions
from an IdP during a SAML request assertion session, attributes stored in the NAS are
retrieved instead. This redirection step is one of the SAML extensions for DTN.
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Extended Identity Provider
In SAML 2.0 when a service provider makes an assertion request e.g. <samlp:AttributeQuery
> to an IdP, the IdP is expected to respond with a SAML assertion <samlp: Response>
containing a user’s attributes [74]. The extension DTN offers is in the attribute response of
the IdP. Instead of the IdP responding with a user attributes, it does two things. Firstly it
initiates trust negotiations with trusted parties if they have not been already initiated. After a
negotiation time-out or on receiving a negotiation response, it prepares a <samlp:Response>.
Secondly if the negotiation was deduced to be successful from the negotiation response, it
responds with a NAS attribute value in its <samlp:Response>. If the negotiation was not
successful or timed out, it responds with the user attributes as it normally would if it was
not extended with DTN. When a service provider receives an attribute assertion with NAS
as an attribute value, it queries its NAS store for negotiated attributes. It is these negotiated
attributes that the service provider uses to support authorisation decisions.
4.3 DTN Data Flow
A detailed view of the data flow between DTN components during negotiation is shown in
Figure 4.3. The interactions between these components are enumerated as follows:
1. Resource request: An entity requests a target resource from a service provider using
a request interface e.g. a web browser or portal.
2. Negotiate credentials: The IdP of the requester initiates a trust negotiation with
other trusted nodes, i.e. next-hop nodes. The IdP negotiates credentials via the nego-
tiation protocol interface.
3. Negotiate credentials: If the receiving node is an intermediary node, it does steps
4 to 10a. If the receiving node is the domain of the service provider, it does steps 4 to
10b excluding 10a.
4. Pass credentials: The node protocol interface communicates the negotiation request
to the node’s trust enforcement point (TEP). Remote credentials and the target do-
main’s identification are passed on to the TEP.
5. Get next-hops: The TEP queries the discovery service via its management interface
for the list of next-hop nodes for the target domain.
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1:Resource request; 2:Negotiate credentials; 3:Negotiate credentials; 4:Pass credentials;
5:Get next-hops; 6:Request context; 7:XACML request; 8:Pull policies; 9:XACML response;
10a:Negotiate attributes or 10b:Negotiated attributes
Figure 4.3: The DTN Architecture and Data Flow
6. Create request context: The TEP contacts the PIP for the request context. Infor-
mation necessary for an authorisation request such as foreign credentials, domain of
the foreign entity and information about the prospective next-hop nodes are passed on
to the PIP. The PIP creates request context based on the information it receives and
it has already, and makes it available to the PDP.
7. XACML request: The request context is passed on to the negotiation agent for the
PDP to decide on.
8. Pull policies: The PDP makes authorisation decision based on the request context
and corresponding policies. The type of policies include access policies, release policies
and trust contract policies.
9. XACML response: For each authorisation request, a corresponding XACML re-
sponse is issued to the TEP.
10. Negotiate attributes or store negotiated attributes: If a node is participating
in a trust negotiation as an intermediary node and if permit was the PDP response,
the TEP will negotiate its credentials with authorised next-hop nodes via the protocol
interface. If a node is the service provider domain and permit was the PDP response,
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the TEP stores the negotiated credentials in the NAS. In addition, the TEP will send a
negotiation response (negotiation status) to the sender node via the protocol interface.
4.4 Summary
This chapter focused upon describing the architecture governing DTN including the system
components for discovery and negotiation protocols. It described the discovery system com-
ponents, which included the discovery interface (service), the controller, the protocol data
processing, the management interface and a routing information handling component. It also
described the components that make up the negotiation system, which included the negoti-
ation service, the trust enforcement point, the negotiation agent, the PDP and SAML plus.
The chapter presented how the SAML plus extends the functionality of an identity provider
and how it compliments the negotiated attributed store. The negotiated attributed store in
itself extends the components of a service provider by providing means of storing negotiated
attributes which can subsequently be used as assertions in a SAML response. The chapter
concluded with a detailed overview of the DTN architecture showing the flow of data between
various components during trust negotiation.
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In this chapter, the formal model upon which DTN is based is presented. The chapter
starts with the access control model, which serves as the basis for trust negotiation. Second,
the DTN model is presented and its key concepts are then described: circle of trust and
trust contracts. Third, credential equivalence, the basic concept underlying trust contracts
is described. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how DTN limits the disclosure of
access control policies.
5.1 Access Control
Access to resources needs to be controlled and managed especially in ensuring that operations
carried out on resources are adequately authorised. Decisions have to be made and enforced in
order to protect resources from unauthorised disclosure and alterations while confidentiality
and privacy needs to be ensured where needed. Access management systems such as attribute-
based access control systems (ABAC) [107, 119, 164] use information contained in policies
and credentials to manage access. Desirable properties of an ABAC system include:
1. Decentralised attributes where an entity’s attribute can be asserted by another entity;
2. Delegation of attributes between authorities in which the authority for an attribute can
be delegated to another entity;
3. Attribute intersection in which combinations of attributes are used to infer another
entity’s attribute(s);
4. Attribute inference where an attribute can be inferred through another attribute;
5. Attribute fields which can be used for parameterised attributes such as defining quan-
tities in a credential.
The key elements of an access control model and their formal representation include:
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• S : Subject, defining an entity such as a user, software agent or organisation. There
will typically be numerous instances of a subject: s0, s1, ..., sk ∈ S ;
• Obj : Object, defining resources or targets more generally. In access control, Objects
are typically protected. There will typically be numerous instances of objects:
obj0, obj1, ..., objk ∈ Obj ;
• A: Action, defining actions that can be performed on objects. There will typically be
numerous instances of actions: a0, a1, ..., ak ∈ A;
• P : Permission, defining what actions are “allowed” to be performed on objects.
P = A×Obj that is P = < ai , objj >;
• R: Role is defined as S .r(h1, ..., hn) where r is role name, hi is a parameter that may
be applied in case r is a parameterised role, and S is the entity who has the role;
• PS : Permissions to role relation, PS ⊆ P × R.
With respect to these elements, [42] defines mapping functions that can be used to express
object access in a role-based context:
• RP(r : role)→ 2permissions , defines a role to permissions mapping, which gives the set
of permissions that are assigned to role r . For example if read and write are permissions
that can be assigned to role X , permissions(X ) has four possible permissions outcomes:
{}, {read}, {write}, {read, write} for role X .
• PA(p : permission) → action, defines the permission to action mapping, which gives
the actions associated with permissions p.
• PO(p : permission) → object , defines the object to permission mapping, which gives
the objects associated with permission p.
• SU (s : subject) → user , defines the subject to user mapping, which gives the users
associated with subject s.
• AR(s : subject)− > 2role , defines the active role mapping, which gives the set of roles in
which subject s is active. For example if Bob could be granted role x and y , AR(Bob)
has four possible outcomes: {}, {x}, {y}, {x, y}.
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To determine if a subject can access an object, the following axiom is typically used for access
control:
access(subject , action, object)→ boolean
true: if subject s can access object obj and invoke action a
false: otherwise
For example, with respect to RBAC [44], object access authorisation can be defined as [42]:
∀ s : subject ; obj : object ; a : action • access(s, a, obj )⇒
∃ r : role; p : permission | r ∈ AR(s) ∧ p ∈ RP(r) ∧ a ∈ PA(p) ∧ obj ∈ PO(p)
5.2 Trust Negotiation
Access control policies (a.k.a policies) and credentials can be defined with languages with
well formed semantics and expressed as finite sets of statements [120]. Using propositional
logic as in [117] a policy PD for resource D can be defined as follows:
PD → FD(C1,C2, ...,Ck )
where C1,C2, ...,Ck are credentials that must be satisfied by the other party; FD is an
expression that uses these credentials, which may include boolean operators ∨ or ∧ and any
parenthesis where necessary. Access is granted to a resource D when the other party discloses
sufficient Ci that satisfies FD(C1,C2, ...,Ck ), i.e if evaluated to true.
Example 5.1 Bob wants to access cancer patients records D at hospital X as part of a
Cancer clinical trial (XCT). Hospital X’s policy requires the requestor to be an investigator or
clinician on the XCT clinical trial before access can be granted. Thus Bob provides credentials
such as CBob1 =“Investigator” or C
Bob
2 =“Clinician” and C
Bob
3 =“XCT”, which can be
expressed as PD → (CBob1 ∨CBob2 )∧CBob3 . Similarly, Bob’s release policies may specify that
that the requesting target, which in this case is hospital X prove its identity amongst other
properties. So for Bob’s credential we have: PCBob → FCBob (C1,C2,C3).
In a nutshell, the policy of a resource is satisfied when the other party discloses the correct
combination of credentials for that resource (C1,C2, ...,Ck ). A resource R is said to be
unprotected if its access control policy is always satisfied R → true or C → true. A resource
is said to have a denial policy if R → false, that is no credential can satisfy that policy or
that resource is not meant for disclosure.
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[117, 119] illustrate with examples how trust is established between two peers P1 and P2
with each of the peers requesting a series of credentials from one another and how requesting
a credential in the series might trigger requests for credentials from the other party. One
problem with exchanging credentials this way is that a point of deadlock can be reached where
both parties wait on each other to disclose the next credential. This credential negotiation
deadlock is explained in [117]. It occurs whenever there is a cyclic credential interdependency:
CX2 ← CBob2 and CBob2 ← CX2 , i.e. where their credential disclosure policies restricts who is
first. [117] also proposed a possible solution to credentials negotiation deadlock. The solution
introduces a collaborative peer to the negotiation process called a locally trusted third party
(LTTP). An LTTP acts as a mediator by disclosing credentials and policy rules to negotiating
parties whenever cyclic interdependency occurs to facilitate trust negotiation. A peer Pc is
said to be an LTTP for Pa and Pb where Pc has previously successfully exchanged and
cached several credentials on more than one occasion at different times with both Pa and
Pb . Hence Pa and Pb ask Pc whom they both trust to act as their LTTP. Pc then releases
missing credentials to both parties, which breaks the cyclic interdependency.
5.3 Dynamic Trust Negotiation
Dynamic trust negotiation (DTN) also known as dynamic negotiation through delegated
trust (DNDT) is the process of negotiating trust between two non-trusting entities through
trusted intermediary entities. Any entity can serve as a negotiator for other entities provided
it is trusted by the two non-trusting entities or by their intermediaries. Like Automated
trust Negotiation (ATN) [110], DTN introduces a mediator called a trusted intermediary
party (TIP) similar to LTTP [117] in ATN. Unlike ATN, a TIP is just one of the multiple
TIPs (many hops) that can exist in a trust negotiation between two peers. These multiple
negotiation hops help to protect credentials and access policies.
Consider an example of dynamic trust negotiation between two peers P1 and P2, where P1 is
a requestor and P2 is the domain of the resource R. With the understanding that credentials
are also resources, two forms of resources exist in this example: Objects and Credentials.
P1 wants to access an object resource (R1 or R2) on P2. P1 will have to first negotiate its
credential resource1 for P2’s credential. P2 has never negotiated with P1 and it is only open
for negotiation with peers it has previously negotiated with such as P3 or P4. This is referred
to as circle of trust in this thesis and is shown in Figure 5.1. Suppose P2’s access policy for
1From here on, ‘resource’ implies ‘credential resource’.
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Figure 5.1: Circle of Trust
R is:
R1,R2 ⊆ R
R1 ← CP31 ∧ CP32
R2 ← CP33
which means P2 requires credential C1 and C2 from P3 for resource R1 while C3 is required
for R2. Suppose P1 belongs to the P3 circle of trust and that P3 access policy with P1 is:
CP31 ← CP11 ∧ CP12
CP32 ← CP13
CP33 ← CP13 ∧ CP14
To access R1, P1 would have to negotiate with P3 by making available:
{CP11 ,CP12 ,CP13 }
while P3 will negotiate on behalf of P1 with:
{CP31 ,CP32 }
However if P1 only makes available:
{CP13 ,CP14 }
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then P3 can only negotiate on behalf of P1 with:
{CP33 }
which will be for P2’s R2 and not R1.
From this it would be seen that P3 serves as a link peer known as TIP for the trust negotiation
between P2 and P1.
P2 ← P3
P2 ← P3.P1
In a typical trust negotiation, where a circle of trust exists, it is often possible to find multiple
LTIP involved in the trust negotiation. Each of the involved TIP act as a hop or a link to
the next TIP and/or finally to the target peer.
5.4 Circle of Trust
DTN introduces the concept of circle of trust (COT) [10, 151] for trust negotiation. The
COT described here is not related to the Liberty ID-FF [71] circle of trust that implies a
federation of service and identity providers. Figure 5.1 shows a COT that describes a circle
of intermediary peers that are trusted by a peer in which one or more trust-contracts exist
between the peers and each intermediary peer. A trust contract is an agreement that exists
between two entities. This circle of trusted peers enable interactions between seemingly
non-trusting domains.
Through overlapping COTs a trust-pathway (chain of trust) can be discovered. Consider
two peers P1 and P5 in Figure 5.1, where P1 is a requester and P5 is a resource provider in
another domain. P1 and P2 has {P3,P4,P6,P7} and {P3,P4,P5} in their COT respectively.
For P1 to access P5 resources, they will need to be trusted by P2. In addition, P2 will
need to understand and trust credentials from P1. Since P1 has trust relationships with
{P3,P4}, which are also in a trust relationship with P2, P1 will initiate a trust negotiation
with P2 through {P3,P4}. Similarly, P2 will initiate a trust negotiation with P5. Thus
{P3,P2}, {P4,P2} are trust-pathways between P1 and P5. Hence trust is realised by exploring
overlapping COT s between P1 and P5.
P1 ← (P3 ∨ P4)← P2 ← P5
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More genreally, trust is realised between Pi and Pj when:
Pi ← Pj :
COT (Pi) ∩ COT (Pi+1)... ∩ COT (Pj ) 6= {}
COT may improve the likelihood of successful negotiations as TIPs can cache trust chains
from previous negotiations, which will reduce the likelihood of future negotiations failing.
The cache can also speed up future trust negotiations.
The advantages of having COT are quickly overshadowed as the number of overlapping COTS
increases. This is because the more hops you have, the less likely peers will be delegating
privileges in open decentralised collaborative environments.
Despite this limitation, COT provides an additional benefit. Overlapping COT s can help to
abstract virtual organisations through which trust can be discovered and realised dynamically.
In virtual organisations, a relational hierarchy often exists, which can be modelled over the
underlying COT s.
5.5 Trust Contract
In DTN, trust is viewed as the possession of authentic and valid credentials necessary for
access control at an end point - typically a target with access control policies defined by the
target resource providers. A credential is either valid and authentic or only authentic. An
authentic credential implies a verifiable and un-tampered credential, while a valid credential
implies a semantically correct credential that is acceptable, useable and tenable to an end
point. Trust negotiation aims at delivering valid credentials that are authentic, and able to
satisfy an access policy.
However, the presence of multiple domain authorities and policy enforcement points intro-
duce a policy semantics divide between domains. That is knowing for example in some
context that org1.investigator is equivalent to org2.investigator . To address this divide,
trust contracts (TC) are introduced in DTN [10]. As defined earlier, a trust contract is an
agreeable arrangement made between two mutually suspicious entities to trust each other to
some extent, which include agreement on identity and key management, credential mappings
and delegation of access attributes such as roles. Trust contracts provide one mechanism to
overcome the semantic issue of what a credential from one domain means (or should mean)
in another domain. Trust contracts implicitly require that overlapping COT s exist.
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Figure 5.2: A network of collaborating health organisation
Figure 5.2 shows an abstract network of a collaborative environment. The network is a
directed and acyclic graph, denoted as G(V,E). The Node V set represents autonomous
organisations. A node refers to an end-point in a communication chain and consists of security
credentials. The Edge E set represents trust and the direction of trust, which consists of
policies and trust agreements (or TC ). As described in Section 2.5, trust is asymmetric and
this is represented with directed edges. If the trust between two nodes is reciprocal, this will
be represented with a bidirectional edge.
Edges have weights, which represents the cardinality of TC sets between two Nodes. The
minimum weight on an edge is 1, that is Edge e implies the existence of at least one TC
between two nodes. For example, in Figure 5.2 the path that has the highest total weight
between sender node S and destination node D is path SJLND since it has in total of 16 trust
contracts. Nodes use weights (number of TC ) to prioritise negotiations with other nodes as
the path with the higher weight is more likely to succeed during trust negotiation. Since
nodes cannot determine the total weight on a path, they can prioritise nodes in their COT
based on the number of TCs they hold.
A trust contract, tc ∈ TC is an agreement between two nodes (u, v) that states the mapping/
relationship that exists between two credentials (cu , cv ). A TC exists between two nodes
when more than one credential mapping is agreed between them, that is:
TC = ({cu0 , cv0}, {cu1 , cv1}, ..., {cuk , cvk })
Relationships between credentials are based on credential equivalence rules, discussed in Sec-
tion 5.6. A tc stems from these rules, which are modelled by the function tc. More formally,
let cu and cv be the set of credential in domain u and v respectively.
[cu , cv ]
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tc : cu cv
∃ x : cu ; y : cv • tc(x ) = y
tc is a partial function that implies a credential in one domain can only be uniquely associated
with at most one credential of another domain (co-domain). Although not all credentials
in a domain can be associated with a credential of a co-domain, one or more credentials
in a domain can be associated with a credential in another domain. The partial function
represents the fact that during credential agreement, the receiving domain (co-domain) may
be willing to make available one of its credentials in exchange for one or more credentials from
the requesting domain. A domain is not obliged to make agreements over all its credentials
with a co-domain nor is a co-domain obliged to make agreements with all of its credentials.
Thus credential x cannot output different results each time the function is called except if
the underlying trust agreement has changed. For example, if credential x is uniquely agreed
for y , tc(x ) can only have y as its output. Section 6 describes in detail four policies that are
used in DTN, including TC -based policies.
5.6 Credential Equivalence
Trust contracts provide one solution to credential equivalence problems that exist between
autonomous organisations by using equivalence rules. Credential equivalence rules define
the relations that exist between credentials. These relations are used in the folding of one
credential to another between different organisations [107]. Credential equivalence rules upon
which DTN trust contracts are based include:
1. Transitive membership rule:
R ← R1
R1 ← R2
⇒ R ← R2
This rule means that R1 is a member of R and R2 is a member of R1, then R2 is a
member of R. As an example,
org1.investigator ← org2.healthpractitioner
org2.healthpractitioner ← org3.specialist
⇒ org1.investigator ← org3.specialist
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2. Linking delegation rule:
R ← R1 · R2
This rule means an entity that has R2 can act as R if the entity is contained in R1.
This requires at least two dependent roles. As an example,
Org1.CancerTrial ← Org2.LeukemiaTrial .Investigator
Org2.LeukemiaTrial ← VOTES
VOTES .Investigator ← Bob
⇒ Org1.CancerTrial ← Bob
This implies that for this linking delegation, Bob must satisfy the requirement that he
is an Investigator on the VOTES project and also satisfy that VOTES is a member
of Org2 Leukemia Trial. In this case, VOTES is a link since Investigator is a role in
VOTES.
3. Intersection rule:
R ← R1 ∩ · · · ∩ Rk
This implies an entity that has R1,R2, ..., and Rk is delegated R. For example,
Org1.BrainIT ← Org2.Neurologist ∩Org2.Consultant
This means an entity who is a Consultant and a Neurologist in Org2 can participate
in the Org1 BrainIT study. It is an intersection and not a union as the rule suggest
a commonality factor exist in each of R1,R2, ..., and Rk . This rule can be used in
situations where a domain requires authorisation attributes to be proved with more
than one credential. For instance Bob is a Neurologist and he is also a Consultant who
works with patients that have brain disorders. However, before Bob can be allowed to
access BrainIT records, he must satisfy at least two credentials that prove he specialises
in brain and nervous system disorders.
5.7 Limiting Disclosure of Access Control Policies
In trust negotiation, peers limit what credentials are disclosed by means of various negoti-
ation strategies. In [112], two strategies were proposed: eager and parsimonious. An eager
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negotiation strategy requires a party to disclose all of its credential to the other non-trusted
party right at the start of a negotiation. The benefit of this strategy is that it assures a nego-
tiation will succeed where successful negotiation is possible. Successful negotiation refers to
the point when all credential disclosure policies are satisfied. This strategy however discloses
more credentials than are potentially necessary thereby reducing party privacy. On the other
hand, the parsimonious negotiation strategy enables a party to disclose its credentials only
after it has been requested and after the necessary disclosure policy for that credential has
been satisfied. This strategy increases party privacy and reduces the risk of unnecessary
credential disclosure. However, this strategy can result in credential negotiation deadlock as
explained in [117], which occurs when there is cyclic credential interdependency.
A solution to the problem of disclosing sensitive credentials is to limit what is disclosed to a
total stranger and to gradually establish trust [118]. In DTN, credentials are only disclosed
to intermediary parties, which are trusted with the expectation that privileges would be
delegated to it that would not be directly offered to non-trusted parties. As negotiations
take place from one intermediary party to another, the likelihood of a remote access control
policy being deduced is small. Furthermore, as trust contracts are added or revoked, or
as changes in trust-pathways between nodes occur, the chances of deducing remote access
policies is further reduced.
Similarly by the nature of trust contracts, credentials should not be unnecessarily disclosed,
as both parties are aware of their contract. These contracts limit what credentials can be
accepted and which credential can be delegated. Trust can only be negotiated within the
constraints of these contracts. However, these constraints only hold during party interactions
and do not restrict what inferences parties can make with credentials during negotiations.
These inferences enable parties to compute inter-contract relationships, which can subse-
quently improve the likelihood of successful negotiations.
5.8 Summary
This chapter gave a detailed description of the design and formalisation of DTN. It has
presented extensive discussion on access control properties and attributes, access control key
elements and model representation, access control policies and credentials. Dynamic trust
negotiation (DTN), which is the process of negotiating trust between two non-trusting entities
through trusted intermediary parties (TIPs) was presented. Automated trust negotiation
(ATN) was also discussed in the chapter to highlight the similarities and differences with
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DTN.
The concepts of circle of trust (COT) for trust negotiation was thoroughly explained. The
discussion showed that through overlapping COTs a trust pathway can be discovered, which
can serve as the basis for trust discovery in DTN. It was highlighted that COT may improve
the likelihood of successful trust negotiations as TIPs can cache trust chains from previous
negotiations. With respect to virtual organisations (VO), COT can model the relational
hierarchies that can often exist, thus enabling the dynamic discovery and realisation of trust
in a VO.
In the trust contract section, credentials were discussed and whether they are valid and
authentic or only authentic. The effect of multiple domains and various relationships between
credentials was presented. Semantic heterogeneity and the impact upon establishment and
utilisation of trust contracts in DTN was discussed. Various credential equivalence rules
such as transitive membership rules, linking delegation rules, and intersection rules were also
described. These equivalence rules serve as the underlying concept for trust contract in DTN.
Unlike the trusted third party in ATN that only helps to facilitate trust negotiation, multiple
TIPs in DTN facilitates negotiation and also helps to prevent the disclosure of credentials
and access policies. The chapter concluded with the rationale for limiting disclosure of access
control policies and discusses two different strategies namely eager and parsimonious.
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This chapter specify the syntax and semantics of the policy language used in DTN. The
policy language itself is introduced in Section 6.1. The syntax of the policy language rule is
specified in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3 specifies the syntax of the associated policy language
functions. These functions and rules are used to describe policies whose syntax is given
in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 describes credentials and their use for exchanging authorisation
information between policy domains. DTN policies are described in detail in Section 6.6 and
the chapter concludes with how conflicts are resolved between policies.
6.1 Policy Language
In order to understand policies it is imperative to understand the language in which they are
described and specified. To describe the types of policies used for DTN, a rule-based policy
language is used. The rule-based framework, as described in [2, 165, 52], is adopted. This
framework offers a declarative language that is based on logic to define rules. This makes it
possible to implement policies in various languages and programming tools. For instance the
policy language described in this chapter is implemented in DTN using the XACML policy
specification language [163].
A rule consists of a rule head and rule body. It takes the form:
Rh ← Rb
where Rh is the rule head and Rb is the rule body.
In this model, satisfaction of Rb makes Rh true. A rule body typically contains conditions
and if these conditions are satisfied, i.e evaluated to true, the rule will be enforced and some
action can be triggered. Thus an authorisation policy can be encoded in a rule body and the
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rule head can be used for encoding the authorisation. For example, a policy rule that decides
on whether subject s can access resource r can be defined as:
canAccess(s, r)← isOwner(s, r)
Given s and r , if the function isOwner(s, r) evaluates to true, i.e. if subject s is the owner
of resource r , then access to the resource is granted; otherwise access is denied. If the body
of a rule is empty, such as Rh ← . this implies the rule has no conditions and is always true.
6.2 Policy Language Rules
The policy rule language used in DTN is based on the Cassandra [2] policy rule language.
The policy rule language is designed to support and use credentials for trust management.
A credential is viewed as a constrained predicate, asserted by an entity called an issuer and
held by an entity called a holder. In a rule, predicates are tagged with both the holder and
issuer. Thus Bob♦OX .p(x ) is a rule that says Bob holds a predicate p(x ) asserted by Oxford,
denoted by OX . The holder is postfixed by the symbol “♦” and the issuer by “.”.
Policy rule ::= (Head ,Body Pred ,Constraint)
Head head ::= E1♦E2.pred
Body Pred P ::= e1♦e2.pred
Credential cred ::= head ← c
Rule rule ::= cred
| head ← P1, . . . ,Pn , c
Constraint c ∈ C
The prefix used here for the issuer is similar to the prefix used for roles in [107, 119]. In
addition to the issuer prefix, the holder prefix used here is similar to the location prefix used
in Cassandra. As in [2], the syntax for policy rules is as follows1:
Definition 6.2.1 (head, body, location, issuer, credential, policy)2 A policy rule is
made up of a prefixed head predicate, a list of prefixed body predicates, and constraints C .
The prefixes ehol and eiss of a predicate ehol♦eiss .p(~e) are referred to as the holder and the
issuer of the predicate, respectively. The entity that issues a rule is called the issuer of the
rule and the entity that holds the rule is called the holder of the rule. A rule of the form
1Definitions for Entities E , Role Names R and Action Names A are presented in [2].
2This definition has been modified from [2].
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head ← c is called a credential or credential rule. A policy rule that is not a credential rule
has identical holder and issuer. Only credentials may have an issuer that differs from the
holder: these represent credentials that are issued by foreign parties.
The typing rules for the above policy rule as specified in [2] are as follows:
Γ ` e : entity Γ ` e ′ : entity Γ ` pred
Γ ` e♦e ′.pred
Γ ` head Γ ` c
Γ ` head ← c
Γ ` head Γ ` P1 · · · Γ ` Pn Γ ` c
Γ ` head ← P1, · · · ,Pn , c
The first inference rule represents a rule head, which can be understood as follows: the
proposition e♦e ′.pred is from the set of propositions for a rule head if e, e ′ and pred are from
the same set of propositions where e, e ′ are entities. In simple terms, these rules express type
definitions for the prepositions, e.g. e♦e ′.pred receives two input variables of type entity and
a variable of type pred .
The typing rules of predicates3 (pred) as used in DTN are presented in Section 6.3.
A rule constraint that is true is often not shown, so also are the issuer and holder of a rule
if they refer to the same entity. Similarly, the holder and/or issuer of a rule is not shown if
it is identifiable from the context. For example,
D♦D .p ←D♦D .p1,D♦E .p2,
E♦F .p3, true
3Predicates are often referred to as functions in this chapter except where it is stated as mapping functions.
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can be written as,
D .p ←D .p1,E .p2,E♦F .p3
or
p ←p1,E .p2,E♦F .p3
Since D is the holder and issuer of the rule, it is clear from the context that the rule is for
D ’s domain and the rule can be found in D ’s policy4. Intuitively, this rule can be interpreted
as this:
D may have a service that can be accessed based on an assertion p. p can be
deduced from D ’s policy if: p1 can be deduced from D ’s policy; the credential
asserting p2 issued by E is available, and that a request from E for a credential
asserting p3 issued by F exists.
From definition 6.2.1, p and p1 are assertions in D ’s policy rules since D is the issuer and
holder respectively. p2 is a credential rule assertion, since the issuer and holder are different,
i.e. E and D respectively. p3 is also a credential rule assertion where F is the issuer and E
is the holder.
Authorisation Function Description
assign(e.p(~e), r , p) implies that an entity with a credential asserting p(~e)
issued by e is assigned role r that is granted permission
p.
can activate(e, r) implies entity e can activate role r , i.e e has been assigned
r or can act with the capability of r .
has activated(e, r) implies that entity e is currently acting with the capabil-
ity of role r .
can invoke(e.p(~e), r) implies an entity can invoke a trust contract for role r if
the entity has a credential asserting p(~e) issued by e.
has invoked(e, r) implies entity e has currently invoked the trust contract
for role r .
can release cred(e1, e2.p(~e), e3) implies a credential asserting p(~e) issued by entity e2 can
be released to e1 if e3 has invoked its trust contract with
e2.
Table 6.1: DTN Authorisation Functions (Predicates)
4The policies described in Section 6.6 are in the context of the Glasgow domain.
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6.3 Policy Language Functions
Based on definition 6.2.1, policy rules can be defined using predicates. A predicate can be
defined as a Boolean function that returns a truth value. Typically, a function has set of
arguments and a return value. The return value is true if the conditions for the predicate
test is satisfied or false otherwise. Two categories of policy functions are defined in RDM
[52]: specification functions and authorisation functions.
Specification functions express basic functions that are defined in the RBAC [42, 44] and
often referred to as mapping functions as described in Section 5.1. Authorisation functions
are used to express authorisation policies. The authorisation functions defined for DTN are
shown in Table 6.1. These functions (predicates) were introduced in Section 3.4 and are used
for expressing DTN authorisation policies5.
These functions return Boolean’s, i.e. true or false. The syntax for these functions are as
follows:
Predicate pred ::= assign(e.pred , r , permission)
| can activate(e, r)
| has activated(e, r)
| can invoke(e.pred , r)
| has invoked(e, r)
| can release cred(e1, e2.pred , e3)
| p(e1, ..., en), where n ≥ 0
Permissions permission ::= q(a1, ..., an), where n ≥ 0
Resource q ∈ ResourceNames
5A trust contract is often referred to as a contract in this chapter.
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The typing rules for the above functions are as followsa:
Γ ` e : entity Γ ` r : role(τ) Γ ` pred Γ ` permission
Γ ` assign(e.pred , r , permission)
Γ ` e : entity Γ ` r : role(τ)
Γ ` can activate(e, r)
Γ ` e : entity Γ ` r : role(τ)
Γ ` has activated(e, r)
Γ ` e : entity Γ ` r : role(τ) Γ ` pred
Γ ` can invoke(e.pred , r)
Γ ` e : entity Γ ` r : role(τ)
Γ ` has invoked(e, r)
Γ ` e1 : entity Γ ` e2 : entity Γ ` e3 : entity Γ ` pred
Γ ` can release cred(e1, e2.pred , e3)
q ∈ ResourceNames
Γ ` a1 : action · · · Γ ` an : action
Γ ` q(a1, ..., an)
aThe syntax for roles and actions along with their typing rules are presented in [2].
In simple terms, these rules express type definitions for the formulas. The first rule says
the formula, i.e. preposition assign(e.pred , r , permission) receives e, r , pred , permissions as
input variables, where e is of type entity , r is of type role(τ) and τ is a variable of some
type. role(τ) represents parameterised roles, e.g. Researcher(‘in computing science dept’),
but for non-parameteirsed roles, role is simply sufficient. The second rule says the formula
can activate(e, r) receives two variables of type entity and role(τ). The third, fourth, fifth
and sixth rules can be explained in like manner. ResourceNames represent a set of user
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defined names for a resource e.g. a service, a database table and a file name. The last rule
says q an object in ResourceNames receives a set of variables of type action to represent a
permission.
6.4 Authorisation Rules for Policy Enforcement
Various authorisation rules can be used to enforce DTN security policies. These rules are
defined as follows:
Rule 1 : An assign-role rule is of the form:
assign(e.p(~e), r , p)←
has invoked(e, r),
p ∈ permissions(r)
where e, r , p are entity, role and permission respectively.
This rule implies that an entity that holds a credential asserting p(~e) issued by e can be
assigned role r granted with permission p. This access control rule says that an entity that
has invoked role r is allowed permission p. A permission is a set of actions permitted on
an object or resource and permissions(r : role) is a mapping function based on RP(role)
mapping function described in Section 5.1. This rule can can also be written as:
assign(e2.can activate(e, r2), r , obj (acts))←
has invoked(e2, r),
acts ∈ {act1, ..., actn},
obj (acts) ∈ permissions(r)
where e, e2 are entities, r , r2 are roles and act1, ..., actn are actions associated with object,
obj .
The rule implies that entity e can be assigned role r and granted permission obj (acts), if
firstly a credential asserting that e has r2 issued by e2 is made available, secondly if e2 has
already invoked a contract for role r . In a scenario where e2 is a local entity and r2 is in the
same domain, the has invoked predicate will always be deduced as true.
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Rule 2 : An entity-role activation rule is of the form:
can activate(e, r)← has activated(e, r2).
where e is an entity, and r , r2 are roles.
This rule implies that an entity e can act with the capabilities of role r if the entity has first
activated role r2. Often, can activate is used as a predicate in a credential rule asserting a
role is assigned to an entity.
Rule 3 : An entity-role active rule is of the form:
has activated(e, r)← c
where e, r are entity and role respectively.
This rule is true if entity e has role r active. If true, the rule suggests that e is a mem-
ber of role r and has presented a credential asserting r . The rule can also be expressed as
has activated(e, r)← isActive(e, r), where isActive(e, r) is a mapping function that returns
true if in r ’s domain, e has role r active. Basically, isActive is a state checker that can be used
to check the state of a role. The has activated predicate is often used with can activate(e, r)
predicate to decide if an entity has a role active and if not, whether it is allowed to activate
the role assuming no other constraints exist.
Rule 4 : A credential-role invocation rule is of the form:
can invoke(e.p(~e), r)← c
where e, r, c are an entity, role and constraint respectively.
This rule implies that an entity with a credential asserting p(~e) issued by e can invoke the
contract for role r if the constraint c can be deduced to be true. The rule can also be
expressed as:
can invoke(e1.can activate(e2, r1), r)←
tc(r1) = r
where e1, e2 are entities, r , r1 are roles and tc() is a trust contract mapping function. For
simplicity, tc(r1) = r represents tc(e1.can activate(e2, r1)) = can activate(x , r), where x is
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an entity variable.
This rule says e2 can invoke a contract for role r if the credential asserting e2 has received
r1 issued by e1. This rule can be deduced to be true if a trust contract exists that maps r1
to r . tc(credential) is used as the rule constraint.
Rule 5 : An entity has invoked rule is of the form:
has invoked(e, r)← c
where e, r, c are an entity, role and constraint respectively.
The rule can also be expressed as has invoked(e, r)← inSession(e, r), where inSession() is
a mapping function that returns true if in the current session state, a trust contract for role
r has already been invoked by e. This is a rule that can show if a potentially remote entity
has been assigned a role based on a trust contract. Like isActive, inSession is a state checker
that can be used to check the invocation state of a contract. inSession() is used as the rule
constraint.
Rule 6 : An entity can receive credential rule is of the form:
can release cred(e1, e2.p(~e1), e3)← e2.p(~e2), c
where e1, e2, e3 are entities, p(~e1), p(~e2) are rule predicates and c a constraint.
The rule says entity e1 can delegate a credential that asserts p(~e1) issued by e2 if p(~e2) and
c can be deduced. The rule can also be expressed as:
can release cred(e1, e2.can activate(e1, r), e3)←
e2.has invoked(e3, r),
e1 ∈ COT (e2)
This rule says entity e1 can be delegated a credential issued by entity e2 which asserts that
e1 can activate role r if e1 is in e2’s circle of trust and if e3 has invoked the contract for role
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r . COT (e : entity) is a mapping function that returns the set of entities in an entity’s COT.
This rule can also be written as:
can release cred(e1, e2.can activate(e1, r), e3)←
e2.has activated(e3, r),
e1 ∈ COT (e2)
where e1, e2, e3 are entities and r is a role.
This rule is same as the first rule except that in this case, entities e2 and e3 are from the
same local domain, and in some cases e2 and e3 can refer to the same entity. The example
in Section 6.5 makes this distinction clear. However, it should be noted that a foreign entity
should not be able to activate a local role, they can only invoke a contract for a local role.
Likewise, a local entity should not be able invoke a contract for a local role rather they should
activate a local role.
Datalog [166] examples of these rules are listed in Appendix C.
6.5 Credentials and Distributed Policy Rules
Credentials serve as the basis for trust management. They are verifiable statements issued
to establish a specific claim. A digital credential is a digitally asserted statement that allows
the issuer to be verified. The statement can be used for authorisation if the issuer is trusted
to have authority or be in a position to make such an assertion. An entity who signed and
issued a credential is called an issuer. The entity a credential is assigned to is called the
holder.
6.5.1 Attribute Certificate
An X.509 Attribute Certificate (AC) [39] is a data construct for encoding security information
through which trust can be managed in an open environment. It is similar to an X.509
certificate (PKC) but is signed and issued by an attribute authority (AA). Unlike PKC, ACs
do not contain a public key. Instead they contain a series of attributes associated with their
holder. Privileges in the form of roles, group membership, security properties or information
are represented as attributes. ACs can be likened to capabilities in that they bind an AC
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holder with a set of authorisation attributes. The structure of an X.509 AC is given in table
6.2.
Version number the version number of the certificate e.g. v2
Serial number the unique identifier for the certificate
Signature algorithm the algorithm used in signing the certificate
Issuer name the name of the entity that issued the certificate
AttrCertValidityPeriod the period in which the certificate is valid
Attributes sequence of attributes that the certificate represents
Holder certificate holder
IssuerUniqueID the identifier for the issuer
Subject unique identifier the identifier for the subject
Extensions optional, for additional information.
Table 6.2: X.509 Attribute Certificate v3
AC’s are used as digital credentials, which can be securely exchanged to provide authorisation
information to access control engines. An AC can either be pushed or pulled depending on
the scenario that best suits the inter-domain communications. The push scenario is typically
used in inter-domain cases where the entity requesting access has its attributes assigned
within its “home” domain. The pull scenario is most useful in inter-domain cases where the
entity requesting access has its attributes assigned and stored at a remote domain.
6.5.2 Distributed Policy Rules
Credentials can be used to exchange authorisation information that assert that an entity is
assigned a role. A role can be tagged with the role authority similar to a credential issuer.
As a credential, it can be assigned to a holder entity regardless of where the issuer is. It can
also be stored at a location different from the holder’s location. For instance an AC can be
issued by an AA [39] and assigned to the entity in the holder field; the AC can be stored by
the AA or at a repository/directory that is managed by a delegated domain. In DTN, the
issuer is the entity that manages or stores the issued credential. For example a credential
can be written as:
Bryan♦GLA.can activate(Bryan, Investigator)← .
This states that an entity called Bryan holds a credential issued by the University of Glasgow
(GLA) asserting an investigator role. In subsequent representation, for clarity, the holder
100
6 Policy Specification
domain is used instead of the holder to show the “home” location of the entity. Similarly, to
be able to distinguish between local and remote roles, the organisation is postfixed by the
symbol “.”. For example the Investigator role can be written as GLA.Investigator .
Using the patient recruitment scenario in Section 3.6, the following example shows how local
and foreign (remote) predicates are used in DTN. Alex, a researcher at University of Dundee
(DUN), has a credential that can be written as:
Alex♦DUN .can activate(Alex ,DUN .Researcher(dept , project , position))←
dept = BiomedicalResearchCentre,
project = CancerTrial ,
position = PrincipalInvestigator
which represents a credential that is issued by the University of Dundee and held by Alex
(expressed as Alex♦DUN ) that asserts that Alex is a researcher, who is a principal investiga-
tor of the cancer clinical trial program at the Biomedical Research Centre. If DUN is willing
to release Alex’s credentials, the University of Dundee will have policies that include a rule
that states, for example, its researcher role can be released to Tayside Children’s Hospital,
Ninewells (TCHN). This can be written as:
DUN .can release cred(TCHN ,
can activate(TCHN ,DUN .Researcher(dept , project , position)),DUN )←
has activated(Alex ,DUN .Researcher(dept , project , position)),
TCHN ∈ COT (DUN ),
dept = BiomedicalResearchCentre,
project = CancerTrial ,
position = PrincipalInvestigator
Similarly at TCHN, there are policy rules that need to be satisfied if it is to be involved in
the negotiation. Two types of policy rules would need to be satisfied for this scenario. The
first TCHN rule can be writing as:
can invoke(DUN .can activate(DUN ,DUN .Researcher), local role)←
tc(DUN .Researcher) = local role,
local role = TCHN .Honconsultant
This rule implies that an entity from the University of Dundee who has a researcher credential
issued by the University of Dundee can invoke the contract which says a DUN researcher role
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is recognised as a TCHN honorary consultant role. The second TCHN rule identified can be
written as:
can release cred(GHG , can activate(GHG , local role),DUN )←
has invoked(DUN , local role),
local role = TCHN .Honconsultant ,
GHG ∈ COT (TCHN )
This rule says that TCHN honorary consultant role can be released to Gartnavel hospital
Glasgow (GHG) if DUN has invoked the contract for TCHN honorary consultant role. In
both rules, Alex (from above) is not referred to, but his organisation is. This is because
in DTN, negotiation is viewed to be between organisations and not individuals. Secondly
this enables rules to be more scalable since the entity (Alex in this case) is linked to the
negotiation session (Section 7.3). In a situation where TCHN wants to restrict role access
to a named entity, a constraint to that effect will be made, e.g. sessionEntity = CN / Alex .
However, this requires TCHN at the point of formulating this policy to know the names of
remote entities.
To support this DTN negotiation at GHG the following policy rules must exist. The first
rule can be written as:
can invoke(TCHN .can activate(DUN ,TCHN .Honconsultant), local role)←
tc(TCHN .Honconsultant) = local role,
local role = GHG .Honconsultant
This rule implies that an entity from TCHN who has an honorary consultant credential issued
by TCHN can invoke the contract TCHN has for GHG’s honorary consultant role. GHG can
deduce from the TCHN credential who the entity is. It is possible for GHG to use these
deductions for finer grained access control.
The second GHG rule for the patient recruitment scenario can be written as:
assign(TCHN .can activate(DUN ,TCHN .Honconsultant),
local role,Patientmaster(acts))←
has invoked(TCHN , local role),
acts = select ,
Patientmaster(acts) ∈ permissions(local role),
local role = GHG .Honconsultant
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This represents what permissions TCHN’s honorary consultant role is allowed within its
domain. The rule implies that an entity that holds TCHN’s honorary consultant credential
is equivalent to GHG honorary consultant role and is granted a select on patientmaster
permission.
Alex is able to get a query response from Gartnavel Hospital Glasgow despite the fact that
his domain is not trusted, but because his researcher credential at Dundee University were
able to be negotiated and able to satisfy each negotiating party’s policies. However, if Alex
(with the same researcher role) requested an update query, e.g. to change the PatientMaster
table records, his request would be denied regardless of complete negotiations since this is
not one of the permissions of a GHG consultant.
6.6 DTN Policies
Four types of security policies are used in DTN [167]: local policies; trust-contract policies;
acceptance policies, and release policies. These triple-based policies consist of 〈subjects,
objects, actions〉 and optionally 〈obligations〉. Each type of policy relates to different stages
of a negotiation and for different resources. Two types of resources suffice in this section.
These are credentials as resources and data objects, e.g. files and databases. In DTN, these
policies are expressed as XACML [163, 84] policies. Each type of policy consists of multiple
rules which can be combined to form a higher level PolicySet, i.e. a collection of policies.
The policies described throughout this section are samples of DTN policies which are defined
and stored by a representative Glasgow (GLA) organisation.
6.6.1 Local Policies
These are policies put in place by service providers to make access decisions for services or
resources they provide. The type of resources mostly protected by these policies are general
resources like data files or database objects such as tables, data views or stored procedures.
These policies are stored in a policy repository and are available to the policy decision point
(PDP) for authorisation decisions on data resources. In a decentralised environment, service
providers can often delegate authority to various AAs for privilege management allowing the
creation and management of security policies which are decentralised and support fine-grained
access control.
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A tabular representation of some local policies are shown in Table 6.3. This shows various
subjects (entities), resources that can be accessed and actions that can be performed. The
subject field contains user names or roles or both. Thus a request may contain a user name
and role as subject attributes. Obligations are conditions on policies, which are to be enforced
by policy enforcement points (PEP). For example, the obligation Anonymise(NHSno, CHI)
in Table 6.3 obliges the PEP to ensure that NHS number and CHI data are anonymised
before they are made available.
Subject Resource Action Obligation
Femi:GLA.GP PatientMaster Select, Insert, Update
John:GLA.Investigator PatientMaster Select Anonymise(NHSno, CHI)
GLA.Nurse PatientMaster Select, Insert
GLA.Clinician PatientMaster Select
GLA.Specialist PatientMaster Select, Insert
GLA.GP/Investigator PatientDrug Select Anonymise(NHSno, CHI)
GLA.VOTES PatientDrug Select, Insert Anonymise(NHSno, CHI)
GLA.VOTES/GP PatientDrug Update
Table 6.3: Tabular View of Local Policies
GP/Investigator is a role label. It indicates Investigator is a subrole of GP.
Local policies indicate what roles are available and the associated permissions for each role
in an organisation. Each row in table 6.3 is enforced as a policy rule. Each of these rules can
be described with Rule 1, described in Section 6.2:
assign(can activate(Femi ,GLA.GP),GLA.GP ,PatientMaster(acts))←
PatientMaster(acts) ∈ permissons(GLA.GP)
assign(can activate(x ,GLA.GP),GLA.GP ,PatientMaster(acts))←
PatientMaster(acts) ∈ permissons(GLA.GP)
In some instances, these rules can include obligations for roles, which must be enforced.
Rules may be implemented in XACML policies, which are stored as PolicySets. In XACML,
the results of each policy can be combined using policy-combining algorithms in order to
reach a final authorisation decision. Use of a rule-combining algorithm allows the effects of
all rules in a policy to be used for an authorisation decision for that policy. Based on the
final authorisation decision reached, where applicable, obligations with a matching “fulfilOn”
effect are also included in the PDP response. An extract of a policy that allows a GP to
perform a select, insert or update on a PatientMaster table is shown in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: An extract of a local policy
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In XACML rule combining algorithms [163] can be defined for policies so that multiple rules
can be combined in one policy. Rules contained in a policy are evaluated and the results
combined and evaluated in order to reach a policy decision. A rule contains a condition,
which is a boolean function. If a rule condition is evaluated to be true the value of the “Rule
Effect”, which can be either a Permit or Deny, is returned for that rule. If a rule cannot
be evaluated or if a rule is evaluated to be false, the result of the rule is Indeterminate
or NotApplicable respectively. For example, the first two rules shown in Figure 6.1 have
“Permit” as the value of their “Rule Effect”. The third rule has a “Deny” value for its “Rule
Effect” and since the rule has no condition it is evaluated to be true.
The policy shown in Figure 6.1 defines access control for the PatientMaster object (resource).
The rules defined in this policy contain the logic of who can access the PatientMaster resource.
Each subject in Table 6.3 who is listed to have access to the PatientMaster resource could be
defined as a rule in the policy. The rule combining algorithm used in the above policy was
the “first-applicable” algorithm. This means that the value of the first rule evaluated to be
true is returned as the final result of the policy. For example, the above policy will return a
permit result if the requester has a GP role or a CN for Femi Ajayi, otherwise it returns a
deny result.
A sample of an XACML policy that allows an Investigator to select only records from Pa-
tientMaster table with obligations that log access and anonymise certain fields is shown in
Extract 1 of Appendix A.
6.6.2 Trust-contract Policies
Trust-contract policies are similar to the local policies described in Section 6.6.1. However
they are designed to validate and enforce trust contracts (or agreements) with respect to
existing local policies. Trust-contract policies allow both trusted and third-party trusted
entities to be included as subjects in a policy. They are used when a remote entity (trusted
or a third-party trusted entity) requests a service or resource. Trust-contract policies provide
restrictive access to resources and services in that they limit privileges of roles. For example,
the first row in table 6.4 implies that any one from Oxford (OX) with a GP role issued by
Oxford will have up to full privileges of a GP, i.e. they are able to perform select, insert or
update of the PatientMaster resource. The second row in the same table implies that any
one that presents a GP role issued by Oxford will have partial privileges of a GP, i.e. they
are able to perform select or insert on the PatientMaster resource. A local policy showing
full privileges of the GP role is illustrated by the first row of table 6.3.
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Subject Resource Action Obligation
OX:OX.GP, GLA.GP PatientMaster Select, Insert, Update Anonymise(NHSno,
CHI), logging
Any:OX.GP, GLA.GP PatientMaster Select, Insert Anonymise(NHSno,
CHI), logging
OX:OX.(Nurse ∩ Clinician),
GLA.GP
PatientMaster Select Anonymise(NHSno,
CHI), logging
IMP:IMP.GP, GLA.GP PatientMaster Select, Insert Anonymise(NHSno,
CHI), logging
Any:IMP.GP, GLA.GP PatientMaster Select Anonymise(NHSno,
CHI), logging
OX:OX.Investigator,
GLA.GP
PatientMaster Select Anonymise(NHSno,
CHI), logging
Any:OX.Investigator,
GLA.GP
PatientMaster Select Anonymise(NHSno,
CHI), logging
OX:OX.VOTES,
GLA.VOTES
PatientDrug Select, Insert Anonymise(NHSno,
CHI), logging
OX:OX.GP/Investigator,
GLA.GP/Investigator
PatientDrug Select Anonymise(NHSno,
CHI), logging
OX:Dlinks ,
GLA.VOTES/GP
PatientDrug Update Anonymise(NHSno,
CHI), logging
Table 6.4: Tabular View of Trust-Contract policies
OX.GP is combination of two labels that implies OX issued a GP role i.e. OX’s GP.
OX.(Nurse ∩ Clinician) implies an entity must have both Nurse and Clinician roles cre-
dentials issued by OX. While Dlinks is an abbreviation for dynamic links discussed in Section
6.6.3. The intersection (∩) signifies commonality, that is to be able to perform Select on a
PatientMaster resource. The remote entity is expected to provide more than one credential
for roles that can perform Select on the PatientMaster resource. In this case, the remote en-
tity is expected to provide credentials for Nurse and Clinician roles since Select with respect
to PatientMaster is common to both Nurse and Clinician roles as defined in its local policies
(see Table 6.3).
Trust-contract policies include obligations for negotiation requests received from remote enti-
ties. A tabular representation of some trust-contract policies is shown in Table 6.4. Each row
represents a trust contract, which is enforced as one or more policy rules. Rule 1 described
in Section 6.2 can be used to enforce trust-contract rules:
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assign(OX .can activate(OX ,OX .GP),GLA.GP ,PatientMaster(acts))←
has invoked(OX ,GLA.GP),
acts = {select , insert , update},
PatientMaster(acts) ∈ permissions(GLA.GP)
The permissions(GLA.GP) returns all permissions granted to GLA.GP , that can be deduced
from permissions allowed to GLA.GP in GLA local policies. It can be used to enforce
permission constraints for trust contracts and also to ensure that permissions granted are
restricted to allowed local policy permissions.
The subject field in Table 6.4 shows attributes such as a third-party-node-identity, remote
roles or trusted entity roles, and local roles (based on existing trust contracts). Policies could
be written to accommodate Any third-party-node-identity and/or trusted entity roles for
policy scalability reasons. Policy obligations ensure that authorisation decisions are logged
and managed as needed, e.g. for future auditing.
Third-party-node-identity enables a PDP to identify and make decisions on when a trusted
third party is making requests for itself or for a third party. This is necessary for scenarios
where a service provider restricts a trusted party (trust contract) from negotiating on-behalf
of other parties or to restrict third-party access. A sample of a trust-contract policy that
allows a remote Investigator to perform select but not insert or update on a PatientMaster
table that is shown in Extract 2 & 3 of Appendix A.
6.6.3 Attribute Access Policies
Attribute Access policies capture the rules that govern access to local attributes. It describes
who can invoke and assume local attributes and from where. The subject field of these policies
include attributes for third-party-node-identities and roles from trusted parties agreed in a
trust contract. However, since third-party-node-identities are unknown in advance, their
subject attributes are generic. Local attributes (credentials) are resources to be protected
which can only be invoked through satisfying trust contracts that have been agreed between
trusted parties.
Table 6.5 shows an exemple of a tabular representation of information described by attribute
access policies. Attribute access policy rule types can be enforced based on Rule 4 (see
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Subject Resource Action Obligation
OX: OX.GP GLA.GP Invoke contract logging
OX: OX.VOTES GLA.VOTES Invoke contract logging
OX: Dlinks GLA.VOTES/GP Invoke contract logging
Any: OX.GP GLA.GP Invoke contract logging
Any: IMP.GP GLA.GP Invoke contract logging
Table 6.5: Tabular View of Acceptance policies
Section 6.2). For example a GLA rule can be given as:
can invoke(OX .can activate(Any ,OX .GP), local role)←
tc(OX .GP) = local role,
local role = GLA.GP
A foreign entity, i.e. OX in this case, can invoke a contract for a local role if it satisfies the
rule condition. Any signifies an unknown entity to GLA but someone who has a credential
issued by OX asserting that it has an OX .GP role. Attribute access policy rules ensure that
a foreign entity (domain) cannot participate in a negotiation if the foreign entity is not in a
position to invoke any of the trust contracts.
It should be noted from Table 6.5 that a subject attribute called Dlinks represents the inter-
pretation of linking delegation rule (discussed in Section 5.6). This is dynamically deduced
based on satisfying trust contracts. For example, in Table 6.5, when a trusted party, e.g.
OX satisfies trust contracts for GP and VOTES , shown as the first two rows in Table 6.5,
it is implied that GP is a role in the VOTES trial and that VOTES is the linking attribute
for the GP role. For example, an entity with credentials issued by OX that satisfies the first
two rows in Table 6.5 is deduced to also satisfy the third row. This means that the entity
can perform select, insert, update on the PatientMaster and perform select on PatientDrug,
and can also by deduction perform update on PatientDrug.
6.6.4 Release Policies
Release policies determine whether negotiated local attributes can be released to a trusted
party for the purpose of trust negotiation either for itself or for other parties. Release policies
control what can be released and who it can be released to. Local attributes (credentials)
are regarded as sensitive resources, and are protected by policies. Since release policies are
mainly geared towards negotiations with trusted parties, and the subject attributes of these
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policies can only contain trusted-node identities. Table 6.6 shows a tabular view of some
release policies.
Subject 1 Subject 2 Resource Action Obligation
Any NOTT GLA.GP Negotiate logging
NOTT IMP GLA.VOTES/GP Negotiate logging
IMP OX GLA.Nurse Negotiate logging
Table 6.6: Tabular View of Release policies
This type of policy can be enforced based on Rule 6 (Section 6.2):
can release cred(OX , can activate(OX ,Nurse), IMP)←
has invoked(IMP ,GLA.nurse),
OX ∈ COT (GLA)
The GLA rule says GLA.nurse credential can be released to OX domain during a negotiation
session if Imperial college (IMP) has invoked the trust contract, has invoked(IMP ,GLA.nurse).
6.7 Resolving Conflicts between Policies
It is not uncommon for conflicts to arise between policies. In DTN, two categories of conflict
are identified. The first category is internal policy conflicts, which arise through conflicts
between local and trust-contract policies. The second is multiple paths policy conflict, which
exist when more than one trust negotiation from the same source node reaches a target node6.
Internal conflicts can occur when trust-contract policies are created with no awareness of
local policies. By definition, trust-contract policies are based on existing local policies, where
the privileges granted to a role through a trust-contract are subsets of privileges granted to
the same role in local policies. For instance, a GP/Investigator role described by a local
policy in Table 6.3 can perform select on the PatientDrug resource. The same role described
by a trust-contract policy in Table 6.4 has the same privileges. However, if a trust-contract
policy exists that states that a GP/Investigator role can also perform select, insert on the
PatientDrug resource, and a conflict will arise between the trust contract and the local policy.
The conflict is triggered only when a remote user with GP/Investigator role wants to perform
insert on the PatientDrug resource.
6Source and target nodes are defined in 7.1.
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Figure 6.2: Multiple-path conflict
Multiple-path policy conflicts can occur when more than one trust-contract satisfy the same
request. This type of conflict happens when a remote credential is negotiated through mul-
tiple end-points.
Example 6.1 Bob who is a GP in the Cardiff node wants to insert data into Glasgow’s
PatientMaster resource. Since the Cardiff node is not directly trusted by Glasgow, they come
under Any node in Glasgow’s policies. The Cardiff node negotiates Bob’s credential through
intermediary nodes and finally through both Oxford and Imperial nodes. These negotiations
enable Bob to present the IMP .GP and OX .GP (from the Imperial and Oxford node respec-
tively) credentials to Glasgow (shown in Figure 6.2). Assuming Table 6.4 represents Glas-
gow’s trust-contract policies, Bob from Any node, presenting OX .GP can perform select,
insert on PatientMaster. Similarly, Bob presenting IMP .GP can perform select on Patient-
Master. However, when Bob presents both credentials, which is not unusual, a conflict will
arise between the two trust-contract policies (see rows 4 and 5 of table 6.4). The OX .GP
implies he can perform select, insert on PatientMaster resource while GLA.GP implies he
can only perform select. The question then is, should Bob be allowed to perform ‘Select’ or
both ‘Select and Insert’.
In DTN, multiple-path conflicts are resolved by implementing role exclusion mechanisms as
discussed in [48]. Defining non-hierarchical roles as mutually exclusive and applying exclu-
sion rules such as run-time/complete exclusion, safety can be ensured. Local roles defined
in trust-contract policies are mutually exclusive in order to ensure constraints that trust-
contract policies offer are enforced. For instance, OX .GP and IMP .GP from Any node are
mutually exclusive. XACML policy-combining algorithms [163] are implemented in DTN to
resolve multiple path policy conflicts by combining conflicting trust-contract policies. Policy
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combining algorithms such as the “deny overrides” algorithm returns a final Deny result if
any of the policies that are being combined return a Deny result. In Example 6.1, if Glasgow
decides to use the “deny overrides” algorithm as the combining algorithm, Bob would be
denied from inserting data into Patientmaster, since GLA.GP would return Deny for the
insert action on PatientMaster, regardless of the result of OX .GP that evaluates to Per-
mit. Extract 3 of Appendix 1 shows a PolicySet sample of how two mutually exclusive
trust-contract policies are resolved.
On the other hand, DTN resolves internal policy conflicts by basing its final access decision
on the evaluation of local policies. This is called local policy priority. One reason for this
priority is that remote entities should not have more privileges than local entities. The
second reason is that DTN is designed to complement existing access control infrastructures
and policies7. For instance, using the internal conflict example, the policy decision engine
will return a deny result for the insert action on PatientDrug resource.
There are also scenarios where both internal policy conflicts and multiple-path conflicts exist
during a request (or user) session. The order of resolution is to first resolve all multiple-path
conflicts and then resolve any internal policy conflicts that are still outstanding.
6.8 Summary
The syntax and semantics of the policy language used in DTN were specified in this chapter.
The policy language, a rule-based policy language was discussed. The rule-based language
uses propositional logic for rules definition. It was shown how a rule consists of a rule head
and rule body. A rule body contains conditions and if these conditions are satisfied, the rule
will be enforced. With this, a rule body can be used to encode parts of an authorisation
policy and the rule head for encoding what should be enforced by the policy.
The syntax of the rule-based policy language was defined and specified. Using the specifi-
cation, six policy language functions or predicates were defined for DTN. These functions
express the various authorisation rules that can be used to enforce DTN policies. The chapter
described how policies defined for DTN include: local, trust contact, attribute access and
release policies. Through these policies it was shown that the potential risks associated with
the notion of transitive trust can be reduced if properly designed and implemented. It was
also described how DTN policies could be used to ensure that trust contracts, which them-
selves are sensitive, could be protected with policies and thus used to control the invocation
7These policies are referred to as local policies in DTN.
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of trust contracts. By using such policies, it was shown how trust contract privileges could
be constrained based on who is invoking the contract and for whom it is being invoked.
The chapter concluded with a discussion on how conflicts between policies could be resolved.
Two types of conflict were identified. An internal policy conflict, which arises when the
evaluation of trust-contract policies disagree with the evaluation of local policies. This conflict
is resolved by given priority to the evaluation of local policies. It was shown that this is valid
since trust-contract policies are supposed to be derived from local policies. The second
conflict identified was based on multiple paths policy conflict. This arises when more than
one trust negotiation from the same source node reaches a target node. It was shown how
this could be resolved by ensuring mutual exclusivity between trust contracts and by the use
of policy-combining algorithms.
113
7 DTN Protocols
This chapter describes details of two protocols used in the DTN framework: the Discovery
and Negotiation protocols. These protocols describe how trust pathways are discovered in a
virtual network and how credentials (trust) are negotiated across the network.
7.1 Node Classification
In order to understand the protocols, nodes are classified differently based on the role(s) they
play in the network. The various nodes classification are shown in Figure 7.1 and described
below:
• Source node: A node is a Source node if the node was the one that initiated a message
request. A message could be a request or a response but a Source node is the originator
of a route request or a negotiation request.
• Target node: A node is a Target node if the node is the resource provider or the end
point for a message request. It is also referred to as a sink node.
• Intermediary node: An Intermediary node is a third party node that acts as a
gateway that relays a message between a Source node and a Target node or another
intermediary node.
Figure 7.1: Classification of nodes
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In addition to this classification, a Sender node is a node from whom a message (request or
response) has been received. A Sender node is not necessarily a Source node, but a Source
node is also a Sender node when it sends a request. An Intermediary node is viewed as a
Sender node since it relays requests or responses to other nodes. Similarly, a Target node
is viewed as a Sender node when it sends a response. Fundamentally, each node is a sender
node whenever it sends or relays a message.
7.2 Discovery
Discovery is the process of selecting paths in a network of connected nodes. Nodes are
connected based on trust, i.e. nodes that trust each other are said to be connected. Through
discovery, nodes can select trusted paths to a non-trusted node. These paths are called trust
pathways or form what is known as circle of trust. A cicle of trust is an ordered list of nodes
that possess credentials that may be used for trust negotiation. These nodes constitute a path
(trust-path) between two points in a network. A path between two points can be discovered
by traversing nodes that are connected through overlapping COTs.
Trust pathways enable nodes to negotiate attributes from point to point. This discovery
process of DTN is similar to network routing. In DTN, the objectives of the discovery
process include:
1. to identify paths that may exist between nodes through which trust negotiation can
occur;
2. to limit route requests to nodes that exist in their COT;
3. to be dynamic and respond to changes as nodes join or leave the network, i.e. as trust
between nodes changes;
4. to be responsive to changes in network conditions and be able to scale up in meeting
network demands.
5. to be secure, offering point-to-point and end-to-end security in the network.
Discovery enables each node to construct next-hop trust (routing) table(s) automatically,
based on the information carried by the discovery protocol. The discovery protocol describes
how nodes (or domains) are discovered based on available trust contracts in a network of
nodes. The protocol uses messages that are packaged as request and response elements, and
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rules that a network must follow when producing and consuming these elements. In the im-
plementation of DTN, these messages are bound to SOAP [66] and subsequently propagated
to trusted nodes as described in Section 7.2.1.
7.2.1 Discovery Messages
Underlying DTN is a generic message structure that abstracts the basic elements of a request
and response. The elements of a message include:
• Source: The Source of a discovery message is represented by its X.500 Distinguished
Name (DN). All nodes (domains) must have a non-empty DN and it is up to other
domains to verify the source DN to the Public Key Certificate (PKC) of the source.
The DN uniquely identifies a node (domain) that initiated the path discovery. It is
based on the subject name of a digital certificate. An example of a source DN is:
/C=UK/O=eScience/OU=Glasgow/L=Compserv
/CN=host/dhaulagiri.nesc.gla.ac.uk
/emailAddress=ajayio@dcs.gla.ac.uk
where host/dhaulagiri.nesc.gla.ac.uk is a placeholder for the service.
• Target: A distinguished name (DN) that uniquely identifies the domain (service
Provider) that is to be discovered. It is expressed as the subject name from its corre-
sponding PKC. This binding can be used to establish an authenticated security context
in which messages can be protected.
• SeqNum: A sequence number that is unique and maintained by the Source node for
each message.
• MAC: Message Authentication Code generated using a keyed hash algorithm [168].
The MAC which is OPTIONAL and if used covers the whole message.
• Type: Identifies the message Type, which can be a request or a response.
The request and response messages can be likened to input and output messages as shown
in Figure 7.1.
Route Request: A route request is a message (query) sent by a node (Sender node) to its
trusted nodes for the discovery of trust paths. These trusted nodes are nodes in the Sender’s
circle of trust (COT) as shown in Figure 7.2. A request message identifies the Source node
that initiated the route request, the Target node (SP) that is to be negotiated with, the
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Figure 7.2: A Sender’s COT
sequence number that uniquely identifies the message and a message authentication code
that can be verified between a given node-pair.
The sequence number is different for each route request initiated by a Source node but does
not change as a route request is being propagated through intermediary nodes. Different
sequence numbers help a Source node to distinguished between route queries. With every
message sent, a time-stamp is associated with the message. This helps intermediary nodes
to distinguish between previously and newly sent messages. Sequence numbers also help to
identify loops and prevent cycles.
The MAC covers the whole message and is generated through a keyed hash algorithm that
uses a shared key or a signed hash value using the sender’s private key. The shared key must
be agreed between two nodes as part of their trust agreement. The shared or private key used
is meant to deter external modification. However, if the message communication is over an
authenticated and secure channel then a MAC is optional. Having a MAC does not prevent
internal attacks, where a sequence number could be modified to potentially destroy routing
information of trust relationships.
Route Response: For every query a response is expected. A route response is a message
sent as a reply to a route query. Even though a route request may be propagated to other
intermediary nodes, only one reply is sent back as shown in Figure 7.3. The route response is
a message Type, which identifies the Source node that initiated the route request, the Target
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Figure 7.3: Discovery messages: Single route response for multiple route requests
node (SP) that is to be negotiated with, the sequence number that uniquely identifies the
message and message authentication code that can be verified between a given node-pair.
The sequence number must be the same sequence number as in the original request otherwise
the response may be associated with another request. If a response cannot be associated with
a request, the response is invalid. As with received route requests, a time-stamp is associated
with the message. This helps intermediary nodes to distinguish an already received response
from another. Similarly, sequence numbers also help to identify loops and prevent cycles.
Like route requests, a MAC is associated with every route response. It is optional if the
response is communicated over a secure channel.
7.2.2 Key Management
Key management is an important part of the DTN protocol. In situations where a MAC is
used, a shared key must be agreed between two parties. This is usually agreed when trust-
contracts are agreed. Periodically, a shared key is renewed and both parties make use of this
new key. In other environments where parties have public and private key-pairs, and trust
the same CAs or Root CAs, then a hash value based on an agreed hash algorithm can be
digitally signed using private keys.
7.2.3 Discovery Process
In DTN a modified Ad-hoc On Demand Vector (AODV) [169, 170] routing protocol is used
to build chains of trusts or discover trust-pathways which allow credentials to be negotiated.
Since DTN is not about shortest paths to a destination, the algorithm used in the protocol
is modified to support discovery of multiple paths to a destination. Similarly, as notification
messages hold sensitive information, notifications are restricted to trusted peers and messages
are encrypted with shared keys or key pairs. Once each node collates routing information,
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Figure 7.4: Discovery process, using Circles of Trust
nodes judiciously select appropriate nodes with respect to destination nodes. The discovery
algorithm is listed in Algorithm 7.1.
Each node u keeps a list of nodes v0, v1, ..., vk ∈ V in its circle of trust (COT) along with
their respective weights, encryption keys and rule-set also known as constraints. When an
entity at a node S in Figure 7.4, makes a request for remote resources1, say a list of cancer
patients for a given trial; a provider service may suggest that the relevant data sets exist
at nodes I , J and D . Node S will then check for nodes I , J ,D in its COT and sends route
requests to nodes that are in its COT, i.e. nodes I and J . It uses the discovery process to
discover nodes that are not in its COT, i.e. node D .
Since node D is not in S ’s COT, a route request is initiated. A route request is initiated
to discover trust-pathways to other nodes if such information does not already exist in the
node’s trust-pathways table. The trust-pathways table contains lists of COT nodes that act
as ‘next hops’ or routes to non-COT nodes. The list is prioritised based on weights of those
routes as described in Section 5.5.
Route Request: Consider Figure 7.4 where S is the Source node and D is the Destination
or Target node S sends a route request (RREQ) to nodes that exist in its COT. Node S
contains nodes I , J and K in its COT and they will all receive a RREQ. A typical RREQ
has the following structure: a source distinguished name; a destination distinguished name;
a sequence number and a message authentication code (MAC ) which is computed using a
shared key, i.e. a RREQ is given as:
1It is assumed that a discovery service for service providers exists that returns a list of service providers
that provide various resources
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Algorithm 7.1 DTN Discovery Protocol – when a message (RREQ or RREP) is received
1: validate MAC
2: if msg is RREQ then
3: if RREQ had not been previously received from sender then
4: save a copy of the RREQ and timestamp
5: if this node is the target then
6: send RREP to RREQ’s sender
7: else
8: send RREQ to nodes in COT
9: end if
10: end if
11: else {msg is RREP}
12: if RREP had not been previously received from sender then
13: save a copy of the RREP and timestamp
14: update routing table
15: if this node is not the source node then
16: find RREP’s request senders i.e. match (source, target , seqnum)
17: send RREP to nodes that sent request
18: end if
19: end if
20: end if
RREQ : {DNs ,DNd ,Seqnum}+ Ksd(MAC )
DNs and DNd are distinguished names for Source and Destination nodes respectively. Seqnum
represents a sequence number. Ksd(MAC ) is a message authentication code computed using
Ksd , which is a key shared between the sender and receiver nodes.
Each node implements a RREQ table that stores route requests it receives from Source nodes
and intermediary nodes. When a non-destination node receives a RREQ, it checks its COT
to see if the sender is a trusted node. It reads the MAC using their shared key and forwards
the message to other trusted nodes, re-computing the MAC using keys it shares with those
nodes. It then stores that node as the ‘next hop’ to the Source node in its trust-pathways
table. Similarly, if it receives the same RREQ from multiple nodes, it stores those nodes as
the ‘next hops’ to the Source node in its trust-pathways table.
Route Response: The destination node DNd , on receiving a RREQ, creates a route response
(RREP) which is sent to nodes it receives a RREQ from. A RREP is given as:
RREP : {DNd ,DNs ,Seqnum}+ Kds(MAC )
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Where DNd and DNs are distinguished names for the destination and Source nodes respec-
tively. The sequence number Seqnum is maintained by the destination node for each reply
made to a Source node. Kds(MAC ) is a message authentication code computed using Kds ,
which is a key shared between two nodes, i.e. the sender node and receiver node.
When a non-Source node receives a RREP, it checks its COT for the sender, checks for the
corresponding RREQ in its RREQ table and if valid, verifies the MAC using its key. For
every valid MAC, a node updates its trust-pathways table registering the RREP sender node
as the ‘next-hop’ to the destination node. The non-Source node also re-broadcasts the RREP
to other nodes it receives a RREQ from but re-computes the MAC s using keys it shares with
those nodes.
Route Update: A node may revoke its trust contracts with other nodes and thus render
some routes in the trust chains invalid. Similarly, new nodes may be added at any time and
new trust relations added. Thus when a node detects broken routes it sends error messages
to other nodes that are in its COT. An error message contains a MAC, which is computed
using shared keys. When a node receives route errors, it authenticates the sender and verifies
the MAC using their shared key. If the MAC is valid, it updates its trust-pathways table,
and if other routes to a destination do not exist, it re-sends error messages to other nodes in
its COT.
7.2.4 Routing Algorithm
The algorithm applied to support DTN was based on a number of factors: route discovery,
confidentiality, maintainability and cost (i.e. number of trust contracts). Various routing
algorithms were compared and some of these are discussed below.
Distance Vector algorithm (DV): This algorithm described in [171] assigns a cost to each
of the links between nodes in the network. Cost in DV is the distance or the number of hops
between nodes. Cost can be evaluated based on message delay, reliability and hop count.
Nodes send information from one point to the other via the path that results in the lowest
total cost, i.e. the sum of the costs of links between the nodes. In DTN, costs are viewed as
weights, i.e. the number of TCs that exist between two nodes. The algorithm works when
each node sends to each neighbouring node its own current idea of the total cost to get to
all the destinations it knows. Neighbouring nodes compare this information to what they
already have in their routing table, and, based on the lowest cost, they update their own
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routing tables. After a while, all nodes in the network will discover the best route and hence
next-hop nodes for all destinations.
When a node becomes unavailable, the network corrects itself when adjacent nodes drop the
unavailable node from their routing tables and pass on their new routing table to their neigh-
bouring nodes. This process is repeated from each node to their adjacent nodes. Eventually
all the nodes in the network have updated their routing tables based on the new information.
However, the DV algorithm has several drawbacks:
• It performs poorly as the number of hops increases due to the time it takes converge,
i.e. time to propagate changes across the entire network;
• It does not scale well due to the fact that information shared between nodes are often
inaccurate, incomplete or obsolete. It causes the count-to-infinity problem discussed in
[172]2;
• It has less computational complexity and message overhead compared to other algo-
rithms, since it requires more resources to evaluate a route;
• It raises privacy issues in trust-based networks as nodes might not want to disclose the
nodes they currently trust to other non-trusted nodes.
Link-State algorithm (LS): [173] describes a LS algorithm that enables each node to build
a map of the entire network in the form of a graph. It works when each node floods the entire
network with information about nodes it can connect to, and each node uses this information
to create a map of the network. With this map, each node calculates the least-cost path from
itself to other nodes. This enables each node to construct a tree with itself as the root and
a given path through the tree is the least cost path to any other nodes. Routing tables are
based on this tree. LS algorithms also have several drawbacks
• They create heavy traffic because of flooding;
• They need a considerable amount of computational resources (e.g. storage and process-
ing unit) to calculate routing tables since it has to build a map of the entire network;
• They assume all nodes can be reached, which is not always the case in trust-based
networks – where reachability is for a selected few;
2This is not an issue for DTN since its aim is to discover multiple paths and not the lowest cost for reaching
a node. It is noted that it might be important to prioritise the path to a node based on the total cost
(number of TCs) of reaching a node
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• They raise privacy issues similar to the DV algorithm as nodes might not want to
disclose the trust relationships they have with other nodes.
Ad-hoc On-Demand Vector algorithm (AODV): Unlike the distance vector algorithm,
AODV [170] is not particularly interested in the shortest route to a destination node but
rather in all the possible routes to a destination node from a Source node. As the name
suggests, the algorithm is widely used in ad-hoc networks such as mobile ad-hoc networks
(MANET). The algorithm is suitable for a dynamic self-starting network with little or no
dependence on adverts from nodes in the network. AODV works by broadcasting route
discovery packets to neighbouring nodes when necessary; it detects nodes in its neighbour-
hood (i.e. reachable nodes), and also shares information about changes in local connectivity
to other neighbourhood nodes that might need the information. To maintain the most re-
cent routing information, nodes use a monotonically increasing sequence counter to identify
obsolete cached routes. With respect to DTN, AODV has the following benefits:
• It scores better on privacy as the algorithm only discloses routing information to its
trusted partners;
• The cost of maintaining routing information is acceptable since the algorithm offers
resilience owing to its discovery of multiple paths;
• It is well suited to discovering possible routes since its objective is to discover multiple
paths rather than the best path.
Distributed Hash Tables (DHT): DHT are not considered as the objective is not to find
a Target node or resource, but rather in finding all nodes that are in a relationship with a
given Target node. Similarly, DHT raises privacy issues since it requires nodes to disclose
the nodes they currently trust to other non-trusted nodes.
7.3 Negotiation
The negotiation protocol describes how negotiation elements are embedded as packages within
negotiation request and response messages. It also describes the processing rules that a
negotiator must follow when producing or consuming these messages. The protocol is based
on a request-response protocol.
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Typically the negotiation process involves an entity through its local-domain, e.g. a Source
node, starts a session with a service provider, e.g. a Target node requests a service or resource.
A user handle (token) and a resource handle (token) are exchanged. On receipt of a resource
token, the local-domain initiates the trust negotiation process with nodes in its routing table
that act as a next-hop to the service provider. If no routes exist, the local-domain initiates a
discovery process with all nodes in its COT. After the discovery process, negotiation requests
are sent to next-hop nodes and a response is expected until the negotiation window closes.
Every node that receives a negotiation request is expected to send back a response.
7.3.1 Negotiation Messages
A negotiation message is a generic message that abstracts the basic elements of a negotiation
request and response. The elements of a negotiation message follow the same structure as
discovery messages, i.e. Source, Target, SeqNum, MAC and Type but also includes elements:
• RCred: Credentials presented as attribute certificates or security tokens. These are
the credentials that a peer wants to negotiate.
• Token: A resource token is created by the service provider, to identify a request and
for linking the request to a user token. It is provided by the service provider during
a resource-request handshake and only remains valid throughout the resource-request
session.
Negotiation Request: A negotiation request is sent as a message from a user’s local-domain
on behalf of a user. The request includes entity credentials (depending on the negotiation
strategy [120]); resource tokens provided by a service provider that are used during the session
to undertake the handshake; a sequence number that uniquely identifies the message, and a
message authentication code for ensuring message integrity.
From a Source node perspective, credentials included in a message are the credentials of
a user that request services from a service provider. Credentials are made available for
negotiation if the local-domain’s release policy does not prevent their disclosure. The trusted
domain or Intermediary domain (next-hop node) on validating the message, will subject these
credentials to its acceptance policy. The sequence number is different for each negotiation
request sent to trusted domains. It is noted that the resource token remains the same for
each negotiation request since it binds negotiation requests to a resource-request session.
Different sequence numbers help a Source node to distinguish negotiations between different
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negotiation paths. A time-stamp is associated with every request sent. This is provided with
the sequence number that can help prevent or detect some external attacks.
An Intermediary node upon receiving a negotiation request, validates the message; subjects
the request credential to its acceptance policies and determines potential delegated local
credentials based on trust-contracts that it holds with the requester and service provider
and/or other intermediaries. These delegated local credentials are similarly subjected to
release policies. If release policies are satisfied, a negotiation request with these delegated
local credentials is created and sent to other trusted nodes (next-hop nodes). The resource
token and sequence number remain unchanged during the received negotiation request. Any
modification to the resource token and sequence number breaks the chain-of-trust for that
particular negotiation. As before, the MAC and time-stamp are associated with every request
sent.
A Target node or service provider receives a negotiation request; validates the message;
subjects the request credential to its acceptance policies, and determines delegated local
credentials based on trust-contracts that it holds with the requester. The service provider
populates its negotiated attribute store (NAS), which is described later in Section 4.2.5 with
the delegated local credentials and resource token. A time-stamp is also saved with each
entry in the store. The resource token links the negotiated attributes to a resource-request
session.
Negotiation Response: A negotiation response is a message sent as a reply to a negotiation
request. It extends the negotiation request message with an additional message element:
• Status: A binary value, 1 or 0. It contains a 1 if at least one local credential was
successfully delegated by the Target node (SP). Otherwise, it contains a 0 indicating
that negotiation was not successful either at the Target node or at any Intermediary
node.
A Target node populates its NAS when a negotiation is successful and it sends a response with
a ‘1’ status value. If delegated local credentials were not available for a negotiation request,
a negotiation response with a ‘0’ status is returned. The credential in the negotiation request
is also included in the response. The sequence number and resource token also remain the
same as the negotiation request. This enables the requester to differentiate between requests
it has sent.
When an Intermediary node receives a negotiation request, it sends back a response with a ‘0’
status if the credential in the negotiation request fails either its acceptance policies or release
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policy, or both. Credentials in the negotiation request are also included in the response. The
sequence number and resource token are unchanged from the received negotiation request.
This enables the requester to differentiate between the requests it has sent.
In addition, when a negotiation response is received and validated, negotiation responses are
sent to all nodes that it has received corresponding negotiation requests from. The status
value in each of these responses is the same as the received negotiation response. Credentials
from corresponding requests are sent in these responses. The sequence number and resource
token are the same as that of the received negotiation response. This enables corresponding
request senders to differentiate between requests they have sent.
7.3.2 Key Management
As described in Section 7.2.2, a shared key has to be agreed between parties. Though a shared
key could be used for both discovery and negotiation, using different keys is preferred since
the compromise of one key would not affect the other. This does not extend to situations
where hash values are signed using private keys, however.
7.3.3 Negotiation Process
Once trust paths or next-hop information exists in the routing tables, domains can prioritise
next-hop values based on the number of trust-contracts they have with these next-hop nodes.
The more trust-contracts the better their chance of successful negotiations, since increase in
trust contracts increases the likelihood of mapping between credentials. On the other hand,
more trust contracts do not guarantee that negotiations will be successful.
The algorithm used by the negotiation protocol is listed in Algorithm 7.2. It shows what
happens when a node receives a negotiation message, which is either a request or a response.
The message states of the negotiation protocol are shown in table 7.1.
When a Source node receives a negotiation response (NREP), it validates the message and
checks the response against any negotiation request (NREQ) it may have sent. The Source
node then waits for more negotiation responses or a negotiation time-out before proceeding
to the Service Provider with the user’s token (or handle) and resource token. The return of
both tokens (with an attribute assertion in the case of Shibboleth) suggest to the SP that
trust negotiations are complete for the requested session and that it can proceed to make
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Message state Source Target SeqNum MAC Token
NREQ sent: default state 1 1 1 1 1
NREPsent: fail state 1 1 1 1 1
NREPrecv: default state 1 1 1 1 1
NREQrecv: fail state 1 1 1 1 1
NREQrecv: pass state 1 1 1 1 1
NREPsent: pass state 1 1 1 1 1
NREPsent: forward state 1 1 1 1 1
Rcred Status Lcred Sender Next-hop
NREQ sent: default state -1 -1 1 1LO 1
NREPsent: fail state 1S 0 -1 1 -1
NREPrecv: default state 1 1= -1 1 -1
NREQrecv: fail state 1 -1 -1 1 -1
NREQrecv: pass state 1 -1 1 1 -1
NREPsent: pass state 1S 1 -1 1 -1
NREPsent: forward state 1OS 1= -1 1 -1
Legend:
1 Yes or Succeed
0 No or Fail
-1 Not Applicable
1= No change in reply
1S Sender’s credential
1OS Original sender’s credential
1LO This node i.e. Self
Table 7.1: Data States for Negotiation Messages
resource policy decisions based on credentials stored in its NAS. The Shibboleth-oriented
flow diagram of a negotiation process is shown in Figure 7.5.
The negotiation time-out is based on a negotiation window. All nodes involved in trust
negotiation are expected to individually set the value of their negotiation window based on
a metric of their choosing. In the current implementation, the value is set to 90 seconds
based on the performance tests described in Section 9.8. This value is based on the sum of
the maximum run time values of both discovery and negotiation. The consideration for the
maximum run time value of the discovery process is due to the fact that node discovery may
be required prior to a trust negotiation. This value can subsequently be changed, e.g. based
on experience. In most cases, a negotiation response is received before a negotiation time-out
occurs. The negotiation window helps to prevent replay attacks (discussed in 7.4.1) and for
requesting session closing.
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7.4 Attacks to Protocols
Different attacks exist that can alter data or gain authentication or authorisation privileges
by inserting false information. The attacks described in this section are general to the AODV
routing protocols and are either externally or internally instigated. External attacks come
from entities, e.g. nodes, that do not belong to the network. Internal attacks come from
nodes that are compromised in the network.
7.4.1 External Attacks
The ways in which an external entity could attack a routing protocol are numerous and
include:
• Replay attack: An attacker could collect routing information such as route request/
response and later propagate stale messages, i.e. messages with sequence numbers that
have already been received or have timed out. If these stale messages are not detected
and dropped, incorrect routing information could be made. This attack could be de-
tected by monitoring sequence numbers and checking them against a list of sequence
numbers that have been received or known to have expired.
• Denial of Service (DoS) attack: A malicious node may attempt to bring down
a network by saturating the network with false routing messages, which could eat up
network resources, e.g. CPU cycles and memory. This would prevent legitimate routing
messages from being delivered and thus make the gathering of routing information
difficult. Similarly an attacker can broadcast false route error messages stating that
some nodes are no longer available thus preventing access to those nodes. This attacker
could be prevented or detected by applying well known DoS solution techniques such
as filtering or intrusion detection techniques [174, 175, 23]. For instance, a node that
is known to be compromised could be backlisted and all messages from the node could
be dropped, until the node’s new public-key and credentials have been re-evaluated.
• Modification: An attacker can modify message elements like sequence numbers to
cause traffic redirection in a network. If integrity measures are taken such as the use
of a MAC or signed hash value, then these modified messages could be detected and
dropped. However, this does not prevent a DoS attack.
• Spoofing: A malicious node can impersonate other nodes through an identification
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spoofing attack and sending bogus routing messages. The bogus messages, if not de-
tected, can cause inconsistent routing tables or false routing entries. This attack can
be prevented or detected when nodes manage and protect their secret keys as described
in Section 7.2.2.
7.4.2 Internal Attacks
Internal attacks are more difficult to detect and are more potent in causing service disruptions
or inconsistent routing information. An internal attack can take over compromised nodes and
even access private keys or shared keys with other nodes. This attack could generate valid
MAC s for modified or false routing messages.
An internal attack can be limited where a Source node digitally signs part of a message:
{Source, Target, SeqNum, Token} thus preventing internal modifications. However, this
would require a key management model for all nodes in the VO (or network), using a hier-
archical approach such as a centralised CA or a web of trust approach such as OpenPGP
[176].
7.5 Summary
In this chapter the details of the discovery and negotiation protocols used in the DTN frame-
work were discussed. The chapter described how trust pathways could be discovered in
a virtual network and how credentials (trust) could subsequently be negotiated across the
network.
It described how the discovery protocol allows domains that form trust-pathways to be dis-
covered through circles of trust and trust contracts. An outline of how the protocol uses
request and response messages, and rules that a network must follow when producing and
consuming the messages was given. The chapter also described how the discovery protocol
made use of the AODV routing protocol. Since DTN is not about shortest paths to a destina-
tion, it was explained how the AODV protocol was modified to support discovery of multiple
paths to a given destination. The chapter described how the messages exchanged using the
protocol were restricted to trusted nodes and how messages could be encrypted with shared
keys or key pairs.
The chapter also described how the negotiation protocol supports negotiation elements that
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could be exchanged using negotiation request and response messages. It discussed the proto-
col and processing rules that a negotiator must follow when producing or consuming negoti-
ation messages. It also presented the algorithm used by the negotiation protocol along with
the protocol’s message states.
The chapter concluded with a discussion of how the protocols can be protected from various
security attacks. The security attacks discussed included replay, denial of service, modi-
fication and spoofing attacks. It described how DTN detects and prevents replay attacks
by employing monitoring of message sequence numbers and checking them against a list of
known numbers. The chapter discussed how denial of service attacks could be prevented or
detected by using filtering and intrusion detection techniques. The chapter also discussed
how modification and spoofing attacks could be prevented and detected by combining key
management and cryptographic techniques.
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Algorithm 7.2 DTN Negotiation Protocol – when a message (NREQ or NREP) is received
1: validate Mat
2: if msg is NREQ then
3: if NREQ had not been previously received then
4: if this node is the target then
5: if acceptance policy returns true then
6: save NREQrecv
7: send NREP to sender
8: save NREPsent
9: else {failed acceptance policy}
10: save NREQrecv
11: send NREP to sender
12: save NREPsent
13: end if
14: else if this node is an intermediary then
15: if acceptance policy returns true then
16: save NREQrecv
17: if release policy returns true then
18: send NREQ to next hop nodes OR forward corresponding replies that was received
from next hop nodes
19: save each of NREQsent
20: else {failed released policy}
21: send NREP to sender
22: save NREPsent
23: end if
24: else {failed acceptance policy}
25: save NREQrecv
26: send NREP to sender
27: save NREPsent
28: end if
29: end if
30: end if
31: else {msg is NREP}
32: if NREP has not been previous received then
33: if this node is the source then
34: save NREPrecv
35: wait for other replies
36: on time out or after all replies, resume SAML (get resource from SP)
37: end if
38: if this node is not target then
39: save NREPrecv
40: send NREP to nodes that sent request, match (source, target, seqnum, token, requestcred)
41: save all NREPsent
42: end if
43: end if
44: end if
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Figure 7.5: Trust Negotiation Flow for VOs
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8 Case Study: Clinical Trials
This chapter presents clinical trials and scenarios that serve as the basis for testing the DTN
framework described in this thesis. The chapter starts with an overview of the e-Health
domain and then focuses on an area of the domain – clinical trials.
8.1 Overview
The e-Health domain is perhaps one of the most interesting domain where data ownership
and access control management is very acute and of concern to the health community. At
present there is an ongoing drive for health researchers to collaborate and access data across
institutional boundaries for improved drug administration [177], disease diagnosis, epidemio-
logical studies [178] and healthcare delivery. e-Health researchers need to share and securely
access data resources that are geographically distributed, owned and controlled by various
organisations.
Two key areas of e-Health research include epidemiological studies and clinical trials. An
epidemiological study is a descriptive, analytic and/or experimental study typically identi-
fying risk factors for diseases and for determining optimal treatment approaches in clinical
medicine. Clinical trials are research studies in which new methods for diagnosing, treat-
ing, detecting and preventing diseases in people are investigated. Both studies require the
collection of data typically on many hundreds or thousands of people over a long period of
time (see Appendix B.2), and from different sources and using numerous devices1. Usually
these studies require collaborative effort from individuals, GPs, clinicians, health boards and
hospitals, among others, and they require a supporting e-Infrastructures.
Some of the issues that affect clinical trials include access to and/or performing analysis
on patient records hosted on different sites and identifying eligible participants in ethically
driven frameworks, e.g. addressing patient consent. Clinical trials also include the collection
1As an example, the UK BioBank is a study which is currently recruiting 500,000 people in the UK, who
will be followed up over 25 years [147].
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and aggregation of data generated during studies in many different forms. Similarly, data
transmission is an issue for data collected during a study is often at mobile health centres and
is substantial in total size. Other issues include portability for remote data entry systems that
are needed for large-scale studies, data processing, and study management. Last, but not the
least, are issues of data protection and access control, privacy, confidentiality, data integrity,
data ownership management, provenance, aggregation and inference, interoperability and
heterogeneity.
8.2 Clinical Trials
Clinical trials are studies carried out in various magnitudes of scale, i.e. study length, size and
time as summarised in Appendix B.2, to test and validate new treatments and health devices
[179, 180]. Generally, clinical trials can be summarised into these areas: patient recruitment,
data management, study administration and co-ordination. Typically, before a trial can
start, willing participants have to be identified, their eligibility for the study evaluated and
their consent obtained. In most trials, targeted populations are commonly represented so
as to cover all possibilities for the medication. Clinical trials are managed and executed in
phases [179] e.g. for a drug to be approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
[181], it must undergo clinical trials. Clinical trials phases are summarised in Appendix B.2.
Two clinical trial examples are presented in this section. These scenarios are taken from
completed studies and are presented with little medical jargon for clarity. These scenarios
highlight some typical processes, issues and requirements of clinical trials. The second sce-
nario is a collaborative study, which shows the impact of collaboration on study management.
In addition, questions raised by these scenarios are presented. The clinical trial, controls and
terms used in this section are defined in Appendix B.
8.2.1 The West of Scotland Coronary Prevention Study
The West of Scotland Coronary Prevention Study (WOSCOPS) was a clinical trial that
investigated pravastatin in a primary prevention context [182, 183]. The randomised, double-
blind, placebo-controlled trial tested the hypothesis that the use of 40mg pravastatin each
night, over an average five year period would reduce coronary morbidity and mortality in
45-64 year old men who had raised plasma cholesterol levels. The study’s principal endpoints
were coronary heart disease deaths, in addition to non-fatal myocardial infarction; coronary
134
8 Case Study: Clinical Trials
heart disease death, and non-fatal myocardial infarction.
WOSCOPS Screening and Recruitment: About 160,000 men were invited to attend clinics
to assess their coronary risk factors. Approximately 81,000 men in the West of Scotland came
for the first visit and those with total cholesterol level of at least 6.5mmol/L were given lipid-
lowering dietary advice and invited to a second screening 4 weeks later. 20,912 men came
for the second visit and those with cholesterol level of at least 4.0mmol/L were advised to
further stay on lipid-lowering diet and invited for a third visit. 13,654 men attended, and
were screened and invited to a fourth visit. On the fourth visit, men with conditions of ≥
4.5mmol/L and ≤ 6.0mmol/L on the last two visits were randomised [184]. About 6,595 men
with raised plasma cholesterol levels who gave written informed consent were finally recruited
to the trial.
WOSCOPS Functional Units: Random blocks of randomised participants were allocated
to various health centres. Participants were followed up in each health centre. A trial
centre team included a physician, a nurse and an administrator responsible for an average
of 400 participants [183]. Participants were seen at an average interval of three months and
continued to undergo dietary advice. The participants received a full medical examination
each year and an electrocardiogram (ECG) was obtained yearly or as required clinically.
Blood and ECG data collected at the health centre were digitally coded and sent to a central
Analysis Centre where they were analysed using modified ECG software. Results and data
generated by this analyses was sent to a central Data Centre. Similarly, data collected at the
health centres were archived at the central Data Centre. Case report forms were collected
and validated at the data centre. When required, the data centre provided blinded and
non-blinded reports to an Executive Committee and Data & Safety Monitoring Committee
respectively. A report is blinded when the identity and treatments of individual participant
are unknown.
Study co-ordination and management of drug dispensing was the responsibility of an Ad-
ministrative Centre. The administrative centre was also responsible for the servicing of
committees including ethics, adverse-events and end-points committees. The administrative
centre was where all randomisation was approved and where all pre-randomisation data was
gathered before being sent to the Data Centre. Figure 8.1 shows the study’s organisation
structure and the flow of data.
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Figure 8.1: WOSCOPS Organisational Structure and Data flow
WOSCOPS Roles: Apart from the roles committees play, other role were identified. In each
health centre, the trial physician conducted the randomisation and yearly visits. The trial
nurse carried out other visits and documented the visits, which the trial physician checked
and approved. Participants with cases that the nurse identified were referred to the trial
physician for treatment. The physician documented these cases. Signs and symptom data,
which was documented at each visit, was evaluated by the trial physician and scrutinised by
the appropriate committees. A clinical research associate from the Administrative Centre
collected detailed hospital records in cases where participants were hospitalised during the
course of the trial. These cases were documented and scrutinised by the Adverse Events
Committee, and the participant potentially withdrawn from trial medication. In some cases
these events were also reported to regulatory bodies.
8.2.2 The Prospective Study of Pravastatin in the Elderly at Risk
The Prospective Study of Pravastatin in the Elderly at Risk (PROSPER) was a study that
tested the hypothesis that the use of 40mg/day of pravastatin would reduce the risk of cardio-
vascular and cerebrovascular episodes in elderly people who have vascular disease or were at
136
8 Case Study: Clinical Trials
high risk of developing vascular disease [185, 186]. The study was double-blinded, randomised
and placebo-controlled to test this hypothesis and was tested in collaborating centres in three
countries: Cork (Ireland), Glasgow (Scotland) and Leiden (The Netherlands) over a period
of about three and half years. The studies primary endpoints were: “definite plus suspect
coronary heart disease death; definite plus suspect non-fatal myocardial infarction; and fatal
plus non-fatal stroke” [186].
PROSPER Screening and Recruitment: Between the three cities, 23,770 men and women
were invited to the first screening. At this visit, written informed consent (Appendix B) was
received from all those that came. Also a brief medical history was taken, the subject’s vital
signs were recorded and dietary advice given. Subjects that satisfied the eligibility criteria
for the next visit were invited to the second screening. At the second visit, a more detailed
medical history was taken, blood samples collected and medication checks carried out. Based
on the results of blood tests, subjects were invited to the first enrolment visit. Second blood
samples were collected for further testing at this stage and stored in the PROSPER bio-bank.
A 12-lead Electrocardiogram (ECG) was recorded and a Mini-Mental State Examination
(MMSE) along with other psychometric tests conducted. At the final enrolment visit, more
physical data was collected and more medical examinations carried out with final checks
performed by the study investigator. Subjects that satisfied all the recruitment criteria had
their consent endorsed by their general practitioner and were randomised for the study.
About 5,800 elderly men (2800) and women (3000), aged between 70 – 82 years, with plasma
cholesterol levels between 4.0 – 9.0 mmol/L were recruited to the study. It was noted that
about half of the study population had evidence of vascular disease and that the other half
were at high risk of vascular disease. The trial participants were identified after their third
visit - during a 10 week screening and enrolment period. The participants were randomised
and during the double-blinded phase, they visited the trial centres every three months.
PROSPER Functional Units: Figure 8.2 shows the distribution of the functional units
among collaborating partners. Most of the centralised units were located in Glasgow under
different organisation control: the Data Centre of the Robertson Centre for Biostatistics; the
Central lipid laboratory of the Department of Patholgical Biochemsitry at Glasgow Royal
Infirmary and the ECG laboratory of the Department of Cardiology at Glasgow Royal In-
firmary. The Bio-Bank unit was located and managed at the Leiden University Medical
Centre.
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Figure 8.2: PROSPER Organisational Structure and Data flow
The Data Centre provided the central randomisation system; statistical analyses for the
study; case report forms, data entry and validation, and appropriate reports to committees.
The central lipid laboratory provided all lipid analyses and the ECG laboratory provided all
electrocardiograph analyses for the study. All medical samples such as blood, plasma, serum
and cells, were stored at the central Bio-bank. The three administrative centres, one for each
country, managed the study centres and provided clinical support to the study nurses and
sub-investigators, e.g. general practitioners. They also managed the flow of data and trial
medication, as well servicing study committees in each country.
PROSPER Roles: The key roles identified in the PROSPER study include: the study in-
vestigator, study nurse, study sub-investigator or general practitioner (GP), clinician, statis-
tician and study committees. Study committees include executive, data and safety monitor-
ing, endpoint and publications committees. Study investigators have access to participants
medical data and history, whilst general practitioners only have access to their patients (par-
ticipant) data. Study nurses are responsible for data collection on a per centre basis, whilst
clinicians have access to data collected for laboratory analyses. Statisticians have access to
randomisation data for statistical analyses. Executive committee members have access to
138
8 Case Study: Clinical Trials
blinded reports, whilst data and safety committee have access to unblinded reports.
8.2.3 Trials Review
In order to automate the clinical trial process electronically, it is important to understand
how the process works. The trials described above helped to raise some important questions
that are common across local and multi-centre research trials. The first question is how
to invite and recruit participants for a trial. As can be seen in the above examples, this
is dependent on the endpoints (defined in Appendix B) of a given trial. However, from a
technical perspective, this is difficult to achieve as medical records required for this purpose
are locked away in individual silos, which are managed and protected by different health
organisations with their own security policies. In multi-countries trials, data privacy laws
and governmental policies of participating countries become a point of contention, most
especially as they impact keeping patient data private and confidential between countries.
Another question related to this is how to obtain and use patient consent as it affects querying
patient records for the selection and invitation stages.
The second question is how to co-ordinate the screening process across health centres. Ubiq-
uitous systems that support multi-centre screening and management would have be in place
for this purpose. However, a key challenge to this is how to authorise and enforce such a
process in an “open” and decentralised environment2. Related to this is the question of who
does what or can do what. For example, what roles are involved in a trial [177], how role
membership is determined and how these roles are mapped to local privileges. For example,
over 33,000 people work in the NHS Glasgow alone, and over 187 different IT-related roles
exist with various kinds of access to data, i.e. different clinical roles with different privileges
to IT systems and data. In a multi-centre trial, the question is how roles can be identified
and mapped to roles across different centres considering the heterogeneity of local roles and
multiplicity of actions that can be performed on data, which offers huge challenges – not
least due to the legacy systems in place.
The third question is how data is collected and stored in data centres. The question of who
has access to this data is very important. As can be seen in above examples, data centres can
be centralised or independently managed at various distributed centres. This requires access
on an ongoing basis, which raises management and data access challenges for data stored
2Open in terms of ubiquitous systems but not in terms of organisations. The nature of organisations in
the health domain can be said to be closed as access to their systems, resources and data are tightly
controlled.
139
8 Case Study: Clinical Trials
across boundaries and behind firewalls. For example, decisions need to be made about how
to allow access to these data sets to the right people for the legitimate purpose. Similarly,
end users should be unaware of the fine-grained security solutions that are restricting and
controlling their access and use of the data at different data centres. These questions present
far reaching issues in collaborative multi-centre trials, i.e. on how trust can be realised in
such security-oriented collaborative environments.
8.3 Frameworks for Clinical Trials
As each individual trial faces the same kinds of challenges for recruitment, data management
and study co-ordination, a framework supporting a multitude of trials would be extremely
beneficial. To establish a framework for clinical trials requires addressing heterogeneity, the
distribution of systems and data sets, and differences in general practices, e.g. how data is
backed up (or not) at given sites. It could be argued that the immediate challenge in the
establishment of an electronic clinical trial is how to recruit people. Key sources of data in
Scotland include national census data sets such as the General Register Office for Scotland
[187] which includes information such as the registration of births, marriages, deaths as well
as being the main sources of family history records. The access to such information, whilst
useful, does not include direct health related information which is likely to impact upon
the suitability of patients to a trial. Primary and secondary healthcare data sets are other
immediate choices. However, access to and use of, these data sets will require ethical approval.
However, in running a clinical trial, it is often the case that statistical information is enough,
e.g. the number of participants that matches a criteria, the percentage of participants that
developed an adverse-events, the length of time for an adverse-event. Thus, rather than
disclosing information on specific patients, statistical information is sufficient.
A key challenge from an IT perspective, as discussed in this thesis, is security. The risk of
data disclosure is ever present and cannot be over emphasised. Ensuring that data guardians
and health professionals with strategic roles for the management of the data protection or
confidentiality associated with patient data sets are involved in the decisions that influence
the development of such infrastructures is crucial to their success; from their development,
their acceptance, and perhaps more importantly their ethical use [126].
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8.4 Infrastructures and Data Sets Across Scotland
A framework that supports a multitudes of trials was explored in the MRC funded Virtual
Organisation for Trials of Epidemiological Studies (VOTES) project [126, 127]. The VOTES
project was a collaborative effort between e-Science, clinical and ethical research centres
across the UK, including the universities of Oxford, Glasgow, Imperial, Nottingham and
Leicester. The primary focus of VOTES was to build a clinical framework that supports a
multitude of clinical virtual organisations (VOs). As noted, VOs are a common concept in the
Grid community and provide a conceptual framework through which the rules associated with
the participants, their roles and the resources to be shared can be agreed and subsequently
enforced across the Grid. VOs in the clinical trials domain are characterised by a much
greater emphasis on security, data access and ownership. These are called Clinical Virtual
Organisations (CVOs) since they have requirements not typical to other HPC-oriented VOs
common to the wider Grid community. Rather than developing bespoke CVOs for each
individual clinical trial, VOTES intention was to develop a framework supporting a multitude
of CVOs.
Each of these CVOs was derived from the framework and adapted depending on the needs
of the trial or study being conducted. Common phases of many clinical trials and epidemi-
ological studies, and the primary focus for core components that exist in the VOTES Grid
framework were:
• Patient recruitment enabling semi-automated recruitment methods for investigators
conducting large-scale clinical studies in a variety of settings;
• Data collection incorporating data entry including intermittent connectivity to other
resources, such as trial-specific databases, code lists for adverse events and non-study
drugs3, randomisation programs and support for internationalisation in case report
forms;
• Study administration, which include detailed logging of essential documents, enabling
rapid dissemination of study documentation and by co-ordinating the transport of study
treatment and collection of study samples.
In order to develop a Grid framework for clinical trials, the potential sources of data and
services that allow access to data are first identified and analysed. Within the Scottish
element of VOTES, the NHS in Scotland are the primary source of data sets and software that
3These are drug prescriptions or treatments that participants may be undergoing besides treatments being
received on the study.
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are needed for clinical trials and epidemiological studies. The following are some identified
data sets and software in Scotland4:
• General Practice Administration System for Scotland (GPASS) [155] is the
core IT application used by over 85% of clinicians and general practitioners involved in
primary care across Scotland;
• Scottish Morbidity Records (SMR) [188] includes records relating to all patients
discharged from non-psychiatric and non-obstetric wards in Scottish hospitals (includ-
ing datasets on death, cancer and hospital admissions);
• Scottish Care Information Store (SCI Store) [154] provides a batch storage sys-
tem which allows hospitals to add a variety of information to be shared across the
community, e.g. pathology, radiology and biochemistry lab results are just some of
the data that are supported. Regular updates to SCI Store are provided by the com-
mercial supplier using a Web Services interface. Currently there are 19 different SCI
Store installations across Scotland (with 3 across the Strathclyde region alone). Each
of these SCI Store versions has their own data models (and schemas) based upon the re-
gional hospital systems they are supporting. The schemas and software are undergoing
continued development;
• NHS data dictionary [189] provides a one-stop shop for health and social care data
definitions and standards. It contains a summary of concepts for SMR datasets in-
cluding online manuals for the datasets; information on the clinical datasets in use in
healthcare and social care datasets along with the data standards upon which they are
based.
8.5 Data Standards and Distributed Security Challenges
As CVOs commonly span heterogeneous domains, a requirement for the construction of
distributed queries and aggregation, or joining, of distributed data is the development and
use of a standard method of classification or common vocabulary. This includes the naming
of the data sets themselves, the people involved and their roles (privileges) with regard to
access and use of these data sets. Preferably these data sets and roles should be standardised
so that comparisons can be made and queries joined together, for example, across a range of
clinical data sets.
4This does not imply that these data are readily available directly, but that are potentially available to
interface with.
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There are quite a few developments in standards for the description of data sets used in the
clinical trials domain. However, this can be an involved process depending on the standards
groups developing and acting on strategies put together through major initiatives such as
Health-Level 7 (HL7) [135], SNOMED-CT [190] and OpenEHR [191]. There are a wide range
of legacy data sets and naming conventions which impact upon standardisation processes
and their acceptance. The International Statistical Classification of Disease and Related
Health Problems version 10 (ICD-10) [192] is used for the recording of diseases, health related
problems and is supported by the World Health Organisation. For example, within the NHS
Scotland, ICD-10 is used along with ICD-9 and read codes in the SMR data sets.
Linking standardised data descriptions between domains so that entities and relationships
within one organisational hierarchy can be mapped or understood within the context of an-
other domain is fundamental to any framework. Once it has been established how meaningful
comparisons can be made between the differing domains, the framework can be applied to
a generic clinical trial that could run queries across heterogeneous domains, bringing back
results, richer in scope and information than if single local sites had been independently
queried.
Since information stored in clinical trials are highly sensitive, data obtained or collected must
be kept in the strictest confidence and the integrity of the data must be maintained. The exact
data should only be revealed to few roles in a trial. This was one of the most fundamental
challenges of VOTES to realise the opportunities and benefits that can be brought to clinical
trials by Grid technology, but also to maintain the high security standards that must be
strictly adhered to.
Security policies will naturally differ between local sites, which leads to several challenges
when defining and implementing policies that take into account both local and remote security
concerns. These include:
• Applying a generic policy that takes into account each local policy or links local policies
together using a standard interface;
• Dynamically enforcing these policies so that, for example, restrictions applied by a site
not providing pertinent information for a particular query will not impact on the other
sites that are involved;
• Building a trust chain that allows local sites to authenticate with a VO and therefore, by
proxy, be authenticated to access limited resources at other sites without compromising
protected resources at those sites;
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• Prevention of inference (statistical disclosure) that may arise when data from multiple
sources are joined together;
• Maintaining data ownership and enforcing ownership policies regardless of where the
data might be moved, stored or used.
8.6 Scenarios
To consider the challenges of clinical trials and provide the context in which DTN is explored,
several key scenarios are outlined and the requirements these place on secure collaborations.
The first scenario presents a representative sequence of interactions demonstrating how re-
cruitment of patients can be ethically achieved. The second and third are overview scenarios
for data collection and study management respectively.
Scenario 1 - Patient recruitment: This scenario presents a representative sequence of in-
teractions demonstrating how recruitment of patients can be ethically achieved.
1. A trials co-ordinator logs into a web portal that provides a visual interface to vari-
ous CVOs associated with a variety of clinical trials5 and/or tentative trials. After
authenticating, a personalised environment is created based upon the specific role (in
this case, that of the trials coordinator) in the CVO and the location from where they
are accessing the portal. He/She is only shown the Grid services pertinent to the ap-
propriate trials applicable to him/her, and hence the data sets associated with those
services.
2. The trial coordinator wishes to recruit patients for a leukaemia cancer trial. Patient
details are available in hospital and GPs local (and secure) databases. Emails are sent
to the GP practices or hospitals with information describing the particular trial to be
conducted, the general criteria applicable to matching patients and other information,
e.g. financial information about participating in the trial. The email contains a link to a
Grid service (Leukaemia trial 2006). The GPs and Consultants themselves are described
in policies associated with the tentative set up of a CVO, for patient identification and
recruitment.
5Of course there are scenarios which predate this one, e.g. how the CVO is established in the first instance
and the policies by which the VO will be organised, managed and enforced.
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3. It is assumed that the GP/Consultant is interested in entering into the trial, i.e. have
matching patients and they follow the attached link. The GP/Consultant may securely
access the Grid service either using a username and password combination or using
a digital certificate, e.g. X509 certificate. In this scenario, it is assumed that X509
certificates are being used.
4. After extracting more information about the trial from the portal, the GP/Consultant
decides to download a signed XML pro-form pre-designed for the trial. This is a
partially completed document describing the main information relevant to the trial as
documented in the trial protocol, where the empty fields need to be filled through a
query to the GP practice or hospital databases.
5. The signature of the signed pro-forma document is checked to ensure its authenticity
and to ensure that it has not been corrupted. If these are both true, the document
is used as the basis for an XML query against the GP practice or hospital databases
(GPASS supports such an interface). This query might, in turn, result in further
information being extracted from other resources.
6. At this point, letters describing the trial to selected patients can be automatically
produced. These are used to obtain patient consent before continuing further with the
recruitment.
7. The selected patients may then consent to participating into the trial. Note that their
letters of consent may be sent directly to the trial coordinator instead of the GP/
Consultant as described here.
8. The forms are automatically completed based on the results of the queries to the GP
practice or hospital database. The forms are digitally signed and returned to the Grid
service for that particular trial (Leukaemia trial 2006).
9. The returned and signed XML document is authenticated. Verification that the sender
(the GP/Consultant) is authorised to upload the document are made, e.g. through
checking that they were one of the GPs/Consultants contacted initially. The docu-
ment is validated to ensure its correctness, e.g. by ensuring it satisfies the associated
schema and the relevant data fields are meaningfully completed (and match the desired
constraints associated with participation in the trial). At this point, the responding
GP/Consultant is formally added to the CVO. Further follow up information may sub-
sequently be sought, e.g. monitoring information related to the selected patients.
10. The completed XML document and the associated meta-data describing the history of
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how this information was established, by whom, when, and for what trial are uploaded
and securely added to the CVO repository for this particular trial.
It is important to note in this scenario that patient consent is given (step 6) before patient
data is returned to the clinical trials team. Another important aspect here is that the GP
can decide whether this might be in the patient’s interest. The patient may ultimately say
no and hence is always involved in the consent process.
Scenario 2 - Data collection: A trial investigator submits a query for data that is generated
or stored at different study centres. The types of data to collect will include lab results,
patient medical history, trial data from trial databases, code lists for adverse events and
follow-up data. Data is expected to be pulled and aggregated from geographically distributed
locations, which include hospitals, primary care information systems, mobile centres, PDAs
and laptops. Security concerns include statistical disclosure, confidentiality, privacy and data
integrity.
Scenario 3 - Study Management: A steering or data monitoring committee member in-
vestigating the adherence/compliance of a study to an agreed protocol, requests access to
collected data and trial investigators audit trails. He/She is expected to generate reports
based on his/her observations and analysis. He/She is expected to execute statistical pro-
grams on data collected from different sources. His/Her requirements include understanding
the semantics and structure of collected data. Security requirements here include confiden-
tiality, privacy and data integrity.
8.7 Summary
This chapter reported on the various clinical trials investigations that served as the basis for
testing the DTN framework and its implementation. The chapter described how two case
studies were carried out, of various magnitudes and scale, to test and validate the security-
oriented requirements of collaborative centres in e-Health environments. The trial reviews
revealed the need for trust realisation in security-oriented collaborative environments. These
reviews formed the basis for the DTN framework, developed and applied for clinical trials.
The chapter described how the VOTES project provided a basis for exploring this research
work. Background information on VOTES was given including how it was a collaborative
effort between e-Science, clinical and ethical research centres across the UK including the
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universities of Oxford, Glasgow, Imperial, Nottingham and Leicester. The chapter described
how the aim of VOTES was to build a clinical framework that supported a multitude of
clinical virtual organisations. Among the findings from this work it was identified that a
key need exists for data standardisation and distributed security. The chapter concluded
with different scenarios tackling the issue of patient recruitment, data collection and study
management in the e-Health clinical trials domain.
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This chapter describes the DTN implementation in systems that have been developed to
support clinical trials. Two systems developed for VOTES are described and the implemen-
tation of DTN in these systems is discussed. The chapter concludes with the performance
and evaluation of the DTN implementation.
9.1 Virtual Organisations for Trials of Epidemiological
Studies
Successful e-Health research depends on access to, and use of, a wide range of clinical,
biomedical, social, geospatial, environmental and other data sets. In large scale, multi-
centre clinical studies crossing geographical and organisational divides, the need to access,
link and aggregate data securely is core. Whilst the Grid community have come up with
a wide variety of technologies that support authentication and authorisation, experiences
in the Virtual Organisations for Trials and Epidemiological Studies (VOTES) project have
shown that irrespective of the technological advances and capabilities offered by the Grid
community, data providers themselves are typically unwilling to provide direct access to
their data sets, i.e. through the penetration of the NHS firewalls, for example, from Higher
Education / Further Education (HE/FE). This is in addition to the European Union directive
that says health providers, like the NHS, should only interact with parties they have explicit
contracts with [157], e.g. informed consent [193, 194] given by a patient for his/her data to
be accessible by another party is a form of a contract. To this end, prototype systems were
developed as part of the VOTES project. These are described in the following sections.
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9.2 The VOTES Distributed Data Framework
The VOTES Distributed Data Framework (VOTES-DDF) was the first system prototype
and was based on the development of a framework for clinical trials infrastructure exploiting
Grid technologies. The architecture shown in Figure 9.1 was used for exploring scenarios of
federating data across clinical domains. The framework relies on various Grid technologies
to access data sets that are provided by data providers such as SCI store and GPASS. The
architecture relies on a multi-database to decompose queries and aggregate results, which are
made available using a Grid data service.
Figure 9.1: The VOTES Architecture [195]
The framework was modelled after the federated database system presented in [4]. Within
the framework, distributed, heterogeneous and autonomous databases could be accessed and
managed. The implementation of VOTES-DDF provided access to multiple SCI Store repos-
itories, a GPASS repository, a consent database, and a clinical trial repository containing
representative clinical trial data from the Robertson Centre for Biostatistics at the Univer-
sity of Glasgow.
Using Grid services often requires appropriate adaptors to facilitate access to, and use of,
specific data resources. The OGSA-DAI [196], a Grid data service, provides a middleware
framework for managing, accessing, and integrating relational data in XML and data held in a
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U1(R14h3) = 1
U2(R14h2) = 0
U3(R34h1) = 1
U4(R14R34h2) = 1
where 4 is a combination function
0, 1 are deny and grant respectively
Rx , hx are resources and subjects respectively
Figure 9.2: An Access Matrix model
variety of different databases such as SQL Server, Oracle, MySQL and Xindice [197]. OGSA-
DAI fits into the data federation model because it provides a collection of data components
for querying, transforming, and for delivering data in various forms.
A key aspect of the infrastructure was exploring how patient consent could be handled. The
system supported a variety of models which allowed patients to consent to their data being
used for a specific clinical trial, e.g. for a particular disease area or to be used generally. In
addition, the system also allowed for patient to opt out, i.e. their data sets may not be used
for any purpose. Numerous variations on this were also explored, e.g. the patient’s data may
only be used provided they are contacted in advance. To support this, a consent database was
established and was used when joining the federated queries undertaken to decide whether
the data should be anonymised and displayed, or not displayed at all.
The authorisation mechanism implemented an access matrix model [1] that specified bit-wise
privileges of users and their associations to data objects in the CVO. Data objects are defined
as fields, tables, views, databases and sites, for the purposes of fine-grained authorisation. As
shown in Figure 9.2, the access matrix was designed to enforce discretionary and role based
access control policies.
As shown in Figure 9.1 The federated data system was composed of four autonomous test
sites, each providing clinical data sources. The data sources exposed by these sites were
configured as data resources on an OGSA-DAI data service. Each data resource was seen as a
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node in the data federation. The OGSA-DAI data service implemented a head node model to
drive the data federation. The head node was selected based on rules or request requirements
and was responsible for decomposing queries, distributing sub-queries and aggregating query
results.
In the implementation, data federation security was achieved at both local and remote levels.
The local level security, managed by each test site, filters and validates requests based on local
policies at DBMS levels. The remote level security was achieved by the exchange of access
tokens between the designated Source of Authority (SOA) at each site. These access tokens
were used to establish remote database connections between the sites in the federation. In
principle local sites authorise their users based on delegated remote policies. This is similar
to the CAS model [64].
9.3 VOTES-DDFDTN
Authorisation based on local and remote security levels is a great challenge. The ideal
situation is when ultimate access control rests with the local resource providers - and the
VO policy simply acknowledges their autonomy. In order for this to be achieved, these roles
(or credentials) must be negotiated and exchanged between resource providers (nodes) in a
flexible and secure way. DTN facilitates this by introducing a negotiation layer, where the
local trust policies are managed by resource managers (RM) which grant or deny access to
their resources based on negotiated attributes. Needless to say in, the clinical domain, data
providers are unwilling to negotiate with parties that are not trusted directly.
The negotiation and discovery layers were implemented as GT4 services. In order to integrate
it with VOTES, the Identity Provider (IdP) connector initiated credential negotiation via
the negotiation service. The discovery service was used to realise trust-pathways, which must
be invoked whenever a new path needed to be discovered or when existing paths needed to
be revalidated.
When a user tries to access a remote data resource protected by a Service Provider (SP),
they are redirected to their home Identity Provider (IdP) through the WAYF service [198],
shown in Figure 9.3. The user is authenticated at the IdP, e.g. using an LDAP repository.
The IdP sends the SP a SAML [199] response that contains an authentication assertion. This
assertion is forwarded to the SP’s assertion consumer service, which validates the assertion.
This authentication assertion includes a temporary pseudonym for the user (the handle) that
the SP can use to reference the user. After validating the authentication assertion, the SP
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creates an attribute-token, which is sent to the user’s IdP’s attribute authority along with
the user’s handle in a SAML attribute query message. The attribute-token and the user’s
handle can then be linked together by the SP to provide the SAML-DTN support.
On receiving a SAML attribute query message, the IdP initiates the home negotiation service
using the SP’s resource token to negotiate for the user attributes. The home negotiation
service negotiates the user attributes with nodes (organisations/sites) that are next-hop nodes
to the target node (SP). Each negotiation hop includes the passing of resource tokens from
node to node, which links negotiated attributes to a resource request. Resource tokens and
negotiated attributes are stored by the target node in its Negotiated Attributes Store (NAS).
When an IdP receives negotiation responses from its next-hop nodes, it returns a SAML
attribute assertion message to the SP. If negotiations were successful, the assertion notifies
the SP to collect negotiated attributes from its NAS. The SP uses a user’s handle to retrieve a
user’s attribute-token, which is used to query a NAS for negotiated attributes. The negotiated
attributes are used to make authorisation decisions as to what the user can access. If the
negotiation fails or times out, the assertion will contain the user attributes as it normally
would, i.e. if it was not extended with DTN. In this case the user attributes may be invalid
at the SP and may not be applicable for authorisation decisions.
Figure 9.3: SAML-DTN model view
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9.4 The Virtual Anonymisation Grid for Unified Access to
Remote Clinical Data (VANGAURD)
Data providers and the key stake-holders in the health domain are acutely aware of confiden-
tiality and ethics concerns on data access and use. They will only release their data provided
it can be ensured that it is not possible to link it with other data sets that can result
in potential violations of patient confidentiality, for example, through statistical disclosure.
The Virtual Anonymisation Grid for Unified Access to Remote Clinical Data (VANGAURD)
[200, 195] is a system designed in VOTES for secure anonymised data access and linkage that
meets the needs of data providers in clinical trials. Key features of VANGAURD include:
• support for pull models of interaction with data providers such as the NHS, who do
not necessarily have to open up their firewalls and thereby become susceptible to risks
of attack;
• support of secure, anonymous data aggregation thus ensuring data integrity;
• support for ways in which data release to users undertaking research allows them to
obtain and use data in a secure, disclosure free environment where third parties cannot
access/use any released data.
VANGAURD explored a new paradigm in the way health institutions share data and collabo-
rate. VANGAURD deviates from existing approaches where clinical data systems are queried
by Grid based systems directly. Rather, a pull and push model approach where clinical data
systems pull query requests and push query results to Grid based services is offered. This
approach was created from the increasing wariness or scepticism of data providers who will
not allow direct access through their firewall to their data.
Focussing on the need for information governance, VANGAURD was designed to ensure that
data release is tightly controlled with strict compliance to confidentiality and integrity. To
achieve this, strong encryption was used whenever data was being exchanged between systems
or temporarily stored in memory. Access to datasets is controlled locally by the provider in
the VANGAURD system. That is, different parts of a resultset are controlled and secured
by the different providers, and yet it is possible for a trusted intermediary to aggregate and
link the different parts of the resultset without the possibility for further linkage.
In VANGAURD, queries are defined based on understanding of the data models of different
systems, i.e. based on the knowledge of the schema that have been made available by data
providers. If a site has joined a CVO participating in a given study, it may subsequently pull
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queries that are targeted to itself into its clinical system. Based on its local security policies,
these queries are validated and authorised, and if valid, are executed. Once executed, the
protected resultsets are pushed out to the requester.
In short, the clinical systems are completely protected from inbound Internet connections.
Rather they are based upon an outbound Internet connection model. However, the question
of security must still be explicitly satisfied, i.e. what queries are being defined by whom and
what artefacts are co-ordinating the access to, and use of, clinical data resources to users
with particular privileges. The VANGAURD system architecture is shown in Figure 9.4 and
shows the following principal components: Viewer, Guardian, Agent and Banker.
Figure 9.4: VANGAURD Component Model [195]
Viewer: The Viewer is a component run by the end-users of VANGAURD. It provide a
means by which users (researchers / investigator for example) can authenticate, submit
queries and collect query results. Viewers only interact with Agents on behalf of their users.
Only a requester can view a result, as results are encrypted with a users individual public-key.
This implies that an Agent (or any other third party) cannot read a user’s results.
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The data available to a user is dependent upon the privileges that the user possesses, e.g.
this model presents authorisation challenges as user privileges are artefacts of the user local
authority. To address the challenges, digitally signed security attributes incorporating role-
based attribute access control models are used. These security attributes are specific to a
given VO, study or trial where they have been agreed upon by all data providers. The security
attributes are then used to enforce local access decisions, i.e. data requests combined with
security attributes are used to determine the authorisation decision on access to the local
data.
Agent: Services as Agents (SaA), are the central piece of the VANGAURD model. They
act as intermediaries between other components. Agents securely collect and aggregate data
from multiple Guardians. Every data request passes through Agents to Guardians. As a
request could require results from multiple Guardians, Agents are responsible for decomposing
requests and compartmentalising requests for each Guardian to collect, authorise and execute.
Guardians deliver results to Agents and Viewers collect results meant for their users from
Agents.
In addition to the responsibility of co-ordination and secure communications between compo-
nents, an Agent is responsible for the generation of hashing keys for use by Guardian systems.
By generating and co-ordinating hashing keys, Agents are able to securely link data across
sites without direct data disclosure being made. For example, data x from Guardian A can
be linked to data y from Guardian B that are both issued a hashing key k from Agent C ,
based on the following expression:
hash(k , index (x )) ⇐⇒ hash(k , index (y))
where,
index (x ) = index (y)
Agents can be knowledge or domain or clinical trial specific. In a collaborative environment
it may well be the case that more than one Agent exists for different purposes. For example,
in a collaborative environment, like clinical trials, an Agent might exist for diabetes studies
whilst another for cardiovascular studies and another for cancer studies. In this environment,
a data provider may register with a diabetes Agent to participate in a diabetes trial and a
different Agent in cardiovascular trial. Having multiple Agents is key to VANGAURD as
Agents must be able to know which Guardian has what data available. In essence, an Agent
acts like a registry service that SP may use to advertise what services they provide. This
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registry is, however, only populated with trusted services and should only be accessible to
trusted clients. However, this trust may well have to be negotiated as is described in Section
9.5.
Guardian: Guardians represent the interface/ protection of data providers. They only in-
teract with Agents to collect user queries, authorise queries, execute queries, provide hashed
fields for joining and encrypt results using user public-keys. One or more Guardian systems
can be involved in responding to a request made by a user. A site can implement more than
one Guardian system for different categories of data or for different participation in a given
VO or study. Guardians publish their data schema along with access policies to Agents, so
that Agents are aware of what they provide and, in case of agreed attributes, user roles they
recognise.
Guardians pull queries periodically from Agents and push the results to the respective Agents.
In situations where a Guardian’s data is to be joined with data from other providers, the
Guardian uses an Agent hashing-key hashes the index that uniquely identifies a row in the
resultset that is pushed to the Agent. As the Community Health Index (CHI) and NHS
number are the most widely used indexes in the UK, hashing based on a key-based hashing
algorithm [168] make it possible to link data between multiple Guardians.
Prior to receiving any queries, a Guardian provides and periodically updates an Agent with
detailed information on the data model it has available, along with access information for
the data model, i.e. what part of the data model is accessible with what security attributes.
A Guardian is able to bind access information to a data model in situations where access
attributes have already been agreed. The access information is to enable a Viewer, instructed
by an Agent, to display different data resources available to a particular user.
Banker: The Banker is responsible for managing the monetary value placed on resources
across the whole VANGUARD system. It provides the accounting functionality for the
services rendered by Guardians. Users buy credits with which they pay for every data request
they make in VANGUARD. The purpose of the Banker is that the services rendered may be
quantified, controlled and monitored. With the Banker every requests made can be logged
and can later be audited. To achieve its goal, the Banker periodically interacts with Agents
to update Agents with credits that a user has left. It also queries Agents for users requests
so as to be able to quantify what has a user has spent.
The notion of a Banker in VANGUARD is relatively new. It echoes the notion of Accounting
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in Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting (AAA) for Grid systems [201]. It is still
not yet clear how scalable the Banker will be in a large collaborative environment. This is
an area that needs further research.
9.5 VANGUARDDTN
The sensitive nature of clinical data makes security a high priority and any method of feder-
ating this data must adhere rigourously to the local security policies that protect this data.
Whilst VANGUARD addressed the concern of data providers for secure anonymised data
access and the pull model requirement, it presents decentralised authorisation challenges as
data providers are autonomous and they control access to their resources.
Decentralised authorisation decisions can be made based on security attributes that have
been agreed for a VO or study. However, experience has shown that there is a slow uptake
for reaching agreement on security attributes between multiple parties as each party wants
attributes that are closely related or equal to their local security attributes. To address this
decentralised authorisation challenge, DTN is proposed as it not only provides a means to
negotiate security attributes for data access, it also adheres to EU directives that require
explicit contracts for data access between parties.
Figure 9.5: VANGAURD-DTN Layered Architecture
157
9 DTN Implementation in VOTES
In Figure 9.5, DTN is shown acting as an underlying framework for the VANGAURD system.
This is used within a Shibboleth-based access management environment. To understand
the role of DTN in VANGAURD a typical scenario is provided. Bob from the Robertson
Centre for Biostatistics (RCB), Glasgow, is a bio-statistician who wants to find out how many
patients aged between 40 – 50 are currently being been treated for Leukaemia across Scotland.
He logs in via a RCB Viewer (V 1) to a Leukaemia (cancer) Agent (A1). The Agent responds
with a Where Are You From (WAYF) and Bob gets redirected to RCB identity provider
(IdP) for authentication. The IdP sends a SAML authentication assertion response back
to the Agent. Bob then submits his query to the Agent and the Agent decomposes the
query and identifies that Guardians G1 and G2 that are needed for that particular query.
Periodically, G1 and G2 pull queries meant for them from A1 and both respond with a
request (authorisation) token, t1 from G1 and t2 from G2. The Agent then makes a SAML
authorisation request to Bob’s (V 1) IdP passing along request tokens t1 and t2 for Guardians
G1 and G2 respectively. In this scenario in Figure 9.5 each of the sites have components,
i.e. a negotiation service for trust negotiation. G1’s negotiation service is X ; G2’s is Y
and V 1’s is P . In the DTN network shown in Figure 9.5, other sites negotiation services
exist also, i.e. Q ,R,S ,T ,U ,V and W . The V 1 IdP invokes its negotiation service P ,
which initiates a trust negotiation with Bob’s credentials along with the request tokens t1
and t2 for target nodes X and Y respectively. On completion of trust negotiations between
P ,Q ,R,S ,T ,U ,V and W , G1 and G2 make authorisation decisions with Bob’s negotiated
attributes in their NAS. Based on the authorisation decision G1 and G2 push the query
result to A1 which joins the data on the hashed indexes and removes this joining information
to prevent further data linkage. Bob via V 1 is able to pull the linked, joined and anonymised
query result from A1.
9.6 Experiment and Evaluation
Performance study of computer networks has gained prominence because of the need to un-
derstand network protocols and the need to create more efficient network protocols. These
studies focus on protocol behaviours under numerous defined conditions owing to the many
attributes of protocols and networks, and the studies are usually carried out through sim-
ulations and/or on real networks. However, performance characteristics such as network
bandwidth, delays, queue size, traffic sources and network loads are difficult to control on
real networks, hence has led to the development of many network simulators, like NS-2 [202],
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REAL [203] and Dummynet [204]. Owing to the complexity of these simulators and the spe-
cialised requirement of DTN like policies, credentials and access management, a specialised
P2P simulator was developed. The simulator goal was to analyse the DTN model and its
associated properties in a peer-to-peer (P2P) environment.
The DTN simulator modelled like a lightweight version of NS-2 was implemented using Java.
The simulator included the following components: a scheduler, message objects, nodes, policy
evaluator, and protocols. The scheduler is responsible for threads and scheduler queues. The
scheduler keeps a queue of threads to be run and executes threads based on a schedule. A
message is either a request or a response. The scheduler using a random distribution generates
node messages. A Message or process can spun other sub messages. Nodes represent network
edges, and protocols were based on the DTN protocols and algorithm described in Chapter
7. The capability of the simulator depends on the amount of resources made available by the
host system. The topology of the simulated environment, credentials, trust contracts and
COTs were generated using a random distribution for every experiment.
Several experiments were conducted using the simulated peer-to-peer (P2P) environment.
The simulator ran on a dual core 2.4GHz Xeon processor machine with 2Gbytes of memory
running Scientific Linux OS. A P2P network of 10 to 1,000 nodes with varying degree of
overlapping COT s were simulated. In all conducted experiments similar negotiation effects
were noticed. In this section results from experiments with 2 to 14 overlapping COT s P2P
simulated network are presented, since there were no significant results for higher overlapping
COT s.
Peers in the simulator are autonomous, each with unique node properties and capabilities
such as services and resources. Each peer in the simulation had a randomly chosen number
of credentials with a maximum of 20 in their local security infrastructure, e.g. an LDAP
server. The objective behind this maximum value was to provide a highly concentrated pool
of credentials from which trust contracts may be randomly generated.
Each peer (node) has randomly chosen nodes in its COT, without any priorities or hierarchies
existing between the nodes. Randomly generated trust contracts tc: 1 ≤ tc ≤ thresh were
established between each peer and peers that exist in their COT, where thresh was a threshold
percentage of credentials in each peer LDAP server. Every peer had a deny rule for any remote
credential from non-COT peers and also for any non-tc remote credential from COT peers.
The simulator is started when the number of nodes and thresh size are initialised.
For each trust negotiation run, the simulator randomly chooses two peers Pi and Pj , i 6= j .
Pi initiates a request with its local credential, CPii for Pj ’s credentials. The request was
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made to all peers in Pi ’s COT. The result of each trust negotiation was recorded at the Pj .
10,000 negotiations runs were divided into 50 rounds for each simulation and results were
collated for each simulation. Each data point shown in the Figures 9.6 and 9.7 represents
the average of 20 simulations with different random seeds.
Figure 9.6: Number of overlapping COTs versus number of negotiations at the target node
Figure 9.6 shows the result when the number of COT involved in the trust negotiation in-
creases. The number of successful negotiations at the target fell exponentially to a very
low value. Similarly, failed negotiations at the target shows that the number of negotia-
tions reaching the target was rapidly affected by the increase in COT. A 10-30% successful
negotiation rate was recorded when the number of overlapping COT was not more than five.
The effect of N-tier delegation hops in the system was also compared. Figure 9.7 shows
the effect of number-of-hops in DTN. The results shows that regardless of the number of
negotiations, the number of negotiations occurring at a target node do not improve if the
number-of-hops (intermediary nodes) involved in negotiations is more than five hops. It
shows that successful negotiation is dependent on fewer numbers of hops. These results are
in agreement with the expected effect of COT on the system.
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Figure 9.7: Number of negotiation rounds versus number of negotiations at the target node
9.7 DTN Similarities with BGP
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is an inter-autonomous system routing protocol [205].
BGP is used to exchange routing or reachability information with other BGP systems. In-
ternet service providers (ISP) use this protocol to determine a route to a destination. Since
multiple paths to a destination can exist, BGP uses various attributes (or properties) to
determine the best route. BGP attributes include: weights, local preference, origin and
next-hop [205].
As with BGP, in a circle of trust, the number-of-hops and size of trust contracts are at-
tributes that affect the way DTN performs. The combined effect of these attributes exhibits
characteristics that are similar to BGP. DTN similarities with BGP include the following:
• Weights: e.g. number of trust contracts (TC), trust levels, and level of risks. In this
case the route with the highest weights will be preferred. Since negotiation success is
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based on the satisfiability of one or more TC at each hop, more TC s at each node
improve the negotiation success rate.
• Local preferences: if there are multiple paths to a destination, the local preference
attribute is used to select the next node for a particular destination. Local preferences
are based on the level of trust, which are often based on past negotiations with a par-
ticular node. For example, if a previous negotiation was successful through a particular
node, that node would be preferred in subsequent negotiations.
• Next-hop attribute: as nodes create trust-pathways [10] to a target node, intermedi-
ary nodes that exist in the local COT are identified as next-hops. These intermediary
nodes are then considered when a target node is to be reached.
9.8 Performance and Evaluation
The DTN implementation has been simulated and tested in a networked environment. Re-
sults from the DTN simulation [11] was discussed in Section 9.6. The main points to observe
from the simulation is that DTN performance drops exponentially as the number of overlap-
ping COT s increases. In the simulation, no limit was placed on the number of nodes that
could exist in a COT as it would not reflect reality. Placing a limit on the number of nodes
in a COT would be similar to limiting the formation of trust relationships, hence unrealistic.
The effect of overlapping COTs is related to the effect of the number-of-hops. Based on the
simulation, DTN was tested across four COTs in a networked environment. No limit was
placed on the number of nodes in each of the COTs, but they were all ultimately constrained
by the number of nodes (8 nodes) in the test environment.
The performance of the implementation was tested using several scenarios. Each of the
scenarios was tested over several runs on similar network (trust) topologies, each with a total
of 8 nodes. Each scenario explores the effect of the different amount of trust relationships, i.e.
number of nodes in a COT and the number of TCs between nodes. Each run in a scenario
involved varying the node that acts as the sender node and node that acts as the target
node. Each run also involved varying the attributes a sender node makes available for trust
negotiation.
Each node was hosted on a 2.2Ghz Celeron with 512Mbytes RAM running Linux. All nodes
had GT4 installed, which hosted both the discovery and negotiation services. Discovery
scenarios involved choosing a node to act as a source node to request the discovery of a
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target node by sending route messages to nodes that exists in its COT. On average the
discovery scenario executed in 43 seconds, ranging from 10 to 65 seconds, for all next-hop
nodes to a target node to be discovered by a source node. Negotiation scenarios involved
a source node negotiating security attributes with nodes that serve as intermediaries for a
target resource. On average the negotiation scenario ran for about 15 seconds, ranging from 5
to 25 seconds, for all negotiation responses to be received the source node. In network terms,
the run time or duration was similar to Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) round-trip
time (RTT) [206].
The reasons for the spread of duration values between discovery and negotiation processes
varies. The discovery process involves a partial multicast of messages on the network com-
pared to the negotiation process that is tightly controlled. It is a partial multicast because
not every node on the network will receive a discovery message. However, some nodes will
receive a message more than once as route requests for a target node are likely to be sent
more than once through multiple nodes. Another associated reason for the variance in dis-
covery duration is due to the fact that the process is a service that runs at the application
layer [207]. As such, it is susceptible to application errors and network load factors as nodes
are connected over the internet, and other processes running in the application layer.
The reasons for variation in negotiation duration include the network size, i.e. the number
of nodes involved in trust negotiations between a sender and target node; the number of
negotiation hops and the number of trust contracts that exist between nodes. The combined
factor of the number-of-hops and number of trust contracts has the most effect on negotiation
duration. Like the discovery service, the negotiation service is somewhat affected by the fact
that it runs in the application layer.
A property of the discovery and negotiation protocol is its time-out value. The value deter-
mines what is called the negotiation window. The initial time-out value used in DTN is based
on the performance tests and is computed to be the sum of the maximum values of discovery
and negotiation run times. Periodically nodes may re-adjust their time-out or negotiation
window value based on the maximum duration values of discovery and negotiation run times
over a period of time. More research needs to be done in this area to determine how best to
calculate the value of the discovery time and hence the time-out or negotiation window.
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9.9 Summary
This chapter discussed the implementation and testing of DTN in a clinical trial setting. The
two systems developed for VOTES were described, and the implementation of DTN in these
systems was discussed.
The first system referred to as the VOTES distributed data framework, provided access
to multiple data repository including clinical software systems such as SCI-Store. Using
Grid middleware services such as OGSA-DAI, it was shown how repositories could be made
available in a common web services-oriented format. The chapter described a key component
of the system used for patient consent, i.e. how data could be accessed and used. It discussed
how the access matrix model discussed in Section 2.2.3 was implemented as an authorisation
mechanism and showed how access policies from various sites could be combined to form a
single access policy. Another key component of the system described here was a federated
data component. This component was designed using a multi-database approach, which
supported the decomposition of queries and aggregation of query results. The chapter also
argued that the access matrix model offered only a single policy approach and hence was
not scalable. It discussed how the ideal approach would be when local resource providers
could control and enforce access to their resources in a dynamic manner. It was shown how
DTN facilitates this by introducing a negotiation layer, where the local trust policies could
be managed by resource managers that grant or deny access to resources based on negotiated
attributes.
The chapter also presented the VOTES VANGUARD system. It described how this sys-
tem provides a secure anonymised data access and linkage model that meets the needs of
data providers. In particular it was shown how VANGUARD offers a pull and push model
approach, where clinical data providers pull query requests and push query results to Grid
based services. It was described why this was necessary, as data providers are wary of al-
lowing direct access to their resources, i.e. through their firewalls. The chapter described
how VANGUARD presents an authorisation challenge, since data providers are not willing to
yield access control to a centralised authority. It was also outlined how DTN offers a solution
in that it provides an underlying trust layer that makes decentralised access control possible.
Finally the chapter presented and discussed the experimental results showing the feasibility,
performance, and application of DTN. The chapter concluded with a performance evaluation
of the DTN implementation itself.
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A couple of things have been assumed in this work. First, it assumes that a means of au-
thentication exists across e-Health domains either by federated or centralised authentication.
Key to these models, and the Grid in particular, is the notion of single sign-on. Secondly,
the thesis assumes that a limited trust relationship exists between all the nodes for federated
authentication for single sign-on to exist. This implies that nodes are able to identify and
communicate with one another from a service (application) layer perspective. The focus of
this work is mainly in the area of security attributes and credentials, which acts as a basis
for trust realisation and that are useful for authorisation decisions.
This chapter provides an overview of the work described in this dissertation. It presents the
conclusions and discussion. Finally it describes potential areas of future work.
10.1 Summary
This chapter has drawn conclusions and identified the main results of the work as a whole.
These primarily stem from the design and development of DTN and how it addresses cross-
boundary decentralised authorisation issues. This includes how the DTN approach supports
trust discovery and trust realisation in e-Health environments. This thesis contribution can
be summarised as follows:
• Inter-domain authorisation – DTN offers a novel approach to address inter-domain
authorisation challenges. By negotiating trust on the lines of linked trust contracts,
authorisation across domains is made possible.
• Access to resources across organisational boundaries – DTN offers the possibility where
a non-trusted remote entity can request resources and present credentials that are
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acceptable, useable and tenable for local authorisation decisions, to remote and initially
non-trusting resources.
• DTN proposes an alternative to the single global attribute ontology approach. Instead
of having one large security attribute ontology, many peer-to-peer security attributes
can be linked together by means of trust contracts and circles-of-trust, which are able
to offer the same benefit as large ontologies, but without the overhead of supporting
and maintaining such large ontologies.
• Multiple negotiation hops in trust negotiations – DTN introduces trusted intermediary
parties (TIP), which are similar to locally trusted third parties (LTTP) [117] in auto-
mated trust negotiation (ATN). Unlike ATN however, more than one TIP can exist in
a trust negotiation between two peers. With TIP, multiple negotiation paths can be
explored. Apart from providing richer negotiation opportunities they can also increase
the chances of a successful trust negotiation.
• The discovery and establishment of trust pathways – Different routing algorithms were
investigated in order to address trust pathway discovery and realisation requirements.
The AODV algorithm was chosen since it provided a basis for the discovery proto-
col used in DTN. This protocol makes it possible to discover and establish trust in
decentralised security-oriented environments such as e-Health.
10.2 Conclusions and Discussion
This thesis concludes that the designed and developed dynamic trust negotiation (DTN)
can address the problem of the discovery and realisation of trust between heterogeneous and
autonomous entities, thereby making decentralised authorisation possible in a collaborative
environment. DTN differs from ATN in that it introduces trust contracts and trusted in-
termediary parties. DTN provides multiple negotiation and delegation hops, which protect
credentials and access policies in collaborative environments. To support these, DTN ex-
plores pair-wise trust relationships that exist between collaborators and ways of discovering
trust pathways from these trust relationships.
ARTEMIS reviewed in Section 2.7.3 showed that by mapping a global security attribute on-
tology to local security attributes ontologies, decentralised access control can be achieved.
This thesis argues that instead of having one large security attributes ontology, many small
security attributes ontologies can be linked together to support decentralised access control.
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It was noted that large security (attributes) ontologies are difficult to create and problem-
atic to change, but the DTN approach presents an alternative to the creation, update and
management of large ontologies.
Today negotiations are largely global and static in nature and they reduce the independence
and flexibility that each partner has because they try to reach a balance between autonomy
and heterogeneity. However, DTN ensures that these negotiations do not have to be global
and do not have to be static. This is achieved by:
• collaborating members forming a pair-wise trust relationship with neighbouring part-
ners through exchanging security attributes;
• allowing collaborating members to release security attributes to other neighbouring
nodes in their COT;
• collaborating members sharing common and overlapping sets of vocabularies that en-
able resource requests to be understood and used to trigger trust negotiations;
• collaborating members implementing their own attribute-based or role-based access
control model.
The DTN model has been evaluated and analysed in Section 9.8 showing the pros and cons of
circle of trust (COT) as well as trust contracts. The model shows how trust can be discovered
and realised between non-trusting entities; how credential semantics between domains can
be mapped; and how disclosure of access control policies can be limited. In conclusion, this
thesis asserts that through DTN one can discover and realise trust in open and decentralised
e-Health environments. The contributions of this thesis include the employment of routing
protocols to trust discovery, the application of trust contracts to trust negotiation, and the
use of negotiation hops to trust realisation.
10.2.1 Collaboration Issues in e-Health
Many of the challenges facing the e-Health domain are security related, e.g. data integrity
and confidentiality. Many of these receive considerable attention since the fallout from secu-
rity events are often very damaging and severe, not only to patients but also to healthcare
providers and the government. In this regard, controlling or restricting access to sensitive
data has been a primary concern for healthcare providers. This is not to say that other
e-Health security issues such as patient identification, user authentication, data linkage and
inference are not being addressed but that access control has been of higher priority. Often
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this drive to control access to clinical data has resulted in a form of paranoia, not necessarily
in a negative sense but in an overly protective sense. This protectiveness is one reason why
data sharing between healthcare providers and researchers has been difficult. DTN has been
shown to integrate well with existing security infrastructures in supporting existing security
infrastructures since DTN makes it possible to receive and use remote security attributes for
local access control decisions, thereby providing support for healthcare providers and their
collaborators [208].
The VOTES project illustrates some of the strict security requirements imposed by health
providers like the National Health Service (NHS) towards Health research collaborations.
Healthcare providers and key stakeholders are concerned about confidentiality and ethical
issues since they directly affect the sharing of data across organisational boundaries. In
VOTES, cross-boundary concerns span from secure data access to data aggregation and
statistical disclosure. Some data providers are not willing to release data as it is feared that
data sets, once released, cannot be controlled or monitored. Similarly they are wary that
released data sets can possibly be linked with other data sets, which can result in the violation
of patient confidentially. The VANGAURD system [195] presents an approach that directly
addresses some of these issues. In Section 9.5, DTN was shown to support this approach
and provide a trust layer that makes decentralised access control possible as opposed to the
centralised VO-agreed security attributes approach.
10.2.2 Access Control in Decentralised Systems
Security in decentralised collaborative environments presents many challenges where entities
from different autonomous security domains want to access and share resources. This is
largely due to cross-boundary issues where security credentials and policies are heterogeneous,
and where yielding control to a centralised authority is not an option. Numerous cross-
boundary approaches exist today and trust negotiation remains a promising solution that is
rapidly evolving.
One approach is the use of a single access control policy that governs authorisation across
domains. This is achieved when all collaborating domains pre-negotiate and agree on privi-
leges amongst other things related to access to shared resources [64]. The implication of this
approach includes having detailed knowledge and agreements on global policies potentially
comprising numerous local policies; global policy maintenance; initial integration effort and
the static relationship between security attributes and credentials. A variation of this ap-
proach is delegating authority to remote entities to assign privileges to their (remote) users
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[126].
Another approach to the single policy paradigm is based on a shared ontology. In this
approach collaborating parties agree on a security ontology that describe roles or privileges
that could be used for collaboration. Each collaborating party maps their local security
ontology to the shared ontology in order to access remote resources. Remote parties in turn
map the shared security ontology onto their local security ontology in order to grant or
deny access to their resources [5, 6]. Associated implications of this approach are the high
maintenance cost and initial integration effort associated with the global ontology.
Dynamic trust negotiation (DTN) presented in this thesis is an optimal approach that maps
remote security credentials into local security credentials through trust contracts, thereby
bridging the gap currently making decentralised security policies for multi-domain collabo-
ration so difficult. This approach requires a minimal knowledge of global policies. DTN also
has a low maintenance cost over global policies since it allows feasible relationships between
security attributes/credentials to be dynamically established and subsequently enforced.
10.2.3 Trust Issues – Discovery and Realisation
Trust is the underlying phenomenon of any security system. Most security systems are
designed using security policies, which define and describe what, how and where it is trusted.
Trust is built on the concept of limiting expected behaviour [16]. It is associated with an
assurance measurement. The level of confidence in limiting behaviour within a security policy
determines the level of assurance.
From an authorisation point of view, trust is often currently viewed from a digital credential
perspective, that is what should be the expected behaviour of an entity in possession of the
digital credentials and security attributes asserted by a remote entity. This implies security
attributes are related to trust and more importantly that they are defined with respect to
behaviour in a context, e.g. a domain. To be able to tackle trust from an authorisation point
of view in a decentralised and open environment, one has to be able to understand, relate
and map security attributes across domains.
DTN addresses this as the issue of trust realisation from a security attribute perspective.
Through trust contracts, mutual agreements on security attributes among potentially sus-
picious entities utilising circles of trust and pair-wise relationships, allow foreign security
attributes to be mapped to local security attributes. So instead of mapping a local attribute
ontology to a global attribute ontology, local attributes can be related and combined together,
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and be used in a more flexible and scalable manner.
Another aspect to the trust issue in decentralised and open environments is how to discover
trust relationships. Some work has been done in this area [102, 104, 107] and [107] in
particular describes a discovery algorithm that can be used to relate credentials that are
needed for authorisation decisions in decentralised environments. However, the algorithm
requires that related credentials are reachable or accessible. DTN on the other hand works
in cases where related credentials are not reachable but where credential relationship’s exist.
This is particularly necessary in e-Health environments where accessibility is restricted to
a trusted few. The DTN discovery algorithm is based on a vector routing algorithm and
works within a contained and security driven environment, where nodes only reach out to
neighbouring nodes, e.g. nodes in their circle of trust.
10.2.4 Credential Equivalence
One of the key challenges in this work is with regard to credential equivalence, i.e. how
to relate or map between security attributes that are asserted with credentials, especially
where a security attribute may originate, be asserted and issued by foreign and autonomous
entities. This is essential to address the cross-boundary challenges of collaboration. In this
thesis, three equivalence rules were presented: a transitive rule; a linking delegation rule,
and an intersection rule. The transitive rule says that if domain A trusts domain B and B
trust domain C then A trust C . Without such transitivity, it would be difficult to link trust
contracts across domains.
The linking of trust contracts is the basis of DTN’s negotiation and delegation hops. The
linking delegation rule when applied to trust contracts and security credentials, i.e. asserted
security attributes, makes it possible to deduce relationship that may exist between creden-
tials. This rule says that credential B is equivalent to credential A if B can be deduced to
relate to credential C .
The intersection rule says that credential equivalence may be deduced based on commonality
between a collection of credentials. The rule highlights the relationship that may exist be-
tween a credential and a collection of credentials. It is based on these rules that DTN trust
contracts are modelled. These rules are derived from work done by [107, 108, 119] for trust
negotiation.
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10.2.5 Security policies
Four types of security policies were presented for DTN to support trust negotiation across
boundaries. These policies show that potential risks associated with the notion of transitive
trust can be reduced if properly designed and implemented. These policies ensure that trust
contracts, which themselves are sensitive and can be regarded as privileged information,
could be protected with policies and thus used to control the invocation of trust contracts.
Similarly, by using these policies, privileges associated with trust contracts can be constrained
based on who is invoking the contract and for whom it is being invoked. With these policies
in place, various aspects of trust negotiation can subsequently be controlled and managed.
This includes controlling the release of credentials to remote domains in scenarios where the
domain is participating in a trust negotiation as an intermediary domain.
10.2.6 Trust Negotiation and Policy Disclosure
Automated trust negotiation (ATN) is one of the promising approaches in the area of trust
realisation, which enables entities including strangers to access resources across autonomous
boundaries through the iterative exchange of credentials. Various negotiation strategies have
been proposed for ATN to protect credential disclosure during trust negotiations. However,
in some domains such as e-Health, not all entities are willing to negotiate credentials or
disclose access control policies directly to strangers irrespective of trust negotiation strategies.
Instead they prefer to negotiate and disclose sensitive information only to those entities
existing within a trust community (or in dynamic trust negotiations (DTN) through a circle
of trust). DTN proposes a model that not only protects sensitive information from disclosure
but also reduces semantic issues that exist with credentials in decentralised systems. In the
model, the process whereby trusted intermediary parties act as links between communities
and provide multiple negotiation and delegation hops, as well as protects the disclosure of
access control policies including for example a service provider’s access control policies.
However, as the network reaches a stable state, i.e. as DTN factors settle over a period of
time, the property of the system where access policies are protected can be inadvertently
reduced. As factors such as trust contracts and COT memberships remain constant over
time, foreign entities will be able to infer a service provider’s access control policies. For
example, in the e-Health environment, there is possibility that existing trust-contracts over
a period of time can be inferred since TCs may not change or be revoked. This is especially
so in the Health domain where organisations maintain their existing trust relationships and
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nodes are not joining, leaving or changing their COT.
10.3 Potential Areas of Future Work
There are several areas where the work described in this thesis could potentially be further
investigated or improved.
Firstly, the discovery protocol described in this thesis was implemented as a service in the
application layer [207]. This allowed it to integrate with existing systems and subsequently
share data between them. However, it could well be the case that the discovery protocol
described in section Section 7.2 would be able to function in the network layer as well, as
is common with routing protocols. This would require investigations in the network layer
space, but hypothetically in addition to feasibility acceptability challenges, it could present
other challenges such as trust information which would subsequently need to be shareable
with services that exist in the application layer.
Secondly, other ways of improving performance of the framework described in this thesis
would need to be studied. Two ways of possibly improving the performance of DTN in-
cludes peer clustering and exploiting RBAC hierarchies. Peer clustering is similar to route
reflector techniques of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) systems. This method would entail
investigating ways of grouping nodes together and having super nodes, which potentially
will reduce the number of hops needed for trust discovery and realisation. Another way of
possibly improving DTN negotiation performance could be through RBAC role hierarchies
[42]. The effect of role hierarchies was not investigated in this thesis but potentially, if it can
be applied in the context of trust contracts, it could significantly increase trust negotiation
success rates.
Thirdly, more work needs to be done in the area of credential equivalence. Much work is
currently being done in the area of matching and mapping domain ontologies [125, 6]. How-
ever, in the area of security attributes and contexts, applying ontological mapping techniques
would be challenging since ontology mapping and matching techniques are still largely in their
infant stages. In addition, the health domain is itself complex with a vast and wide spec-
trum of roles and access attributes applicable to myriad resources. It will offer significant
challenges and case studies for ontology mapping. Work is on-going in this area in the health
domain with significant progress in the areas of clinical ontologies like SNOMED-CT [190]
and ICD-10 [192].
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Fourthly, further work is needed in the area of trust realisation so as to reduce to a barest
minimum the security challenges of decentralised collaborations. A more robust algorithm
could be developed or investigated to achieve this since the approach described in this thesis
is not the only method and arguably is not the best method in all situations. In order to
achieve this, trust would need to be defined and modelled differently. It may also have to be
combined with advances made in the area of ontologies for credentials used in access control.
A hybrid combination of DTN and ontologies exploiting push and pull of security attributes,
or combining centralised and federated DTN approaches are other areas of applications re-
search. Finally the work described here has focused largely on the e-Health domain. The
application of DTN could equally be applied to other domains which would likely raise their
own requirements that would need to be addressed.
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A XACML Policies for DTN
This appendix provides an outline and example of some of the XACML policies that have
been implemented to explore DTN.
A.1 Extract 1
An extract of a policy that allows an Investigator to select records from PatientMaster table
only with obligations that log access and anonymise certain fields is shown in Figures A.1 –
A.2:
A sample request for the policy shown in Figures A.1 – A.2 is shown in Figure A.3. The
request when evaluated will yield a deny response as Richard is not allowed to perform insert
or update on PatientMaster.
A.2 Extract 2
An extract of a trust-contract policy that allows a remote Investigator to perform select but
not insert or update a PatientMaster table is shown in Figures A.4 – A.5:
A sample request for the policy shown in Figures A.4 – A.5 is shown in Figure A.6. The
request when evaluated will yield a permit response.
A.3 Extract 3
The XACML extract shown in Figures A.7 – A.10, show how two mutually exclusive trust-
contract policies can be resolved.
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A sample request for the policy shown in Figures A.7 – A.10 is shown in Figure A.11. The
request when evaluated will yield a deny response as both roles are mutually exclusive.
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Figure A.1: An extract of a local policy with obligation – Part 1
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Figure A.2: An extract of a local policy with obligation – Part 2
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Figure A.3: A request from a local entity
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Figure A.4: A trust-contract policy - Part 1
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Figure A.5: A trust-contract policy - Part 2
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Figure A.6: A trust contract invocation request
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Figure A.7: Mutually exclusive trust-contract policies - Part 1
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Figure A.8: Mutually exclusive trust-contract policies - Part 2
184
A XACML Policies for DTN
Figure A.9: Mutually exclusive trust-contract policies - Part 3
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Figure A.10: Mutually exclusive trust-contract policies - Part 4
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Figure A.11: A request that causes multiple-path conflict
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B Background to Clinical Trial Phases
and Terminology
This appendix briefly summarises the typical phases associated with clinical trials, as well as
identifying and defining terms often used.
B.1 Clinical Trial Controls and Terms
Institutional Review Boards (IRBs): An IRB is typically a group of doctors, lawyers,
clergymen and community members, formed to review and approve applications for clinical
trials in order to protect the rights of participants. The IRB monitors trials and also has the
authority to terminate on-going trials if the need arises.
Data and Safety Monitoring Boards (DSMBs): A DSMB is an independent body that
reviews trial data and suggest changes to the trial process / design if necessary, e.g. dis-
advantages to one or more groups in a trial. DSMBs can also recommend that a trial be
terminated.
Informed Consent: This is a voluntary consent given by a trial participant to show that
they have understood all aspects of their involvement in a particular trial including potential
risks. An informed consent form is provided by the research body and submitted to the IRB
for review. The participant must be provided with information such as trials purpose, risks,
treatment, benefits, procedures schedule and IRB contact information.
Placebo: Is a substance used as a trial medication which has no effect because it does not
contain an active drug. It is used for comparison with an active drug to see if the active
agent (drug) has any effect on the diseases. Not all trial use placebos.
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Randomisation: Is a selection process where participants are anonymously divided into two
groups to decide who gets an active agent or a placebo.
Double-blinded: Is a trial that use placebos, where neither the research staff nor trial
participant knows which treatment is assigned to which individual in the trial.
Open-label: Is a trial where both the research staff and participant know which treatment
is assigned to which individual in the trial.
Endpoints: Is a measurable event or outcome that can be used to determine if the trial or
study is of benefit. A clinical trial endpoints are usually defined in the study objectives.
B.2 Clinical Trials Phases
Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV
Question Is it a safe
treatment?
Does the
treatment
work?
What are the
long-time re-
sults in lots of
people?
What is the
long-term
safety infor-
mation?
Volunteers Usually healthy
volunteers or
without com-
parison groups
Volunteers
with the
disease or
condition
Both healthy & non-healthy volunteers
Goal Determine best
doses
Get safety in-
formation
More infor-
mation on
safety and
effectiveness
Get informa-
tion about
very rare side
effects
Risk High Risk Moderate
Risk
Low risk Very low risk
Length Few
weeks/months
About a year Up to three
years
May last for
years
Size Few partici-
pants
About a hun-
dred partici-
pants
Some hun-
dreds of
participants
Some thou-
sands partici-
pants
Time Before drug approval After drug
has been
approved
Table B.1: Common Phases of Clinical Trials
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Descriptions
In the codes shown, comments are started with a ‘%’ symbol. A statement or assertion
ending with a ‘.’ is a clause. Each term in the parenthesis of a clause is either a constant
or logical variable. A logical variable is a term that begins with a capital letter. “A clause
is a head literal followed by an optional body. A body is a comma separated list of literals.
A clause without a body is called a fact, and a rule when it has one. The punctuation ‘:-’
separates the head of a rule from its body. A clause is safe if every variable in its head occurs
in some literal in its body” [166].
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C.1 assign(e.p(~e), r , p)
Require: e, e1:entity; acts:actions; obj :resource; r , r1:role; obj (acts):permission
Ensure: assign(e.p(~e), r2, obj (acts))← can activate(e, r2), has invoked(e2, r),
obj (acts) ∈ permissions(r)
where p(~e) is can activate(e, r2)
% Let e, e2 be instances of Entity
% Let o,n be instances of Object
% Let a, b, c be instances of Action
% Let q , r , r2 be instances of Role
% Let assign(U ,V ,W ,X ,Y ,Z ) represent assign(e2.p(~e), r , obj (acts))
can activate(e, r2). % assertion communicated as a credential
has invoked(e2, r). % transient assertion
permissions(r , b,n). % local assertion to represent n(b) ∈ permissions(r)
permissions(q , a,n). % local assertion to represent n(a) ∈ permissions(q)
permissions(q , a, o). % local assertion to represent o(a) ∈ permissions(q)
permissions(r , a, o). % local assertion to represent o(a) ∈ permissions(r)
permissions(r , b, o). % local assertion to represent o(b) ∈ permissions(r)
permissions(r , c, o). % local assertion to represent o(c) ∈ permissions(r)
assign(U ,V ,W ,X ,Y ,Z ) :- can activate(U ,X ), has invoked(V ,W ), permissions(W ,Y ,Z ).
assign(V ,V ,W ,W ,Y ,Z ) :- can activate(V ,X ), permissions(W ,Y ,Z ).
Note: U ,V ,W ,X ,Y ,Z are logical variables. The rule implies U is assigned W and granted
permission Z (Y ) if a can activate(V ,X ) or has invoked(V ,W ) assertion can be evaluated to be
true.
C.2 can activate(e, r)
Require: e:entity; r :role
Ensure: can activate(e, r)← has activated(e, s)
% Let e, f be instances of Entity
% Let r , s be instances of Role
has activated(e, r).
has activated(e, s).
has activated(f , r).
can activate(X ,Y ) :- has activated(X , s), Y = r .
Note: X ,Y are logical variables. The rule implies X can activate Y if X has already activated
role s. Usually can activate(X ,Y ) is an assertion made by a domain and passed on to other
domains in form of a credential.
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C.3 has activated(e, r)
Require: e:entity; r :role
Ensure: has activated(e, r)← isActive(e, r)
% Let d, e, f be instances of Entity
% Let r, s be instances of Role
isActive(e, r). % mapping function that returns true if entity e has role r active
isActive(f , s).. % mapping function that returns true if entity f has role s active
isActive(f , r).. % mapping function that returns true if entity f has role r active
isActive(d , s).. % mapping function that returns true if entity d has role s active
has activated(X ,Y ) :- isActive(X ,Y ).
Note: X ,Y are logical variables. The rules implies X has already activated Y if in the domain
for Y , X has role Y active.
C.4 can invoke(e1.p(~e), r)
Require: e1:entity; r , r1:role
Ensure: can invoke(e1.p(~e), r)← tc(r1) % where can activate(e, r1) represents p(~e)
% Let e be instance of Entity
% Let r, s be instances of local Role
% Let r1, r2 be instances of remote Role
contract(r1, r). % mapping function that returns true if tc(r1) = r
contract(r2, r).
can activate(e, r1). % assertion communicated as a credential
can invoke(Z, X, Y) :- contract(X, Y), can activate(Z, X).
Note: Z ,X ,Y are logical variables. The rule implies Z can invoke contract for Y if Z has an
assertion that says it can activate X and if a trust contract exists that map X to Y .
C.5 has invoked(e, r)
Require: e:entity; r :role
Ensure: has invoked(e, r)← inSession(e, r)
% Let e, f be instances of Entity % Let r, s be instances of Role
inSession(e, r). % mapping func. returns true if e had invoked contract for r in the current session
inSession(f, s).
has invoked(X, Y) :- inSession(X, Y).
Note: X ,Y are logical variables. The rules implies X has activated Y if in the current session
state, X had invoked contract for Y .
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C.6 can release cred(e1, e2.p(~e), e3)
Require: e1, e2, e3:entity; r :role
Ensure: can release cred(e1, e2.p(~e), e3)← has invoked(e3, r), cot(e1, e2)
Or can release cred(e1, e2.p(~e), e3)← has activated(e3, r), cot(e1, e2)
% Let canReleaseCred(X ,Y ,R,Z ) represent can release cred(e1, e2.p(~e), e3
% where can activate(e1, r) represents p(~e)
has invoked(e3, r).
has activatde(e3, r).
cot(e1, e2).
can release cred(X ,Y ,R,Z ) :- has activated(Z ,R), cot(X ,Y ).
can release cred(X ,Y ,R,Z ) :- has invoked(Z ,R), cot(X ,Y ).
Note: X ,Y ,R,Z are logical variables. The rule implies R can be released to Y if Y is in X ’s
COT and if a has activated(Z ,R) or has invoked(Z ,R) assertion can be evaluated to be true.
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